Abstract
Individual verifiability is the ability of an electronic voting system to convince a voter that his vote has been correctly counted in the tally. Unfortunately, in most electronic voting systems the proofs for individual verifiability are non-intuitive and, moreover, need trusted devices to be checked. Based on the remote voting system JCJ/Civitas, we propose Trivitas, a protocol that achieves direct and end-to-end individual verifiability, while at the same time preserving coercion-resistance.
Our technical contributions rely on two main ideas, both related to the notion of credentials already present in JCJ/Civitas. Firstly, we propose the use of trial credentials, as a way to track and audit the handling of a ballot from one end of the election system to the other end, without increased complexity on the voter end. Secondly, due to indistinguishability of credentials from random values, we observe that the association between any credential and its corresponding vote can be made public at the end of the election process, without compromising coercion-resistance. The voter has more intuitive and direct evidence that her intended vote has not been changed and will be counted in the final tally.
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Bursuc, S., Grewal, G.S., Ryan, M.D. (2012). Trivitas: Voters Directly Verifying Votes. In: Kiayias, A., Lipmaa, H. (eds) E-Voting and Identity. Vote-ID 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7187. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_12
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