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Disjunction Category Labels

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Information Security Technology for Applications (NordSec 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7161))

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Abstract

We present disjunction category (DC) labels, a new label format for enforcing information flow in the presence of mutually distrusting parties. DC labels can be ordered to form a lattice, based on propositional logic implication and conjunctive normal form. We introduce and prove soundness of decentralized privileges that are used in declassifying data, in addition to providing a notion of privilege-hierarchy. Our model is simpler than previous decentralized information flow control (DIFC) systems and does not rely on a centralized principal hierarchy. Additionally, DC labels can be used to enforce information flow both statically and dynamically. To demonstrate their use, we describe two Haskell implementations, a library used to perform dynamic label checks, compatible with existing DIFC systems, and a prototype library that enforces information flow statically, by leveraging the Haskell type checker.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Stanford University, USA

    Deian Stefan, David Mazières & John C. Mitchell

  2. Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden

    Alejandro Russo

Authors
  1. Deian Stefan
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  2. Alejandro Russo
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  3. David Mazières
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  4. John C. Mitchell
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Cybernetica AS, Ãœlikooli 2, 51003, Tartu, Estonia

    Peeter Laud

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Stefan, D., Russo, A., Mazières, D., Mitchell, J.C. (2012). Disjunction Category Labels. In: Laud, P. (eds) Information Security Technology for Applications. NordSec 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7161. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29615-4_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29615-4_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29614-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29615-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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