Abstract
Is there any practical meaning in the theory up to now proposed, mainly with respect to the possibility of the P.A. designing an incentive scheme that is both equitable and efficient? The issues to consider are two: the standard problem of designing an equitable taxation scheme, and the matter of incentives to induce agents to reveal their true productivity potential.
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Nicola, P. (2013). Information Incentives and Performance. In: Efficiency and Equity in Welfare Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 661. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30071-4_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30071-4_6
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