Abstract
This paper presents MarkPledge3 (MP3), the most efficient specification of the MarkPledge (MP) technique. The MP technique allows the voter to verify that her vote is correctly encrypted with a soundness of 1 − 2− α, with 20 ≤ α ≤ 30, just by performing a match of a small string (4-5 characters). Due to its simplicity, verifying the election public data (vote encryptions and tally) in MP3 is 2.6 times faster than with MP2 and the vote encryption creation on devices with low computational power, e.g. smart cards, is approximately 6 times better than the best of the previous MP specifications (MP1 and MP2).
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Joaquim, R., Ribeiro, C. (2012). An Efficient and Highly Sound Voter Verification Technique and Its Implementation. In: Kiayias, A., Lipmaa, H. (eds) E-Voting and Identity. Vote-ID 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7187. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_7
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