Abstract
Failures in component-based systems are generally due to unintended or incorrect interactions among the components. For safety-critical systems, we may attempt to eliminate unintended interactions, and to verify correctness of those that are intended. We describe the value of partitioning in eliminating unintended interactions, and of assumption synthesis in developing a robust foundation for verification. We show how model checking of very abstract designs can provide mechanized assistance in human-guided assumption synthesis.
This work was supported by National Science Foundation Grant CNS-0720908. The content is solely the responsibility of the author and does not necessarily represent the official views of NSF.
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Rushby, J. (2012). Composing Safe Systems. In: Arbab, F., Ölveczky, P.C. (eds) Formal Aspects of Component Software. FACS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7253. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35743-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35743-5_2
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