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Freedom, Rights and Social Software

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Games, Actions and Social Software

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 7010))

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Abstract

Rohit Parikh suggests that social procedures such as conventions, customs as well as more formalized institutions could be viewed as social software [24,25]. Verifying such procedures could be carried out in as systematic a manner as verifying computer software by computer scientists. The verification is both in terms of their internal workings - they should produce the outcomes desired in the most efficient manner; and comparatively across such procedures to ensure these ‘programs’ do not contradict or frustrate each other. In the verification of social processes, the social software theorist can make use of the numerous techniques used in the social sciences to analyze social processes mathematically. Indeed, the models of decision theory, social choice theory and game theory not only describe and explain social processes, but they can also be examined normatively to see if the processes are efficient or reach the desired outcomes.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 0200, Australia

    Keith Dowding

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

    Martin van Hees

Authors
  1. Keith Dowding
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  2. Martin van Hees
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI), Science Park 123, 1098 XG, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Jan van Eijck

  2. Department of Artificial Intelligence, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, University of Groningen, PO Box 407, 9700 AK, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Rineke Verbrugge

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Dowding, K., van Hees, M. (2012). Freedom, Rights and Social Software. In: van Eijck, J., Verbrugge, R. (eds) Games, Actions and Social Software. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7010. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29326-9_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29326-9_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29325-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29326-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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