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Coalition Configurations and the Public Good Index

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Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After

Abstract

In games with a coalition structure, players organize themselves in coalitions that form a partition of the set of players. In games with a coalition configuration, the union of the coalitions is the whole set of players but the coalitions are not necessarily disjoint. We introduce two variations of the Public Good Index for games with a coalition configuration, provide axiomatic characterizations of them, and apply them to a real world example.

This chapter has been published in Homo Oeconomicus 29 (3), 2012.

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Acknowledgments

This research received financial support from the Academy of Finland, as well as from Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Spain) and FEDER through Projects ECO2008-03484-C02-02, MTM2011-27731-C03-02 and MTM2011-27731-C03-03 and from Xunta de Galicia through Project INCITE09-207-064-PR.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Statistics and Operations Research, University of Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain

    José M. Alonso-Meijide & Balbina Casas-Méndez

  2. Department of Statistics and Operations Research, University of Vigo, Vigo, Spain

    M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro

  3. Institute of SocioEconomics, University of Hamburg, Germany and Public Choice Research Centre, Turku, Finland

    Manfred J. Holler

  4. Public Choice Research Centre, Turku, Finland

    Andreas Nohn

  5. Institute of SocioEconomics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

    Andreas Nohn

Authors
  1. José M. Alonso-Meijide
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  2. Balbina Casas-Méndez
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  3. M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
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  4. Manfred J. Holler
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  5. Andreas Nohn
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to José M. Alonso-Meijide .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of SocioEconomics, Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, Hamburg, 10146, Germany

    Manfred J Holler

  2. Department of Political Science and, Contemporary History, University of Turku, Assistentinkatu 7, Turku, 20014, Finland

    Hannu Nurmi

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Alonso-Meijide, J.M., Casas-Méndez, B., Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G., Holler, M.J., Nohn, A. (2013). Coalition Configurations and the Public Good Index. In: Holler, M., Nurmi, H. (eds) Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_16

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35928-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35929-3

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