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Economics Instruments for Pollution Abatement: Tradable Permits Versus Carbon Taxes

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Abstract

Contemporary energy policy issues are dominated, directly and indirectly, by major concerns at both local and global levels of environmental degradation arising from combustion of fossil fuels. The advent of “carbon pricing” (either through an emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax) represents an attempt to impose a cost on consumers that will limit such degradation (i.e. the deleterious impacts of climate change) to scientifically-determined “acceptable” levels. The resulting higher cost of fossil fuel combustion for power generation should induce a reduction in the demand for power (the “demand effect”) whilst simultaneously stimulating investment in competitively-priced low carbon power generation technologies (the “supply effect”). At least in theory, the trading of emission permits can be shown to be a least-cost economic instrument for meeting a specified level of reduction of carbon dioxide. However, a carbon tax possesses the same property. In this chapter the relative merits of these two instruments will be assessed, paying particular attention to factors that could, in practice, lead to significant levels of inefficiency for one instrument relative to the other.

The author acknowledges financial research support from Santos Ltd.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Also known as a “Pigouvian” tax.

  2. 2.

    However, a hybrid scheme is possible whereby if the price of permits reaches a predetermined price ceiling the latter becomes the fixed permit price (effectively, therefore, a carbon tax). The initial years of the Australian Clean Energy Future Plan has this arrangement in place to avoid price spikes in the early years of the permit trading regime and, as a consequence, reduce price volatility risks for potential investors in power generation assets.

  3. 3.

    This explanation is based upon results derived by Weitzman (1974). A number of studies have also addressed the relative merits of taxes as opposed to emissions trading schemes in the presence of uncertainty; for example, Nordhaus (1994), Hoel and Karp (2002), and Newell and Pizer (2003).

  4. 4.

    However, if one also allows for uncertainty over its slope then the preference of taxes over permits is expressed in terms of unknown parameters: a result that has little practical use (see Quirion (2005) for further details).

  5. 5.

    In fact the subsidies need not be “hidden” since a social welfare argument may be made for protecting certain industries or sections of society from the impact of carbon pricing. The IEA (2010) estimated that worldwide fossil fuel consumption subsidies amounted to US$557 billion in 2008, so this is not a trivial issue.

  6. 6.

    This issue is addressed, at least partially, in the context of emissions embodied in exports from China in Chapter 8 of Helm and Hepburn (2009).

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Correspondence to Anthony D. Owen .

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Owen, A.D. (2013). Economics Instruments for Pollution Abatement: Tradable Permits Versus Carbon Taxes. In: Dorsman, A., Simpson, J., Westerman, W. (eds) Energy Economics and Financial Markets. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30601-3_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30601-3_6

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