Abstract
We present a new model for polling-booth voting: the voter enters the polling booth with a computational assistant which helps her verify that her vote is correctly recorded. The assistant interacts with the voting system while the voter votes on the machine in the polling booth. We present an independently-verifiable, coercion-resistant protocol based on this model. Unlike all other independently-verifiable protocols, this one is completely paperless and does not require the voter to perform any tasks outside the polling booth. We provide property definitions, rigorous claims and a description of a prototype.
This work was done while Nandi was at The George Washington University. Florescu, Rubio and Vora were supported in part by NSF Award No. 0831149, Nandi and Zagórski by NSF Award No. 0937267. Zagórski was also supported in part by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education scientific project - grant N N206 369839.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Adida, B. Advances in Cryptographic Voting Systems. PhD thesis, MIT (2006)
Adida, B.: Helios: Web-based Open-Audit Voting. In: Usenix Security Symposium (2008)
Benaloh, J.: Simple verifiable elections. In: USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2006)
Benaloh, J.: Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station auditing. In: USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2007)
Benaloh, J., Tuinstra, D.: Receipt-free secret-ballot elections. In: ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (1994)
Carback, R., Chaum, D., Clark, J., Essex, A., Mayberry, T., Popoveniuc, S., Rivest, R.L., Shen, E., Sherman, A.T., Vora, P.L.: Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy. In: Usenix Security Symposium (2010)
Chaum, D.: Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections. IEEE Security and Privacy, 38–47 (January/February 2004)
Chaum, D., Carback, R., Clark, J., Essex, A., Popoveniuc, S., Rivest, R.L., Ryan, P.Y.A., Shen, E., Sherman, A.T., Vora, P.L.: Scantegrity: End-to-end verifiability for optical scan elections. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security: Special Issue on Electronic Voting 4(4), 611–627 (2009)
Chaum, D., Popoveniuc, S., Vora, P.L.: eTegrity and ePunchscan. In: NIST End-to-End Voting Systems Workshop (October 2009), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/e2evoting/documents/papers/Popoveniuc_PaperlessVoting.pdf
Even, S., Goldreich, O., Lempel, A.: A randomized protocol for signing contracts. Communications of the ACM 28(6), 637–647 (1985)
Juels, A., Catalano, D., Jakobsson, M.: Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In: Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES (2005)
Katz, J., Lindell, Y.: Introduction to Modern Cryptography. Chapman & Hall/CRC (2008)
Kelsey, J., Regenscheid, A., Moran, T., Chaum, D.: Attacking Paper-Based E2E Voting Systems. In: Chaum, D., Jakobsson, M., Rivest, R.L., Ryan, P.Y.A., Benaloh, J., Kutylowski, M., Adida, B. (eds.) Towards Trustworthy Elections. LNCS, vol. 6000, pp. 370–387. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Neff, C. A.: Practical high certainty intent verification for encrypted votes (2004)
Popoveniuc, S., Hosp, B.: An Introduction to PunchScan. In: Chaum, D., Jakobsson, M., Rivest, R.L., Ryan, P.Y.A., Benaloh, J., Kutylowski, M., Adida, B. (eds.) Towards Trustworthy Elections. LNCS, vol. 6000, pp. 242–259. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Ryan, P.Y.A.: A variant of the Chaum voter-verifiable scheme. Tech. Rep. CS-TR: 864, School of Computing Science, Newcastle University (2004)
Sandler, D.R., Derr, K., Wallach, D.S.: VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system. In: USENIX Security Symposium (2008)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Chaum, D. et al. (2012). Paperless Independently-Verifiable Voting. In: Kiayias, A., Lipmaa, H. (eds) E-Voting and Identity. Vote-ID 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7187. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-32746-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-32747-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)