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Abstract

As has been pointed out above, hybrid financial instruments are economically and legally challenging. Moreover, within the given tax rules, there is a sharp distinction for the tax consequences of the remuneration derived from debt capital and the one derived from equity capital from a cross-border corporate tax perspective. Hence, guidelines for the assessment of the corporate taxation of hybrid financial instruments and of their classification are presented in the following. They also need to be considered in terms of an optimal design of tax rules.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    There are numerous variable criteria that can be used to evaluate tax rules. With respect to the goals of taxation, revenue promotion, redistribution of wealth in society and regulation of economic activity are also accepted criteria for evaluating tax policy. Cf. e.g. Avi-Yonah 2006: 1 et seq.; Avi-Yonah 2011: 2 et seq.

  2. 2.

    Cf. inter alia Neumark 1970: 67 et seq.; McLure 1975: 535; Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 216 et seq.; Schwinger 1994: 40; Fleming et al. 2001: 350; German Council of Economic Experts 2010: 216; Rosen and Gayer 2010: 352 et seq., 375.

  3. 3.

    Cf. Arndt and Fischer 2008: 74; Jacobs et al. 2011: 101.

  4. 4.

    Cf. e.g. García Novoa 2010: 568, with further reference.

  5. 5.

    Cf. Phelps 1965: 32; European Commission 2001: 26; Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 34 et seq. For the origin of this fundamental principle see inter alia García Novoa 2010: 568.

  6. 6.

    Cf. e.g. Zuber 1991: 47 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Elschen and Hüchtebrock 1983: 253 et seq.; Schwinger 1992: 12 et seq.; Zuber 1991: 48 et seq.; Rosen and Gayer 2010: 330 et seq.; German Council of Economic Experts 2010: 211.

  8. 8.

    Cf. Wagner 1989: 265; Schwinger 1992: 13.

  9. 9.

    Cf. Elschen and Hüchtebrock 1983: 255; Elschen 1991: 100 et seq.; Zuber 1991: 49; Wagner 1992: 3 et seq.; Spengel 2003: 224; Homburg 2010: 239 et seq.

  10. 10.

    Cf. Elschen and Hüchtebrock 1983: 253; Elschen 1991: 106; Schneider 2002: 97; Spengel 2003: 223 et seq.

  11. 11.

    Cf. Haller 1981: 221 et seq.; Zuber 1991: 48; Schneider 1992: 193; Schwinger 1992: 13.

  12. 12.

    Cf. Zuber 1991: 51 et seq.

  13. 13.

    Cf. Elschen 1991: 108 et seq.; Zuber 1991: 77 et seq.; Spengel 2003: 226; Homburg 2010: 240.

  14. 14.

    Cf. European Commission 2001: 26; Shackelford et al. 2010: 784.

  15. 15.

    Besides, decisions on different types of fixed asset investment and organizational forms are the most important neutrality considerations. Cf. Kiesewetter 1997: 25; Wagner 1995: 742 et seq.; Homburg 2010: 240 et seq. Here, the financial neutrality is solely crucial because the scope of this thesis lies on the analysis of financial transactions, whereas the decision between fixed asset and financial investments (which concern especially the investment neutrality) has already been taken. Cf. also Spengel 1998: 349; Heinhold 1999: 77.

  16. 16.

    Cf. Sect. 2.1.

  17. 17.

    Edgar 2000: 33.

  18. 18.

    Cf. Schwinger 1994: 48; Maiterth and Sureth 2006: 227; German Council of Economic Experts 2010: 211; Homburg 2010: 251 et seq. See critically Schneider 2009: 127 et seq. Subsequently and in this context, retained earnings are not relevant, since the focus lies on external financing.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Homburg 2010: 251 et seq.

  20. 20.

    Cf. Mintz 1996: 35. See already Sect. 2.3.11. An approach for such concept could be the so-called allowance for corporate equity (ACE). Cf. Sect. 5.3.33. See also Wenger 1983: 207 et seq.; Schmidt 1998; Spengel 2003: 328 et seq.; de Mooij and Devereux 2011: 95 et seq.

  21. 21.

    Cf. Kemmeren 2001: 523.

  22. 22.

    Cf. Musgrave 1969: 108 et seq.; Spengel 2003: 230 et seq.

  23. 23.

    Cf. Sect. 2.3.2.

  24. 24.

    Cf. Zuber 1991: 115; Spengel 2003: 230 et seq.

  25. 25.

    Cf. European Commission 2001: 27; Göydeniz 2011: 665; Jacobs et al. 2011: 18 et seq. As widely accepted in international tax literature, the focus is on global economic welfare. But disregarding overall efficiency and focusing merely on national economic welfare, the concept of national neutrality should not be waived as an option for taxation. Cf. Schön 2009: 83 et seq. See further also Graetz 2001: 277 et seq.; Shaviro 2009: 128 et seq.

  26. 26.

    Cf. Vogel 1988a: 311 et seq.; European Commission 2001: 27; Graetz 2001: 270 et seq.; Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 35; Terra and Wattel 2008: 172 et seq.; Panayi 2007: 6 et seq.; Mason 2010: 130 et seq.; Thompson 2010: 341 et seq., 357 et seq., 359 et seq.; Jacobs et al. 2011: 18 et seq.

  27. 27.

    Cf. Homburg 2010: 303 et seq.; Thompson 2010: 359 et seq. However, the application of the production efficiency theorem faces criticism. First, and in an international context, the production efficiency theorem may only be relevant if national government budgets are linked through a system of international transfers. Cf. Keen and Wildasin 2004. Second, and already mentioned in a national context, production efficiency is based on the assumption that governments can tax pure profits. In practice, this seems unrealistic.

  28. 28.

    Cf. Mason 2010: 130.

  29. 29.

    Cf. Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 29 et seq.; Thompson 2010: 350.

  30. 30.

    Cf. Graetz 2001: 320 et seq.; Schön 2009: 68 et seq.

  31. 31.

    Cf. Couzin 2002: 259 et seq.

  32. 32.

    Cf. Schön 2009: 69 et seq. See also Shaviro 2010: 34 et seq. For empirical observation of (limited) headquarter mobility see Voget 2010.

  33. 33.

    Cf. also Chorvat 2000: 843 et seq.; Schön 2009: 79 et seq.

  34. 34.

    Cf. Thompson 2010: 364; Becker and Fuest 2011: 96 et seq. Regarding the impact on social cost of complexity, see Sect. 3.1.5.

  35. 35.

    Cf. Griffith et al. 2010: 957; Harris 2010: 575. See further also Harris 1996: 504 et seq. For instance, Germany generally imposes a per-country limit on the tax credit. Cf. e.g. Jacobs et al. 2011: 45 et seq. In contrast, the United Sates impose an overall limit on the tax credit. Cf. e.g. Rosen and Gayer 2010: 453; Suringa 2010: 781 et seq.

  36. 36.

    Cf. Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 44 et seq.; Griffith et al. 2010: 957 et seq.; Mason 2010: 132; Thompson 2010: 340 et seq., 348 et seq.

  37. 37.

    Cf. also Thompson 2010: 350 et seq.

  38. 38.

    Cf. also Schön 2009: 268 et seq.; Mason 2010: 132.

  39. 39.

    Cf. Vogel 1988a: 311 et seq.; European Commission 2001: 27; Graetz 2001: 270 et seq.; Spengel 2003: 235; Terra and Wattel 2008: 174 et seq.; Panayi 2007: 9 et seq.; Mason 2010: 130 et seq.; Jacobs et al. 2011: 18 et seq.

  40. 40.

    Cf. Homburg 2010: 305 et seq.; Mason 2010: 132; Jacobs et al. 2011: 32 et seq. But, capital import neutrality ensures international consumption neutrality. Cf. Homburg 2010: 306 et seq. However, production efficiency is generally preferred over consumption efficiency. Cf. Musgrave 1992: 181 et seq.; Tanzi 1995: 77 et seq.; Bird and Wilkie 2000: 82.

  41. 41.

    Cf. Musgrave 1987: 206; Schreiber 1994: 241; Fohr 2001: 69 et seq.

  42. 42.

    Cf. Mason 2010: 130.

  43. 43.

    Regarding the increasing integration of today’s economies around the world see e.g. Tanzi 1995; Gordon and Hines 2002: 1937 et seq.; Griffith et al. 2010: 917 et seq.

  44. 44.

    Cf. Schön 2009: 80 et seq.

  45. 45.

    Cf. Gale 2002: 1503; Fleming and Peroni 2005: 221 et seq.; Kleinbard 2007: 68 et seq. Regarding the impact on social cost of complexity, see Sect. 3.1.5. Furthermore, an exemption system is more vulnerable for transfer pricing abuse. Cf. Kleinbard 2007: 78; Thompson 2010: 357.

  46. 46.

    Cf. also Graetz 2001: 261 et seq.; Schön 2009: 80 et seq.

  47. 47.

    Cf. Schreiber 1994: 241.

  48. 48.

    Cf. in more detail Desai and Hines 2004: 955 et seq.; Hines 2009: 269 et seq.; Griffith et al. 2010: 926, 953 et seq.

  49. 49.

    Cf. Schön 2009: 81; Shaviro 2009: 127 et seq.; Griffith et al. 2010: 926, 953 et seq. See critically Fleming et al. 2008: 50 et seq.

  50. 50.

    Cf. also Desai and Hines 2004: 956.

  51. 51.

    Cf. Kane 2006: 53 et seq.

  52. 52.

    Cf. Schön 2009: 82.

  53. 53.

    Fleming et al. 2009: 1091.

  54. 54.

    Cf. Ault and Bradford 1990: 40; Giovannini 1990: 483; McLure 1992: 15; Devereux and Pearson 1995: 1659 et seq.; Graetz 2001: 299; Shaviro 2009: 127; Becker and Fuest 2011: 93 et seq. For a different view see Vogel 2002: 4 et seq.

  55. 55.

    Cf. Schön 2009: 82. Furthermore, and from a theoretical perspective, source-based taxation is actually the preferred implementation, if encouraging the most productive ownership pattern is the overriding goal, since it would maximize the after-tax profitability of domestic firms. Cf. Griffith et al. 2010: 954 et seq.

  56. 56.

    Cf. Green 1993: 31 et seq.; Graetz and O’Hear 1997: 1037 et seq.

  57. 57.

    Cf. Schön 2009: 82; Griffith et al. 2010: 955. See also Göydeniz 2011: 665 et seq.

  58. 58.

    Cf. Musgrave 1969: 254; Graetz 2001: 272; Brauner 2003: 291 et seq.; Mason 2010: 131. See further also Graetz and O’Hear 1997: 1108 et seq.; Graetz and Warren 2006: 1217.

  59. 59.

    Cf. Roin 2001: 545 et seq.; Schön 2009: 78 et seq.

  60. 60.

    Cf. Roin 2002: 61 et seq.; Schön 2009: 78 et seq.

  61. 61.

    Cf. Sect. 2.3.2.

  62. 62.

    Even a partial harmonization limited to a certain number of jurisdictions might not be an option since neutrality is not globally achieved. Cf. Schön 2007: 1076 et seq.

  63. 63.

    Cf. Avi-Yonah 2007: 9; OECD 2012: 11. See also Jacobs et al. 2011: 3 et seq. For an explanation of the higher relevance of concern for double taxation as compared to non-taxation see Ring 2002: 106.

  64. 64.

    Cf. Avi-Yonah 2007: 8 et seq. See also Rosembuj 2011: 160 et seq. With regard to the evidence of international agreement on this principle see Avi-Yonah 2000b: 169 et seq.; Rosenbloom 2000: 164.

  65. 65.

    Cf. also Avi-Yonah 2006: 1 et seq.; Avi-Yonah 2011: 2 et seq.; Comolet-Tirman 2011: 201.

  66. 66.

    Cf. Musgrave 1969: 115 et seq.; Klapdor 2000: 176.

  67. 67.

    Cf. Fleming et al. 2001: 301 et seq., 306; Peters and Snellaars 2001: 13 et seq.; Kemmeren 2001: 523. See also Gribnau 1999: 3, 27 et seq.; Meussen 1999: 174.

  68. 68.

    Cf. Lindahl 1958: 220; Harris 1996: 2 et seq.; Gribnau 1999: 3; Jachmann 2000: 9; Fohr 2001: 75; Kaplow 2008: 404; Rosen and Gayer 2010: 12.

  69. 69.

    Cf. Tipke 1981: 9; Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 218; Kirchhof 2002: 10; Rosen and Gayer 2010: 357, 366 et seq.

  70. 70.

    Cf. Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 219; Tipke and Lang 2008: 88. See also Neumark 1970: 121 et seq.; Haller 1981: 14 et seq.; Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 31 et seq. See also for France: Marchessou 1999: 80; Comolet-Tirman 2011: 201; for Germany: Vogel and Waldhoff 1999: 99 et seq.; for Italy: Pietro 1999: 118 et seq.; for Spain: Rasembuj 1999: 157 et seq. An alternative equity dogma relies on the benefit principle and implies that the tax burden is distributed among taxpayers in proportion to the benefits received by each individual taxpayer from public goods and services. While justifying source taxation by the fact that income is generated in the source country because of whose economic and legal system, the variety of government expenditures to which this concept can be applied is comparatively limited due to difficulties from the general characteristics of public goods and services. Consequently, most revenues of taxes may not be derived on a received benefits basis. Cf. Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 219 et seq.; Neumark 1970: 42 et seq.; Fleming et al. 2001: 333 et seq.; Müller 2001: 7 et seq.; Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 33. For a more detailed and controversial discussion see also Sect. 3.1.3.

  71. 71.

    Cf. Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 219 et seq.; Tipke and Lang 2008: 88 et seq. The question of the theoretical merits of whether the ability to pay principle is applicable to corporations is controversially discussed, but outside the scope of this study. From a practical perspective, it is at least widely recognized that a corporation’s income must be accepted as a proxy for the ability to pay of their shareholders. Cf. Ault and Bradford 1990: 55; Gammie 1994: 628 et seq.; Harris 1996: 102 et seq.; Fleming et al. 2001: 319 et seq., with many further references; Graetz 2001: 302. See also Schön 2009: 89. For a more comprehensive debate see Hey 1996b: 119; Musgrave 2001: 1339; Tipke and Lang 2008: 91 et seq. The practical perspective corresponds with the acceptance of corporate taxation as such. Cf. Sect. 2.3.1.

  72. 72.

    For the (un)usefulness of this refinement see generally Kaplow 1989: 139 et seq.; Musgrave 1990: 113 et seq.; Kaplow 1992: 191 et seq.; McDaniel and Repetti 1993: 607 et seq.; Fleming et al. 2001: 301.

  73. 73.

    Cf. Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 223; Müller 2001: 9; Tipke and Lang 2008: 88 et seq.; Rosen and Gayer 2010: 356 et seq., 366 et seq.

  74. 74.

    Cf. Seligman 1970: 4; Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 223; Tipke and Lang 2008: 88 et seq.; Kraft 1991: 41 et seq.; Lang and Englisch 2006: 256.

  75. 75.

    Cf. Wagner 1992: 4 et seq.

  76. 76.

    Cf. Schön 2005a, 129; Rosen and Gayer 2010: 375.

  77. 77.

    Cf. Weisbach 1999: 1640.

  78. 78.

    Cf. inter alia Ault and Arnold (2010): 198. See also Fleming et al. 2001: 315. See also Rosenzweig 2007: 575, for the United States.

  79. 79.

    In an ideal world, each taxpayer’s individual utility would be measurable and the tax rules would maximize total utility. Since utility is not possible to measure, income has been considered to be a reasonable proxy for utility. Cf. Buehler 1946: 251; Kaufmann 1998: 162 et seq. An alternative indicator of economic ability to pay is consumption, which can be defined as the difference between income and savings. Cf. Bradford 1986; Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 224 et seq.

  80. 80.

    Cf. Kaldor 1965: 29; Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 224; Kraft 1991: 47 et seq.

  81. 81.

    Cf. Tipke and Lang 2008: 245 et seq.; Schön 2009: 74.

  82. 82.

    Cf. Fleming et al. 2001: 302, 308; Schön 2009: 72.

  83. 83.

    Cf. Green 1993: 29 et seq., 70 et seq.; Graetz and O’Hear 1997: 1034; Fleming et al. 2001: 324 et seq.; Fleming et al. 2008: 59 et seq.; Schön 2009: 72; Jacobs et al. 2011: 19 et seq.

  84. 84.

    Cf. Musgrave and Musgrave 1972: 68 et seq.; Homburg 2010: 287 et seq.

  85. 85.

    Cf. Schaumburg 1995: 130; Schön 2009: 73.

  86. 86.

    Cf. also Jacobs et al. 2003: 219.

  87. 87.

    Cf. Musgrave and Musgrave 1972: 68 et seq.; Homburg 2010: 290 et seq.; Fleming et al. 2001: 311 et seq., 352; Schön 2009: 73. See also Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 31 et seq. For a territorially defined ability to pay with respect to the different taxation of non-residents among each other see Shay et al. 2002: 93 et seq.

  88. 88.

    Cf. Zuber 1991: 90; Fohr 2001: 80; Schön 2009: 72.

  89. 89.

    Cf. Green 1993: 31 et seq.; Graetz and O’Hear 1997: 1037 et seq.

  90. 90.

    Cf. Gordon 1992: 1159 et seq.; Schön 2009: 82 et seq., with further references; Rosen and Gayer 2010: 313 et seq.

  91. 91.

    Cf. Graetz and O’Hear 1997: 1102 et seq. See also Graetz 2001: 299. Regarding the corporate income tax, see Vann 2010b: 298 et seq. However, there is a tendency to even lower source taxes on mobile activities, in particular on financial (portfolio) income. Cf. Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 26 et seq., 36 et seq.; Vann 2010b: 298 et seq., 305.

  92. 92.

    Cf. Graetz and O’Hear 1997: 1037 et seq.; Avi-Yonah 2007: 12; Schön 2009: 82 et seq.

  93. 93.

    Cf. Schön 2009: 73.

  94. 94.

    Cf. Flick 1961: 172; Schaumburg 1998: 600. For this result in a domestic context see Pohmer 1988: 143 et seq.; Seer 1996: 335; Beiser 2000: 416.

  95. 95.

    Cf. Lang and Englisch 2006: 260. See also President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board 2010: 56 et seq.

  96. 96.

    Cf. Wagner 1992: 4 et seq.

  97. 97.

    Cf. Elschen 1991: 102; Tipke and Lang 2008: 89.

  98. 98.

    Cf. also Kaufmann 1998: 202.

  99. 99.

    Cf. Avi-Yonah 2000a: 1614; Rosenzweig 2007: 576 et seq.

  100. 100.

    Cf. Musgrave 1969: 130; Musgrave and Musgrave 1972: 70 et seq.; Fohr 2001: 75; Schäfer 2006: 79.

  101. 101.

    For a comprehensive discussion of the justification of the source entitlement see Kaufmann 1998: 183 et seq. One other interpretation is based on the idea that an allocation of taxing rights should be used as an instrument of income redistribution among countries adjusting an unequal historical marginalization in the world. Cf. Brown 2002: 46 et seq.; McDaniel 2003: 265 et seq.; Rosenzweig 2007: 577. However, this interpretation is not accepted at the international level. Cf. Zuber 1991: 107 et seq. See also Graetz 2001: 300 et seq. Another interpretation again is based on the theory of economic rents and on the idea that cross-border transactions generate higher benefits than those which would be obtained from simply domestic transactions justifying a jurisdiction’s taxing right as an economic rental charge for the use of its market and resources. However, this interpretation suffers from implementation difficulties in practice, since the precise level of the rental charge is difficult to isolate and to measure. Cf. Zuber 1991: 110; Musgrave and Musgrave 2000: 315. This approach is often used as a justification of an equitable allocation of taxes directed specifically to economic rents on mineral resources, rather than rents on the use of a capital market. Cf. Vann 2010b: 301.

  102. 102.

    Cf. Vogel 1988b: 398; Zuber 1991: 110 et seq.; Schaumburg 1995: 129 et seq.; Shay et al. 2002: 90 et seq.

  103. 103.

    Cf. Vogel 1988b: 394 et seq.; Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 219 et seq.; Zuber 1991: 108 et seq.; Musgrave and Musgrave 2000: 315; Graetz 2001: 298; Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 33.

  104. 104.

    Cf. Musgrave and Musgrave 1972: 71; Vogel 1988b: 398; Zuber 1991: 111; Avi-Yonah 1997: 520 et seq.; Fohr 2001: 77 et seq.; Graetz 2001: 298.

  105. 105.

    This principle can be invoked by both the source country and the residence country, since income-generating activities will be in both jurisdictions. Cf. Musgrave 2002: 52.

  106. 106.

    Cf. Ault and Bradford 1990: 30 et seq.; Schreiber 1994: 243; Graetz 2001: 299; Schreiber 2005: 46.

  107. 107.

    Cf. Musgrave 1984: 234; Oestreicher 2000: 179.

  108. 108.

    Cf. Oestreicher 2000: 180.

  109. 109.

    Cf. Schreiber 2004: 221.

  110. 110.

    Cf. Oestreicher 2000: 184; Jacobs et al. 2003: 220; Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 84.

  111. 111.

    Cf. Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 52, with further references.

  112. 112.

    See also Kemmeren 2001: 434; Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 84 et seq.

  113. 113.

    Cf. Kemmeren 2001: 434; Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 84 et seq. See also Vann 2010b: 298. Concerning the issue with regard to the interposition of a financial intermediary in a third jurisdiction, see Kemmeren 2001: 435.

  114. 114.

    For a more differentiated picture distinguishing between active and passive income see Avi-Yonah 2007: 11 et seq.

  115. 115.

    Cf. Graetz 2001: 298; Schön 2009: 75 et seq.

  116. 116.

    Cf. Hellwig 2003: 589 et seq.; Schön 2009: 75 et seq.

  117. 117.

    Cf. Tanzi 1995; Gordon and Hines 2002: 1937 et seq. Moreover, it is often difficult to differentiate the share of the tax revenue that is used for the public goods and services provided from the share that is used to foster distributive objectives of a tax system. Cf. Kaplow 2008: 179 et seq., 403 et seq.

  118. 118.

    Cf. Green 1993: 29 et seq.; Fleming et al. 2001: 333 et seq.; Musgrave 2002: 52.

  119. 119.

    Cf. Schön 2009: 76. See also Fleming et al. 2001: 315; Shay et al. 2002: 99 et seq.

  120. 120.

    Cf. Schön 2009: 77.

  121. 121.

    Nevertheless, corporate residence as a decisive factor suffers from being elective. Cf. Sect. 3.1.1.

  122. 122.

    Cf. Arnold 2003: 104. For the traditional view see e.g. Bird and Wilkie 2000: 91 et seq.; Owens 2002: 127 et seq.

  123. 123.

    For a more meaningful overview on the rationale of tax competition see Avi-Yonah 2000a: 1573 et seq.; Schön 2000: 90 et seq.; Edwards and de Rugy 2002: 63 et seq.; Schön 2003; Wilson and Wildasin 2004: 1065 et seq.; Hines 2007: 268 et seq.; Griffith et al. 2010: 935 et seq.

  124. 124.

    Cf. Schön 2009: 77 et seq., with further references.

  125. 125.

    Cf. Schindel and Atchabahian 2005: 26 et seq., 36 et seq.; Vann 2010b: 298 et seq., 305. See also Schön 2009: 77 et seq. Nevertheless, corporate income tax as an indirect source tax on shareholders has remained notably resilient. Cf. Vann 2010b: 298 et seq. See also Graetz and O’Hear 1997: 1102 et seq.; Graetz 2001: 299.

  126. 126.

    Cf. Bird and Wilkie 2000: 91 et seq.; Owens 2002: 127 et seq.

  127. 127.

    Cf. Sect. 4.2.11; Lang 1991: 54; Lang 1997: 27 et seq.; Schuch 2004: 220; Bell 2005: 19; Panayi 2007: 28; Vogel and Lehner (2008): 145 et seq.; Palma 2010: 624; Jacobs et al. 2011: 65; OECD 2011: 58.

  128. 128.

    For the widely agreed income tax treaties between EEA, EU and OECD Member States see Table A.1 in the annex.

  129. 129.

    Cf. Lang 2004: 81; Panayi 2007: 23 et seq., 29 et seq.; Jankowiak 2009: 28 et seq.; Holmes et al. 2011: 227.

  130. 130.

    Cf. Panayi 2007: 23 et seq.; 31 et seq.; Holmes et al. 2011: 227, 235. Regarding other, unambiguous opinions cf. Lang 2004: 86 et seq.

  131. 131.

    Cf. Vogel and Lehner (2008): 128; Jacobs et al. 2011: 83 et seq.

  132. 132.

    Cf. Wassermeyer 1996: 155 et seq.; Arndt and Fischer 2008: 74 et seq.; Vogel and Lehner (2008): 183; Helminen 2009: 24, with further references; Jacobs et al. 2011: 101.

  133. 133.

    Cf. Arndt and Fischer 2008: 116; Helminen 2009: 10. Regarding the history of the EU, see Arndt and Fischer 2008: 7 et seq.; Helminen 2009: 9. Other supranational organizations are particularly the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, for the NAFTA region all aspects of direct and indirect taxes have been carved out. Cf. e.g. Cockfield 2005: 46 et seq. The WTO law is also restrained in that it is mostly focused on indirect taxes. Cf. Arndt and Fischer 2008: 241 et seq.; Schön 2004a: 283 et seq. Regarding the limited impact of WTO law on direct taxes, see e.g. Lang et al. 2005.

  134. 134.

    As 19 EU Member States are also OECD Member States, the EU law should not be overlooked by the further developments at the level of the OECD.

  135. 135.

    Cf. Hey 1996b: 80; Terra and Wattel 2008: 18; Helminen 2009: 3 et seq.; Jacobs et al. 2011: 98 et seq.; Lampreave 2011: 17 et seq. See also Spengel 2003: 245 et seq. This is in compliance with the subsidiarity principle established in Art. 5 TEU. Cf. Hey 1996b: 80; Spengel 2003: 245; Helminen 2009: 4, 13; Jacobs et al. 2011: 98 et seq. In contrast, the harmonization of indirect taxes is required (Art. 113 TFEU). See e.g. Terra and Wattel 2008: 10 et seq., 119 et seq., 267 et seq.

  136. 136.

    Cf. among others ECJ of 14/02/1995 (C-279/93, Schumacker), ECR 1995: I-225 Para. 21, 26; ECJ of 11/08/1995 (C-80/94, Wielockx), ECR 1995: I-2493 Para. 16; ECJ of 27/06/1996 (C-107/94, Asscher), ECR 1996: I-3089 Para. 36; ECJ of 13/12/2005 (C-446/03, Marks&Spencer), ECR 2005: I-10837 Para. 29; ECJ of 06/03/2007 (C-292/04, Meilicke), ECR 2007: I-1835 Para. 19; ECJ of 29/03/2007 (C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz), ECR 2007: I-2647 Para. 21. See also Vogel 2005: 373 et seq.; Helminen 2009: 4.

  137. 137.

    Cf. e.g. Zanotti 2004: 500; Helminen 2009: 9 et seq., 17 et seq. See further Jacobs et al. 2011: 205 et seq.

  138. 138.

    Cf. e.g. Arndt and Fischer 2008: 116 et seq. In the case of purely domestic transactions the fundamental freedoms do not apply. Cf. Wouters 1999: 105; Reimer 2000: 53.

  139. 139.

    Cf. Vanistendael 2005: 530; Helminen 2009: 10, 55 et seq., 60 et seq.

  140. 140.

    Cf. also Terra and Wattel 2008: 44. By contrast, the other fundamental freedoms like the free movement of goods (Art. 28–37 TFEU), persons (Art. 45 TFEU) and services (Art. 59–62 TFEU) as well as the right of residence (Art. 21 TFEU) and prohibition of any discrimination on the grounds of nationality (Art. 18 TFEU) can be neglected in this context. For details see Herzig and Dautzenberg 1997: 10; Cordewener 2004a: 9; Rödder 2004: 1629; Lang 2007a: 22 et seq.; Arndt and Fischer 2008: 132 et seq.; Terra and Wattel 2008: 44 et seq.; Helminen 2009: 60 et seq.

  141. 141.

    Cf. inter alia ECJ of 28/01/1986 (270/83, Avoir Fiscal), ECR 1986: 273 Para. 13; ECJ of 29/04/1999 (C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scotland), ECR 1999: I-2651 Para. 22; ECJ of 13/04/2000 (C-251/98, Baars), ECR 2000: I-2787; ECJ of 13/12/2005 (C-446/03, Marks&Spencer), ECR 2005: I-10837. See also Terra and Wattel 2008: 55 et seq.; Helminen 2009: 73 et seq.

  142. 142.

    Cf. Kischel 2000: 453; Terra and Wattel 2008: 57 et seq.; Helminen 2009: 93 et seq.

  143. 143.

    Cf. Dautzenberg 2000: 723 et seq.; Jaeger 2001: 73 et seq.; Helminen 2009: 93 et seq.

  144. 144.

    Cf. the guiding ruling of the ECJ of 30/11/1995 (C-55/94, Gebhard), ECR 1995: I-4165 Para. 37. See also ECJ of 12/12/2006 (C-446/04, FII GL), ECR 2006: I-11753 Para. 127 et seq. Even though the freedom of free movement of capital should be interpreted more narrowly as to solely prohibit obstacles to flows concerning investments in which decision of the business activity cannot be influenced. Cf. Schön 2005b: 508 et seq. But see also Helminen 2009: 106 et seq., with further references.

  145. 145.

    Cf. e.g. ECJ of 23/10/2008 (C-157/07, Krankenheim Ruhesitz), ECR 2008: I-8061 Para. 24.

  146. 146.

    Cf. e.g. ECJ of 24/05/2007 (C-157/05, Holböck), ECR 2007: I-4051 Para. 28 et seq.; Terra and Wattel 2008: 54 et seq., 59 et seq.; Helminen 2009: 108; Jacobs et al. 2011: 214 et seq. Regarding the differences of both freedoms in detail, see Jacobs et al. 2011: 207 et seq., with further references; Panayi 2008a: 571 et seq.

  147. 147.

    Cf. Cordewener 2004b: 8; Helminen 2009: 10. See also ECJ of 21/09/1999 (C-397/07, Saint Gobain), ECR 1999: I-6161; ECJ of 11/03/2004 (C-9/02, De Lasteyrie du Saillant), ECR 2004: I-2409; ECJ of 13/12/2005 (C-446/03, Marks&Spencer), ECR 2005, I-10837; ECJ of 14/12/2006 (C-170/05, Denkavit), ECR 2006: I-11949.

  148. 148.

    However, discriminations and restrictions may be justified in certain cases. Cf. Hinnekens 2004: 73 et seq. See also in more detail Terra and Wattel 2008: 49 et seq.; Helminen 2009: 111 et seq.; Jacobs et al. 2011: 218 et seq. An exemplary justification is the prevention of tax evasion. Cf. e.g. ECJ of 16/07/1998 (C-264/96, ICI), ECR 1998: I-4695 Para. 26; Helminen 2009: 115 et seq. Another exemplary justification is the need to safeguard the coherence of the tax system. Cf. e.g. ECJ of 28/01/1992 (C-204/90, Bachmann), ECR 1992: I-249; ECJ of 28/01/1992 (C-300/90, Commission/Belgium), ECR 1992: I-305; Helminen 2009: 123 et seq.

  149. 149.

    Cf. Cordewener 2004b: 1 et seq.; Helminen 2009: 49 et seq., 57; Jacobs et al. 2011: 208 et seq. See also inter alia ECJ of 28/01/1986 (270/83, Avoir Fiscal), ECR 1986: 273; ECJ of 13/07/1993 (C-330/91, Commerzbank), ECR 1993: I-4017; ECJ of 11/08/1995 (C-80/94, Wielockx), ECR 1995: I-2493; ECJ of 12/06/2003 (C-234/01, Gerritse), ECR 2003: I-5933.

  150. 150.

    Cf. inter alia ECJ of 27/09/1988 (81/87, Daily Mail), ECR 1988: 5483; ECJ of 30/11/1995 (C-55/94, Gebhard), ECR 1995: I-4165; ECJ of 15/05/1997 (C-250/95, Futura-Singer), ECR 1997: I-2471; ECJ of 16/07/1998 (C-264/96, ICI), ECR 1998: I-4695; ECJ of 13/04/2000 (C-251/98, Baars), ECR 2000: I-2787; ECJ of 14/12/2000 (C-141/99, AMID), ECR 2000: I-11619; ECJ of 21/11/2002(C-436/00, X and Y), ECR 2002: I-10829; ECJ of 11/03/2004 (C-9/02, De Lasteyrie du Saillant), ECR 2004: I-2409; ECJ of 13/12/2005 (C-446/03, Marks&Spencer), ECR 2005, I-10837. See also Jaeger 2001: 61 et seq.; Arndt and Fischer 2008: 124.

  151. 151.

    Cf. Cordewener 2004b: 1 et seq.; Helminen 2009: 57 et seq.; Jacobs et al. 2011: 211. Regarding restrictions by other member states see ECJ of 15/05/1997 (C-250/95, Futura-Singer), ECR 1997: I-2471. Regarding restrictions by their domestic member states see ECJ of 27/09/1988 (81/87, Daily Mail), ECR 1988: 5483; ECJ of 16/07/1998 (C-264/96, ICI), ECR 1998:I-4695; ECJ of 13/04/2000 (C-251/98, Baars), ECR 2000: I-2787; ECJ of 14/12/2000 (C-141/99, AMID), ECR 2000: I-11619; ECJ of 11/03/2004 (C-9/02, De Lasteyrie du Saillant), ECR 2004:I-2409; Schön 2004b: 31. In the event that an obstacle is cause by one member state but is neutralized completely by another member state (e.g. on the basis of tax treaty concluded), this obstacle exists no longer. Cf. e.g. ECJ of 08/11/2007 (C-379/05, Amurta), ECR 2007: I-9569 Para. 26 et seq.

  152. 152.

    Cf. Terra and Wattel 2008: 68 et seq., 158 et seq.; Vanistendael 2008: 97; Helminen 2009: 51 et seq.

  153. 153.

    For an unambiguous example see ECJ of 16/07/2009 (C-128/08, Damseaux), ECR 2009: I-06823.

  154. 154.

    Cf. e.g. ECJ of 01/02/1996 (C-177/94, Perfili), ECR 1996: I-161; ECJ of 12/05/1998 (C-336/96, Gilly), ECR 1998: I-2793 Para. 44; Terra and Wattel 2008: 68 et seq.; Schön 2009: 94; Helminen 2009: 51 et seq.; Eden 2010: 612 et seq.; de Wilde 2010: 284. Of other opinion see Beiser 2009: 236 et seq.

  155. 155.

    Cf. de Wilde 2010: 284, with further references. See also Helminen 2009: 51 et seq. Examples for profit shifting are transfer prices with respect to the intra-group use of intellectual property. Cf. e.g. de Wilde 2010: 284.

  156. 156.

    Cf. e.g. de Wilde 2010: 284.

  157. 157.

    Cf. inter alia ECJ of 12/05/1998 (C-336/96, Gilly), ECR 1998: I-2793 Para. 24, 30; ECJ of 13/12/2005 (C-446/03, Marks&Spencer), ECR 2005: I-10837 Para. 45 et seq.; ECJ of 18/07/2007 (C-231/05, Oy AA), ECR 2007: I-6373 Para. 51 et seq. Cf. also Helminen 2009: 23, 51 et seq.; Schön 2009: 94; Dutch Ministry of Finance 2011: 28.

  158. 158.

    Cf. ECJ of 05/07/2005 (C-376/03, D.), ECR 2005: I-5821 Para. 59 et seq. Cf. also Weber 2005: 429 et seq.; Lang 2007b: 195 et seq.; Helminen 2009: 25 et seq., with many further references; Schön 2009: 94.

  159. 159.

    Since the abovementioned fundamental freedoms take precedence over the secondary EU law, the latter has to be compliant with primary EU law. Cf. inter alia ECJ of 18/09/2003 (C-168/01, Bosal), ECR 2003: I-9409 Para. 43; ECJ of 23/02/2006 (C-471/04, Keller Holding), ECR 2006: I-2107 Para. 45. See also Rödder 2004: 1633; Schön 2004c: 297; Zanotti 2004: 500 et seq.; Schön and Schindler 2004: 576; Eberhartinger and Six 2007: 215 et seq.; Arndt and Fischer 2008: 73, 119.

  160. 160.

    Cf. Helminen 2009: 17 et seq.; Lampreave 2011: 17 et seq.

  161. 161.

    Cf. Council Directive, 90/435/EEC: 6, as lastly amended by Council Directive, 2003/123/EC: 41.

  162. 162.

    Cf. Council Directive, 2003/49/EC: 49.

  163. 163.

    Cf. in more detail Sect. 4.2.12. See also Eberhartinger and Six 2009: 12; Helminen 2009: 129 et seq., 151 et seq.; Jankowiak 2009: 31; Bundgaard 2010a: 443.

  164. 164.

    Cf. IBFD 2005: 5 et seq.; Six 2008: 57 et seq.; Jacobs et al. 2011: 171 et seq., 180 et seq.; IBFD 2011a: Chap. 7.

  165. 165.

    The Saving Directive (2003/48/EC: 38, as lastly amended by Council Directive, 2006/98/EC: 129) will not be taken into consideration for the further analysis, since its objective and scope of application – it solely affects interest payments to individuals – deviate from those of the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the EU Interest and Royalties Directive as well as the scope of this thesis. Regarding the EU Saving Directive see in more detail, e.g., Panayi 2009: 179 et seq.

  166. 166.

    Cf. ECOFIN Council 1998. The EU Code of Conduct for business taxation does not address harmful tax competition outside the EU and only affects the EU Member States. Cf. also Lodin 2000: 214 et seq.

  167. 167.

    Cf. Lodin 2000: 214; Kalloe 2011: 504 et seq. See also Pinto 1998: 388. A similar initiative comes also from the OECD, but with a different scope as tax havens as such are primarily targeted. Cf. Osterweil 1999: 198 et seq. For this OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition see inter alia OECD 1998: 7 et seq.; Osterweil 1999: 198 et seq.; McLure 2005: 90 et seq.

  168. 168.

    Cf. also Lampreave 2011: 17 et seq.

  169. 169.

    Cf. Pinto 1998: 388 et seq.; Osterweil 1999: 199 et seq.; Carlos Santos 2000: 419; Hendricks 2000: 413; Lodin 2000: 214; Parly 2000: 407; Bogaerts 2005: 357; Fontana 2006: 329; Terra and Wattel 2008: 198 et seq.; European Commission 2011b: 10. As merely a political commitment, the EU Code of Conduct is part of the European ‘soft law’. Cf. Szudoczky and van de Streek 2010: 274; European Commission 2011b: 10; Lampreave 2011: 17 et seq.; Martínez Bárbara 2011: 273. Cf. contra Meussen 2002: 157 et seq.

  170. 170.

    Cf. also Ellis 2000: 414.

  171. 171.

    Cf. Pinto 1998: 389; Osterweil 1999: 199; Lodin 2000: 214; Nijkamp 2001: 147 et seq.; Bogaerts 2005: 357; Terra and Wattel 2008: 198; Szudoczky and van de Streek 2010: 274 et seq.; Kalloe 2011: 504; Lampreave 2011: 17 et seq.

  172. 172.

    Cf. Pinto 1998: 389; Osterweil 1999: 199; Hamaekers 2000: 398; Nijkamp 2001: 148; Terra and Wattel 2008: 198; Szudoczky and van de Streek 2010: 275; Kalloe 2011: 504; Lampreave 2011: 17 et seq.

  173. 173.

    Cf. Code of Code of Conduct Group 2008: 5, 14; Conduct Group 2008b: 10 et seq.; Code of Conduct Group 2010: 8; Kalloe 2011: 512 et seq.

  174. 174.

    Cf. Szudoczky and van de Streek 2010: 274; Lampreave 2011: 17 et seq.

  175. 175.

    European Commission 2006: 7 et seq. Cf. European Commission 2010: 4. See further also Kalloe 2011: 513.

  176. 176.

    Monti 2010: 82. See further also Martínez Bárbara 2011: 279 et seq.; Meussen 2011: 101.

  177. 177.

    European Commission 2011b: 10 et seq.

  178. 178.

    European Commission 2010: 4.

  179. 179.

    European Commission 2010: 5. See further also European Commission 2011a: 8.

  180. 180.

    Euro Summit, 2011: 9.

  181. 181.

    For a more comprehensive overview see e.g. Barenfeld 2007: 258 et seq.; Panayi 2008b: 114 et seq.; Spengel 2008b: 556 et seq.; Konrad 2009: 252 et seq.; Cerioni 2011: 515 et seq.; Erasmus-Koen 2011: 237 et seq.; Vascega and van Thiel 2011: 374 et seq.

  182. 182.

    Cf. also Monti 2010: 81 et seq. See further also Meussen 2011: 101.

  183. 183.

    Cf. also Helminen 2010: 170. For such discrimination see e.g. ECJ of 12/12/2002 (C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst), ECR 2002: I-11779.

  184. 184.

    Cf. Surrey and Brannon 1968: 915; Rosen and Gayer 2010: 369; Shaw et al. 2010: 1133. See also OECD 1990: 31; Harris 1996: 8; Graetz 2001: 310. For an exemplary tax policy design in the last century see Diamond and Mirrless 1971: 8 et seq.; Mirrless 1971: 175 et seq.

  185. 185.

    Cf. Koop 1993: 103 et seq.; Obermair and Weninger 2008: 19 et seq.; Evans 2008: 450, 457 et seq.; Rosen and Gayer 2010: 368 et seq.; Shaw et al. 2010: 1103, 1106. For empirical significance see e.g. Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996: 411 et seq.; European Commission 2004a; Laffer et al. 2011: 17 et seq. For a comprehensive literature overview see Evans 2003: 64 et seq.

  186. 186.

    Cf. Koop 1993: 103 et seq.; Graetz 2001: 310; Shaw et al. 2010: 1121 et seq. See also President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board 2010: 56. Besides, evasion costs can be listed as well, i.e. social costs from engaging in illegal attitudes and to conceal them. Cf. Slemrod and Yitzhaki 1996: 179 et seq.; Rosen and Gayer 2010: 371 et seq. Since the focus is on well-advised taxpayers who comply with the tax rules, evasions costs will be disregarded.

  187. 187.

    Cf. Holtzman 2007: 426 et seq.; Evans 2008: 454 et seq. For an increase of complexity in tax law over time in most jurisdictions, which will raise administration and compliance costs as mentioned below, see Holtzman 2007: 426 et seq.; Evans 2008: 447 et seq.; Lang et al. (2008); Evans 2010: 83 et seq., with further references; World Bank/International Finance Corporation/PricewaterhouseCoopers 2010: 44

  188. 188.

    Cf. European Commission 2001: 28; European Commission 2004a; Furuseth 2008: 292; Obermair and Weninger 2008: 19 et seq.; Chessman et al. 2010: 744 et seq. See also Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996: 411 et seq.; World Bank/International Finance Corporation/PricewaterhouseCoopers 2010: 43.

  189. 189.

    Cf. Chessman et al. 2010: 744 et seq.

  190. 190.

    Cf. Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996: 411 et seq.; Evans 2003: 71 et seq.; Holtzman 2007: 421; Evans 2008: 457 et seq. See also KPMG 2006.

  191. 191.

    Cf. Evans 2008: 461; Shaw et al. 2010: 1119 et seq. However, compliance costs may be inversely related to administration costs, e.g. in the case of self-assessment of taxes. Cf. Evans 2008: 461. See further Haig 1935: 327 et seq.; Allers 1994: 41; Shaw et al. 2010: 1121.

  192. 192.

    Cf. Slemrod and Sorum 1984: 461; Sandford 1989: 68 et seq.; Slemrod 1996: 355 et seq.; Schizer 2000: 1352 et seq.; Wagner 2005a: 94 et seq.; Wagner 2005b: 529 et seq.; Evans 2008: 450 et seq.; Homburg 2010: 54 et seq.; Shaw et al. 2010: 1106.

  193. 193.

    Cf. Koop 1993: 103; Harris 1996: 7; European Commission 2001: 28; Nobes 2004: 40; Holtzman 2007: 419; Shaw et al. 2010: 1107 et seq. However, in some cases, taxpayer’s private costs are not identical to social costs, e.g. in case of penalties for non-compliance with tax rules. Cf. Shaw et al. 2010: 1111.

  194. 194.

    Other determinants can be e.g. the size of the firm as mentioned above, the type of tax and the industry or sector in which the firm operates. Cf. Evans 2008: 459; Shaw et al. 2010: 1101. See generally Holtzman 2007.

  195. 195.

    Cf. Thuronyi 1998: 72 et seq.; Holtzman 2007: 425; Obermair and Weninger 2008: 20; Woellner et al. 2009: 24; Shaw et al. 2010: 1119. See also German Council of Economic Experts 2010: 217, with further reference; HM Revenue & Customs 2010a: 11; HM Revenue and Customs 2010b: 6, 10; President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board 2010: 56 et seq.; Laffer et al. 2011: 8 et seq.

  196. 196.

    Income taxation is inherently complex. Cf. e.g. Prebble 1993: 60. See further also Lipin 2011: 703 et seq.

  197. 197.

    Cf. Surrey 1969: 673 et seq.; Prebble 1994: 380 et seq.; James 1999: 731 et seq.; Evans 2010: 83; Laffer et al. 2011: 10.

  198. 198.

    Cf. Evans 2010: 83. For a wider, theoretically grounded classification of causes, see e.g. Cooper 1993: 417 et seq. See also Pronk 2009: 547 et seq.

  199. 199.

    Cf. Krever 2000: 86. See also Surrey 1969: 673; Pronk 2009: 548 et seq.

  200. 200.

    Cf. Harris 1996: 8; Graetz 2001: 311; Dilworth 2010: 1116; Evans 2010: 83; HM Revenue & Customs 2010a: 11.

  201. 201.

    Cf. Smith 2007: 24. For the trend of base-broadening and rate-cutting see Spengel 2008a: 42 et seq.; Auerbach et al. 2010: 844 et seq. See also Sullivan 2006: 440.

  202. 202.

    Cf. further Laffer et al. 2011: 25. However, the structure of tax rates can also affect the complexity. Cf. Pronk 2009: 548; Shaw et al. 2010: 1119 et seq. See also Monti 2010: 81 et seq.

  203. 203.

    Cf. also Graetz 2001: 311; HM Revenue & Customs 2010a: 11; Schnitger 2011: 368.

  204. 204.

    For this, but with regard to inconsistencies between different types of tax of only one jurisdiction, see Woellner et al. 2009: 26, 33; Shaw et al. 2010: 1119. See also Cooper 1993: 417 et seq. For inconsistencies due to the disregard of economic substance see Strnad 1994: 573. Cf. also Chessman et al. 2010: 719.

  205. 205.

    Cf. Roin 2002: 63 et seq.; Tipke 2003: 349; Spengel and Malke 2008: 68; Monti: 2010: 81 et seq.; Shaw et al. 2010: 1119.

  206. 206.

    Cf. Gammie 1999: 234; Woellner et al. 2009: 25.

  207. 207.

    Cf. Schizer 2000: 1353; European Commission 2001: 28; Evans 2010: 84 et seq.; Shaw et al. 2010: 1120. See also President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, 2010: 56 et seq.; Lipin 2011: 665 et seq.; Schnitger 2011: 367. Additionally, frequent changes are making it more difficult for a taxpayer to foresee and estimate his/her tax burden, which may negatively effect on investment decisions. Cf. Wendt 2009: 49. See further also Schnitger 2011: 367.

  208. 208.

    Cf. Klapdor 2000: 45; Treisch 2004: 104 et seq.; Spengel 2006: 43.

  209. 209.

    Cf. further Scientific Advisory Committee of the German Federal Ministry of Finance 2007: 20 et seq.

  210. 210.

    Cf. Evans 2008: 462; Evans 2010: 85. See also Laffer et al. 2011: 11.

  211. 211.

    Cf. Shaw et al. 2010: 1120, with further reference.

  212. 212.

    Cf. e.g. HM Revenue & Customs 2010a: 10, 15; HM Revenue & Customs 2010b: 5, 7 et seq.

  213. 213.

    Cf. Harris 1996: 9; European Commission 2001: 28. See also Cooper 1993: 417 et seq.; Treisch 2004: 103 et seq.; Andersson 2007: 84, 94 et seq.; Chessman et al. 2010: 719; HM Revenue & Customs 2010a: 10 et seq., 15 et seq.; President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board 2010: 56; Lipin 2011: 665 et seq. However, defining borderlines and criteria that are as detailed and thus include as few open-ended tax rules may improve legal certainty, but not simplicity. Cf. Holtzman 2007: 419, 421. For a different view cf. Pinder 2005: 85. See in general also Turnbull 1997: 24 et seq.

  214. 214.

    Cf. Whittington 1995: 452 et seq.; Harris 1996: 9; Wendt 2009: 49. See also Neumark 1970: 342 et seq.; Shaw et al. 2010: 1114.

  215. 215.

    Cf. Cooper 1993: 417 et seq.; Turnbull 1997: 21 et seq.; Andersson 2007: 94 et seq.; Holtzman 2007: 418; European Commission 2001: 28; Evans 2010: 83. For some empirical evidence see e.g. Jorgenson 1971: 1111 et seq.; Chirinko 1993: 1987 et seq.; Andersson 2007: 94 et seq., with further references. Regarding the general relevance of legal certainty in international law, cf. Maxeiner 2007: 541 et seq.; Maxeiner 2008: 27 et seq. For legal certainty in the sense of predictability see also Raitio 2003: 372 et seq.; Raitio 2006: 395 et seq.

  216. 216.

    Cf. Thuronyi 1998: 72 et seq.; Maxeiner 2008: 40; Spengel and Malke 2008: 68; Woellner et al. 2009: 32. See further Lipin 2011: 703 et seq.

  217. 217.

    Cf. Neumark 1970: 54 et seq., 283 et seq., 295 et seq.; HM Revenue & Customs 2010a: 11. See also Woellner et al. 2009: 30.

  218. 218.

    Cf. also Schaumburg 1998: 79. See generally Holtzman 2007: 420.

  219. 219.

    Cf. also Graetz 2001: 312 et seq.

  220. 220.

    Cf. Treisch 2004: 107 et seq.

  221. 221.

    Cf. European Commission 2001: 28; Holtzman 2007: 421.

  222. 222.

    Cf. Gammie et al. 2005: 15; Frebel 2006: 72; Holtzman 2007: 421; Evans 2008: 460. See also Harris 1996: 8 et seq. For an example see OECD 1990: 31.

  223. 223.

    Cf. European Commission 2001: 28. See also Harris 1996: 8 et seq.

  224. 224.

    Cf. Wagner 2005b: 528 et seq.; German Council of Economic Experts 2010: 184, 211.

  225. 225.

    Cf. e.g. Becker and Fuest 2011: 96 et seq.

  226. 226.

    Cf. Holtzman 2007: 421; Spengel and Malke 2008: 68 et seq. See also Slemrod 1990: 171 et seq.; Harris 1996: 9.

  227. 227.

    Cf. also Weisbach 1999: 1627 et seq.

  228. 228.

    Cf. Pratt 2000: 1056 et seq., 1065 et seq.; MacNeil 2005: 96 et seq., 209 et seq.; Franke and Hax 2009: 32; Schön 2010: 80 et seq. See also Matre 2002: 456, 458; Rudolph 2006: 5; Baums 2007: 957 et seq.; Brealey et al. 2008: 366 et seq.; Helminen 2010: 165 et seq. For a more detailed reflection of the non-tax legal nature of financial instruments in Germany see Briesemeister 2006: 68 et seq., with further references. Moreover, there are timing differences between the remuneration derived from interest-generating debt and dividend-generating equity: While the remuneration derived from the former is realized when it is accrued, the remuneration derived from the latter is basically only realized when it is actually received. Cf. Benshalom 2010: 1230 et seq. See also Pratt 2000: 1119.

  229. 229.

    Cf. Sect. 2.2.

  230. 230.

    Cf. Sect. 2.2.11. See also Hariton 1994: 501 et seq.; Santangelo 1997: 332; Edgar 2000: 92 et seq.; Helminen 2010: 163 et seq.

  231. 231.

    Cf. Schön 2010: 80. See further Helminen 2010: 164.

  232. 232.

    Cf. MacNeil 2005: 210; Benshalom 2010: 1253 et seq.; Schön 2010: 80. For Germany see Henn 2002: S. 25; Baums 2007: 960 et seq.; Hüffer 2010: § 12 recital 3. For the importance of control rights from an economic point of view see Tirole 2006: 389 et seq., with further references.

  233. 233.

    In contrast, the difference between fixed and contingent payments can be substituted for each other through the use of put and call options, so that debt and equity capital do not differ economically in kind to that effect. For the put-call parity theorem see Warren 1993: 465 et seq.; Shaviro 1995: 652 et seq.; Edgar 2000: 21 et seq., 94 et seq.

  234. 234.

    Cf. Sect. 2.2.12.

  235. 235.

    Cf. Sect. 2.2.2.

  236. 236.

    Cf. Engle and Raineri 1996: 777. Hereby, an appropriate regime of corporate governance (e.g. shareholders’ acting as a ‘watchdog’) can be fostered. Cf. European Commission 2004b: 6.

  237. 237.

    Cf. Sect. 2.2.1.

  238. 238.

    Cf. Sect. 3.1. See also e.g. Weisbach 1999: 1640. Regarding the different tax treatment of interest-generating debt and dividend-generating equity de lege lata see Sect. 2.3.

  239. 239.

    Cf. Sect. 5.3.3; Knoll 1993: 1506 et seq.; Warren 1993: 473 et seq.; Schmidt 1998: 68 et seq.; Wood 1999: 54 et seq.; Pratt 2000: 1117 et seq.

  240. 240.

    Cf. Auerbach et al. 2010: 857 et seq., 877 et seq.; President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, 2010: 65 et seq.; de Mooij and Devereux 2011: 93 et seq.

  241. 241.

    Fundamentally see also Schön 2010: 82 et seq. For the successful reform in Belgium in form of a notional interest deduction for equity capital see e.g. Heyvaert and Deschrijver 2005: 459 et seq.; Vanhaute 2008: 157 et seq.; IBFD 2011a: Sect. 1.9.6.

  242. 242.

    For the same result see Emmerich 1985: 139; Benshalom 2010: 1261; HM Treasury 2010: 14; Schön 2010: 82 et seq. See also Sanger 2011: 8. Nevertheless, a fundamental tax reform in terms of an elimination of the debt/equity distinction for tax purposes should be the overall goal, not least because of its contribution to the development of the financial and economic crisis in 2008–2009. Regarding this contribution see Sullivan 2008: 1241; Benshalom 2010: 1222; Hemmelgarn and Nicodème 2010: 17 et seq.; Shackelford et al. 2010: 783 et seq. See also Harris 2010: 588. Generally differently cf. Emmerich 1985: 121, 139.

  243. 243.

    Cf. Passarella 1999: 43; Goyeneche and Moreno 2000: 486; Honiball 2000: 573; Penny 2000: 647; Rotondaro 2000: 266.

  244. 244.

    Cf. Hariton 1994: 499 et seq. In contrast, Weisbach’s distinction is based on efficiency arguments. Cf. Weisbach 1999: 1627 et seq.

  245. 245.

    Cf. also Lawrence 1990: 118; Collado and Rey 1993: 110; Essers et al. 1994: 170; Engle and Raineri 1996: 777; Carlisle 2000: 105; Briesemeister 2006: 68, 72; Bogenschütz 2008b: 52 et seq.; Franke and Hax 2009: 31, 33; Helminen 2010: 166; Bourtourault and Bénard 2011: 187. See further Küting and Dürr 2005: 1529; Hoor and Kreemer 2011: 654.

  246. 246.

    Cf. Lang 1991: 123; Thiele 1998: 22 et seq.; Lamon 2005b: 118; Flora 2006a: 78 et seq.; Franke and Hax 2009: 34 et seq. See further Sauer 1993: 40 et seq.; Haun 1996: 31; Lamon 2002: 66 et seq.; Matre 2002: 456, 458; Serbini and Flora 2005: 20. For another, more simplified systematization see Wöhe et al. 2009: 174.

  247. 247.

    Yet, exceptions exist – particularly in the case of obligations toward third parties. Cf. Thiele 1998: 22.

  248. 248.

    Cf. Thiele 1998: 22; Bogenschütz 2008b: 49. See further Lang 1991: 124 et seq.; Sauer 1993: 42.

  249. 249.

    Cf. Thiele 1998: 28; Carlisle 2000: 106; Franke and Hax 2009: 42 et seq.; Hammer 2011: 18. Moreover, the investor can be obliged to further payments, e.g. due to a liability or an embedded option. Cf. Thiele 1998: 28; Briesemeister 2006: 73.

  250. 250.

    Cf. Thiele 1998: 28; Carlisle 2000: 106; Briesemeister 2006: 73; Flora 2006a: 78; Baums 2007: 957 et seq.; Bogenschütz 2008b: 49. Both rights have not necessarily to be clearly separated from each other. Cf. inter alia Briesemeister 2006: 83 et seq.

  251. 251.

    Cf. Thiele 1998: 23 et seq.; Lamon 2005b: 118; Briesemeister 2006: 73 et seq.; Flora 2006a: 78; Baums 2007: 958; Bogenschütz 2008b: 49 et seq.; Franke and Hax 2009: 34 et seq. See further also Sauer 1993: 42 et seq.; Haun 1996: 32 et seq.; Küting et al. 2008: 941; Ross et al. 2008: 856 et seq.

  252. 252.

    Cf. Burns and O’Donnell 2000: 113; Lamon 2002: 66.

  253. 253.

    Cf. Thiele 1998: 23 et seq.; Briesemeister 2006: 73 et seq.; Baums 2007: 958; Bogenschütz 2008b: 49 et seq.; Franke and Hax 2009: 34 et seq. See further Sauer 1993: 42 et seq.; Haun 1996: 32 et seq.; Lamon 2002: 61; Küting et al. 2008: 941; Ross et al. 2008: 856 et seq.

  254. 254.

    Cf. Thiele 1998: 23 et seq.; Lamon 2002: 65; Lamon 2005a: 53; Briesemeister 2006: 73 et seq.; Baums 2007: 958; Bogenschütz 2008b: 49 et seq.; Franke and Hax 2009: 34 et seq. See further also Sauer 1993: 42 et seq.; Haun 1996: 32 et seq.; Küting et al. 2008: 941; Ross et al. 2008: 856 et seq.

  255. 255.

    Cf. Thiele 1998: 27; Briesemeister 2006: 74; Ross et al. 2008: 409; Bogenschütz 2008b: 49 et seq.

  256. 256.

    Cf. Briesemeister 2006: 74 et seq.; Flora 2006a: 79; Franke and Hax 2009: 45 et seq. See also Sauer 1993: 55 et seq.; Haun 1996: 33; Lamon 2002: 66 et seq. Since the acquiescence of the modification right by one party corresponds to the right to modify rights and obligations by the other party, solely the latter (here: from the view of the investor) will be examined in the following.

  257. 257.

    In cases of compulsory liquidation corporate related investors generally lose their right to control. Cf. Baums 2007: 959; Feuerer and Hörtnagl 2011: 375 et seq., both for Germany. See Ross et al. 2008: 857, for the United States.

  258. 258.

    Cf. Franke and Hax 2009: 50 et seq. See also Lang 1991: 123; Sauer 1993: 55 et seq.; Lamon 2005b: 118; Ross et al. 2008: 408. See further Lamon 2002: 66 et seq.; Rudolph 2006: 5. For the importance of control rights from an economic point of view see Tirole 2006: 389 et seq., with further references. Moreover, other, particularly corporate related rights are to participate in general meetings and to table resolutions. Cf. European Commission 2004b: 5 et seq. See Förster 2011: 366 et seq., for Germany.

  259. 259.

    Cf. Burns and O’Donnell 2000: 113; Immerman and Rowe 2004: 309; Flora 2006a: 78 et seq.

  260. 260.

    Cf. Sects. 3.2.3, 4.2.23, 4.2.33, 4.2.43 and 4.2.53; MacNeil 2005: 210; Brealey et al. 2008: 367 et seq., 372; Franke and Hax 2009: 51 et seq.; Benshalom 2010: 1253 et seq.; Schön 2010: 80. See further Lang 1991: 123; Haun 1996: 33; Baums 2007: 959. Nevertheless, the contractual related investor can indirectly have (limited) rights to make decisions, as, for instance, the corporation has to comply with covenants which may limit the business policy. Cf. MacNeil 2005: 210, 222 et seq.; Franke and Hax 2009: 50 et seq. See also Rudolph 2006: 5; Brealey et al. 2008: 367 et seq.; Bazzana and Palmieri 2010: 1 et seq., with further references. Furthermore, the corporate investor’s voting power can be bounded by contract to the decision made by, for instance, contractual investors. Cf. Priester 1984: 657 et seq.

  261. 261.

    Cf. Lang 1991: 123 et seq.; Flora 2006a: 79; Franke and Hax 2009: 54. See also Baums 2007: 959.

  262. 262.

    Cf. Sauer 1993: 59 et seq.; Thiele 1998: 30 et seq.; Franke and Hax 2009: 53 et seq.

  263. 263.

    Cf. Briesemeister 2006: 74. See further Sauer 1993: 55.

  264. 264.

    Cf. Thiele 1998: 30 et seq.; Briesemeister 2006: 74 et seq.; Franke and Hax 2009: 53. See further Rudolph 2006: 5 et seq.; Baums 2007: 959.

  265. 265.

    The exercise of the right leads to an extinction of the rights and obligations (prior to maturity) and, thus, a repayment of the committed capital. Cf. Sauer 1993: 64 et seq.; Ross et al. 2008: 412;Franke and Hax 2009: 47 et seq. See further also Rudolph 2006: 5 et seq.; Baums 2007: 958. However, specific rights and/or obligations can persist. Cf. Thiele 1998: 29.

  266. 266.

    The exercise of the right can lead to a change of the legal nature of any right or obligation (but not their termination). In practice, the conversion of a single right or obligation is not of great importance, but the conversion of the array of rights and obligations, i.e. the entire financial instruments. Cf. Thiele 1998: 30; Lamon 2002: 61 et seq.; Franke and Hax 2009: 48 et seq. See further Carlisle 2000: 106 et seq.; Lamon 2005b: 118; Rudolph 2006: 5 et seq. However, the conversion may also relate, for instance, to the payment currency. Cf. Briesemeister 2006: 75; Franke and Hax 2009: 49.

  267. 267.

    The disposal of the bundle of rights and obligations, i.e. of the financial instrument, does not lead to a termination of all rights and obligations, but to their cession from the transferor to the transferee. Cf. Thiele 1998: 29 et seq.; Franke and Hax 2009: 45 et seq. See further also Rudolph 2006: 5 et seq.

  268. 268.

    De facto changes can be achieved, for instance, by the acquisition of a further bundle of (the same or different) rights and obligations. Cf. e.g. Flora 2006a: 79. However, separately transferable option rights and/or obligations will not be considered in the further analysis.

  269. 269.

    Furthermore, the (fixed or contingent) distinctive characteristics can differ from the situation in which the entitlement to modifications arose. In fact, for instance, the investor can be obliged for a conversion with a fixed ratio and to a date being contingent on the corporation’s economic situation. For comparable designed parts of contingent convertible bonds see e.g. Böhringer et al. 2011: 49 et seq.

  270. 270.

    Cf. also Franke and Hax 2009: 55.

  271. 271.

    Cf. Schneider 1987: 186; Herzig 1994: 593; Haun 1996: 19 et seq.; Thiele 1998: 32 et seq. See further Emmerich 1985: 133 et seq. Regarding a distinction by means of the degree of risk to which an investor is exposed see Swoboda 1985a: 356 et seq.; Swoboda 1985b: 55 et seq.; Polito 2000: 299 et seq. Regarding this approach see critically Haun 1996: 26 et seq.; Drukarczyk 2008: 303.

  272. 272.

    The allocated functions of equity are the continuity function, the liability function, the loss compensation function and the profit sharing function. Cf. inter alia Thiele 1998: 49 et seq., with further references.

  273. 273.

    Cf. Schneider 1987: 185 et seq.; Elschen 1993: 591; Süchting 1995: 27 et seq.; Haun 1996: 30 et seq.; Thiele 1998: 36 et seq.; Weisbach 1999: 1659 et seq.; Küting and Dürr 2005: 1529; Baums 2007: 957 et seq.; Drukarczyk 2008: 303, 376. See further Calì 2000: 410; Krause 2006: 193; Küting et al. 2008: 941. For another exemplary ideal-typical distinction cf. Verdoner 2005: 282 et seq., in terms of global trading.

  274. 274.

    Cf. Haun 1996: 31; Thiele 1998: 35 et seq.

  275. 275.

    Cf. Swoboda 1985b: 44 et seq.; Elschen 1993: 591 et seq.; Küting and Kessler 1994: 2105 et seq.; Süchting 1995: 27 et seq.; Haun 1996: 31 et seq.; Thiele 1998: 37 et seq.; Fabozzi 2002: 2; O’Neill 2003: 161; Küting and Dürr 2005: 1529; MacNeil 2005: 96 et seq., 209 et seq.; Rudolph 2006: 5; Baums 2007: 957 et seq.; Drukarczyk 2008: 303 et seq.; Perridon et al. 2009: 357 et seq., 383; Schön 2010: 85; Putnoki et al. 2011: 79.

  276. 276.

    Cf. also Schneider 1987: 187; Thiele 1998: 36; Baums 2007: 957.

  277. 277.

    Regarding this methodological approach cf. Weisbach 2000: 71 et seq.; Benshalom 2010: 1262 et seq. See further Weisbach 1999: 1659 et seq.; Baums 2007: 957.

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Bärsch, SE. (2012). Guidelines for Corporate Income Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments. In: Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived Therefrom in an International and Cross-border Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32457-4_3

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