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Auditable Envelopes: Tracking Anonymity Revocation Using Trusted Computing

  • Conference paper
Trust and Trustworthy Computing (Trust 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7344))

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Abstract

In this paper, we discuss a protocol allowing the remote user of a system providing revocable anonymity to be assured of whether or not her anonymity is revoked. We achieve this via a novel use of Trusted Computing and Virtual Monotonic Counters. The protocol has wide-ranging scope in a variety of computer security fields, such as electronic cash, fair exchange and electronic voting.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK

    Matt Smart & Eike Ritter

Authors
  1. Matt Smart
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  2. Eike Ritter
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Technical University Darmstadt, Hochschulstrasse 10, 64289, Darmstadt, Germany

    Stefan Katzenbeisser  & Melanie Volkamer  & 

  2. Institute of Software Technology and Interactive Systems, Vienna University of Technology and SBA Research, Favoritenstrsse 9-11, 1040, Vienna, Austria

    Edgar Weippl

  3. School of Informatics, Indiana University, 901 East Tenth Street, 47405, Bloomington, IN, USA

    L. Jean Camp

  4. Department of Computer Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 201 S. Columbia Street UNH-CH, 27599-3175, Chapel Hill, NC, USA

    Mike Reiter

  5. Huawei America R&D, 2330 Central Expressway, 95050, Santa Clara, CA, USA

    Xinwen Zhang

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Smart, M., Ritter, E. (2012). Auditable Envelopes: Tracking Anonymity Revocation Using Trusted Computing. In: Katzenbeisser, S., Weippl, E., Camp, L.J., Volkamer, M., Reiter, M., Zhang, X. (eds) Trust and Trustworthy Computing. Trust 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7344. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30921-2_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30921-2_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30920-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30921-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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