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Low Data Complexity Attack on Reduced Camellia-256

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7372))

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Abstract

This paper proposes a low data complexity attack on reduced-round block cipher Camellia. Utilizing a 7-round meet-in-the-middle distinguisher with an FL layer between the fifth and the sixth round, one can attack 12-round Camellia-256 with 219 chosen plaintexts and 2231.2 encryptions. This attack starts from the first round of Camellia-256, so as to keep the property of Camellia that inserting the FL layers every 6 rounds; it also takes the whitening keys into account. Compared with the recent proposed attacks on Camellia-256, the attack in this paper has much lower data complexity; at the same time, it is also the best attack on Camellia-256 in terms of the number of rounds and the time complexity, if one only consider the ’regular’ reduced Camellia with 6 rounds before (after) the first (last) FL layer and with whitening keys.

This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61133013 and No. 60931160442), in part by the Research Council K.U.Leuven: GOA TENSE, the IAP Program P6/26 BCRYPT of the Belgian State (Belgian Science Policy), and in part by the European Commission through the ICT program under contract ICT-2007-216676 ECRYPT II.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China

    Jiazhe Chen & Leibo Li

  2. ESAT/COSIC and IBBT, KU Leuven, Belgium

    Jiazhe Chen

Authors
  1. Jiazhe Chen
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  2. Leibo Li
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, NSW, 2522, Wollongong, Australia

    Willy Susilo

  2. School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, 2522, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Yi Mu

  3. School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, 2522, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Jennifer Seberry

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Chen, J., Li, L. (2012). Low Data Complexity Attack on Reduced Camellia-256. In: Susilo, W., Mu, Y., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7372. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31447-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-31448-3

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