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The Factual Element Requirement

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The Matrix of Derivative Criminal Liability

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Abstract

The modern structure of the factual element requirement is common to most modern legal systems. This structure applies the fundamental principle of conduct of criminal liability. The factual element requirement is the broad objective-external basis of criminal liability (nullum crimen sine actu). The factual element is designed to answer four main questions about the factual aspects of the delinquent event: “what?” “who?” “when?” and “where?” “What” refers to the substantive facts of the event (what happened). “Who” relates to the identity of the offender. “When” addresses the time aspect. “Where” specifies the location of the event.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the fundamental principles of criminal law see above at paragraph 1.1.2.1.

  2. 2.

    Article 121-1 of the French penal code provides: “Nul n’est responsable pénalement que de son propre fait”; Hans-Heinrich Jescheck und Thomas Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts—Allgemeiner Teil 206 (5 Auf., 1996); Dugdale, (1853) 1 El. & Bl. 435, 118 E.R. 499, 500: “…the mere intent cannot constitute a misdemeanour when unaccompanied with any act”; Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223, 36 S.W. 628 (1896); Proctor v. State, 15 Okl.Cr. 338, 176 P. 771 (1918); State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951); Lambert v. State, 374 P.2d 783 (Okla.Crim.App.1962); In re Leroy, 285 Md. 508, 403 A.2d 1226 (1979).

  3. 3.

    For the principle of legality in criminal law see Gabriel Hallevy, A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law (2010).

  4. 4.

    Ibid at pp. 135–137.

  5. 5.

    Ibid at pp. 49–80.

  6. 6.

    Ibid at pp. 81–132.

  7. 7.

    See e.g., in the United States, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962).

  8. 8.

    Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part sec. 11 (2nd ed., 1961).

  9. 9.

    Sir Gerald Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland 61 (1st ed., 1967); Treacy v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537, 559, [1971] 1 All E.R. 110, [1971] 2 W.L.R. 112, 55 Cr. App. Rep. 113, 135 J.P. 112, per Lord Diplock: “Where the definition of the crime incorporates a requirement of consequences subsequent to the completion of the physical acts by the accused, Professor Gordon in his book on Scots criminal law classifies the resultant crime as a ‘result-crime’ as distinct from a ‘conduct-crime’, but this nomenclature, though convenient in drawing attention to the distinction, tends to blur the fact that the conduct of the accused is as essential a component of a ‘conduct-crime’”.

  10. 10.

    The conduct is discussed below at paragraph 4.3.1, the circumstances are discussed below at paragraph 4.3.2 and the results discussed below at paragraph 4.3.3.

  11. 11.

    For the role of inaction in derivative criminal liability see below at paragraph 4.3.1.3.

  12. 12.

    Gabriel Hallevy, Victim’s Complicity in Criminal Law, 2 Int’lJ. of Punishment & Sentencing 72 (2006).

  13. 13.

    For the general course of the criminal attempt see above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  14. 14.

    Manley, (1844) 1 Cox C.C. 104; State v. Bailey, 63 W.Va. 668, 60 S.E. 785 (1908).

  15. 15.

    Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 69 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949); Pollack v. State, 215 Wis. 200, 253 N.W. 560 (1934); Baker v. United States, 21 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.1927); Miller v. State, 25 Wis. 384 (1870); Anderson v. Superior Court, 78 Cal.App.2d 22, 177 P.2d 315 (1947); People v. Cohen, 68 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1947); People v. Luciano, 277 N.Y. 348, 14 N.E.2d 433 (1938); State v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2nd Cir.1939); State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32, 630 A.2d 990 (1993).

  16. 16.

    United States v. Bell, 812 F.2d 188 (5th Cir.1987).

  17. 17.

    In Tables 4.3 to 4.7, the symbol “✓” relates to the fulfillment of the relevant factual element component (of the relevant row) by the relevant joint-perpetrator (of the relevant column). For instance, the upper “✓” symbol of table 4-3 means that component 1 has been committed and fulfilled by joint-perpetrator 1. Empty rectangle means that the relevant component has not been fulfilled by the relevant joint-perpetrator.

  18. 18.

    Harley, (1830) 4 Car. & P. 369, 172 E.R. 744.

  19. 19.

    Bingley, (1821) Russ. & Ry. 446, 168 E.R. 890; State v. Adam, 105 La. 737, 30 So. 101 (1901); Roney v. State, 76 Ga. 731 (1886); Smith v. People, 1 Colo. 121 (1869); United States v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir.1969).

  20. 20.

    Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); State v. Cohen, 173 Ariz. 497, 844 P.2d 1147 (1992); State v. Carrasco, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075 (1997); People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 424 N.Y.S.2d 157, 399 N.E.2d 1177 (1979); State v. Stein, 94 Wash.App. 616, 972 P.2d 505 (1999); Commonwealth v. Perry, 357 Mass. 149, 256 N.E.2d 745 (1970); United States v. Buchannan, 115 F.3d 445 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Moreno, 588 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858 (7th Cir.2000); State v. Duaz, 237 Conn. 518, 679 A.2d 902 (1996); Harris v. State, 177 Ala. 17, 59 So. 205 (1912); Apostoledes v. State, 323 Md. 456, 593 A.2d 1117 (1991); State v. Anderberg, 89 S.D. 75, 228 N.W.2d 631 (1975); Espy v. State, 54 Wyo. 291, 92 P.2d 549 (1939); State v. Hope, 215 Conn. 570, 577 A.2d 1000 (1990).

  21. 21.

    Dusenbery v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 770, 263 S.E.2d 392 (1980).

  22. 22.

    In tables 4.8 to 4.11, the symbol “✓” relates to the fulfillment of the relevant factual element component (of the relevant row) by the relevant person (of the relevant column). For instance, the upper “✓” symbol of table 4-8 means that component 1 has been committed and fulfilled by the perpetrator-through-another. Empty rectangle means that the relevant component has not been fulfilled by the relevant person.

  23. 23.

    See above at paragraph 2.2.3. Nicola Lacey and Celia Wells, Reconstructing Criminal Law—Critical Perspectives on Crime and the Criminal Process 53 (2nd ed., 1998).

  24. 24.

    Butt, (1884) 49 J.P. 233, 15 Cox C.C. 564, 51 L.T. 607, 1 T.L.R. 103; Stringer and Banks, (1991) 94 Cr. App. Rep. 13; Manley, (1844) 1 Cox C.C. 104; Mazeau, (1840) 9 Car. & P. 676, 173 E.R. 1006.

  25. 25.

    Compare article 26 of the German penal code which provides: “Als Anstifter wird gleich einem Täter bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einen anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat bestimmt hat”. Article 121-7 of the French penal code provides: “Est également complice la personne qui par don, promesse, menace, ordre, abus d’autorité ou de pouvoir aura provoqué à une infraction ou donné des instructions pour la commettre”; Section 5.02(1) of The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code—Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 76 (1962, 1985) provides: “A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct that would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such crime or would establish his complicity in its commission or attempted commission”.

  26. 26.

    For the meaning of results-offenses see above at paragraph 4.1.

  27. 27.

    For the external derivation see above at paragraph 2.1.2.2.

  28. 28.

    For the conduct component of derivative criminal liability see below at paragraph 4.3.1.

  29. 29.

    For the circumstances component of derivative criminal liability see below at paragraph 4.3.2.

  30. 30.

    For the results component of derivative criminal liability see below at paragraph 4.3.3.

  31. 31.

    See e.g., article 27(1) of the German penal code provides: “Als Gehilfe wird bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einem anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat Hilfe geleistet hat”; Article 121-7 of the French penal code provides: “Est complice d’un crime ou d’un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité la préparation ou la consommation”; Article 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c.94 as amended by the Criminal Law Act, 1977, s. 65(4) provides: “Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender”.

  32. 32.

    For the meaning of conduct-offenses see above at paragraph 4.1.

  33. 33.

    For the conduct component of derivative criminal liability see below at paragraph 4.3.1.

  34. 34.

    For the accessoryship-after-the-fact see above at paragraph 2.2.5.4.

  35. 35.

    Above at paragraph 4.1.

  36. 36.

    The mental element requirement of derivative criminal liability is discussed below at Chap. 5.

  37. 37.

    As did some other definitions, which the most popular of them is “willed muscular movement”. See Herbert L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 101 (1968); Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law 54 (1881, 1923); Antony Robin Duff, Criminal Attempts 239–263 (1996); John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832, 2000); Gustav Radbruch, Der Handlungsbegriff in seiner Bedeutung für das Strafrechtssystem 75, 98 (1904); Claus Roxin, Strafrecht—Allgemeiner Teil I 239–255 (4 Auf., 2006); BGH 3, 287.

  38. 38.

    Scott T. Noth, A Penny for Your Thoughts: Post-Mitchell Hate Crime Laws Confirm a Mutating Effect upon Our First Amendment and the Government's Role in Our Lives, 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 167 (1998); Henry Holt, Telekinesis (2005); Pamela Rae Heath, The PK Zone: A Cross-Cultural Review of Psychokinesis (PK) (2003).

  39. 39.

    See e.g., Kelly v. Commonwealth, 1 Grant 484 (Pa.1858); Mullins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 477, 5 S.E.2d 491 (1939); United States v. Harper, 33 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.1994); State v. Townsend, 105 Wash.App. 622, 20 P.3d 1027 (2001); Article 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c.47; Article 72 of the Crimes Act, 1961 of New Zealand; Article 22 of the German penal code.

  40. 40.

    Porter, [2006] E.W.C.A. Crim. 560, [2007] 2 All E.R. 625, [2006] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 359.

  41. 41.

    United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir.1988); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 258, 77 S.E.2d 846 (1953); State v. Shewell, 178 Or.App. 115, 35 P.3d 1096 (2001), but compare: People v. Smith, 148 Ill.2d 454, 170 Ill.Dec. 644, 593 N.E.2d 533 (1992); State v. Reeves, 916 S.W.2d 909 (Tenn.1996).

  42. 42.

    United States v. Runco, 873 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Del Carmen Remirez, 823 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987); United States v. Duran, 96 F.3d 1495 (D.C. Cir.1996); State v. Bliss, 80 S.W.2d 162 (Mo.1935); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.1983); People v. Terrel, 99 Ill.2d 427, 77 Ill.Dec. 88, 459 N.E.2d 1337 (1984); Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 59 N.E. 55 (1901), but compare: People v. Smith, 148 Ill.2d 454, 170 Ill.Dec. 644, 593 N.E.2d 533 (1992).

  43. 43.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.2.

  44. 44.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.3.

  45. 45.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.4.

  46. 46.

    RG 36, 402; RG 53, 189; BGH 6, 359; BGH 7, 234; BGH 8, 137; BGH 34, 63.

  47. 47.

    Smith, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 2187; Race Relations Board v. Applin, [1973] Q.B. 815, [1973] All E.R. 1190, [1973] 2 W.L.R. 895, 117 Sol. Jo. 417; Invicta Plastics Ltd. v. Clare, [1976] R.T.R. 251, [1976] Crim. L.R. 131, 120 Sol. Jo. 62; Knightsbridge Crown Court, [1999] R.T.R. 21; James, (1985) 82 Cr. App. Rep. 226; Coventry Justices, [2004] E.W.H.C. 905 (Admin); Claydon, [2005] E.W.C.A. Crim. 2827, [2006] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 339, [2006] Crim. L.R. 345, [2006] Crim. L.R. 241.

  48. 48.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.5; D. (an infant) v. Parsons, [1960] 2 All E.R. 493, [1960] 1 W.L.R. 797, 58 L.G.R. 325; Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] Q.B. 773, [1975] 2 All E.R. 684, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 11, 61 Cr. App. Rep. 118, [1975] R.T.R. 473, 139 J.P. 569; Ferguson v. Weaving, [1951] 1 K.B. 814, [1951] 1 All E.R. 412, 49 L.G.R. 339, 115 J.P. 142, [1951] W.N. 99; Lynch v. Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, [1975] A.C. 653, [1975] 1 All E.R. 913, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 641, 61 Cr. App. Rep. 6, 139 J.P. 312; National Coal Board v. Gamble, [1959] 1 Q.B. 11, [1958] 3 All E.R. 203, [1958] 3 W.L.R. 434, 42 Cr. App. Rep. 240; Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v. Maxwell, [1978] 3 All E.R. 1140, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1350, 68 Cr. App. Rep. 128, 143 J.P. 63; Du Cros v. Lambourne, [1907] K.B. 40; Clarkson, [1971] 3 All E.R. 344, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1402, 55 Cr. App. Rep. 445, 135 JP 533; Giannetto, [1997] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 1, [1996] Crim. L.R. 722, 140 Sol. Jo. 167; Calhaem, [1985] 1 Q.B. 808, [1985] 2 All E.R. 266, [1985] 2 W.L.R. 826, 81 Cr. App. Rep. 131; Beatty v. Gillbanks, (1882) 9 Q.B. D. 308; Coney, (1882) 8 Q.B. D. 534.

  49. 49.

    RG 6, 169; RG 11, 63; RG 58, 113; RG 67, 191; RG 71, 176; RG 73, 153; BGH 8, 390; OGH 1, 321; OGH 2, 23.

  50. 50.

    McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89 (1910); People v. Chapman, 62 Mich. 280, 28 N.W. 896 (1886); State v. Scott, 80 Conn. 317, 68 A. 258 (1907); United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir.2000); Alonzi v. People, 198 Colo. 160, 597 P.2d 560 (1979); State v. Wilson, 39 N.M. 284, 46 P.2d 57 (1935); McGhee v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 422, 270 S.E.2d 729 (1980); State v. Haddad, 189 Conn. 383, 456 A.2d 316 (1983); Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 293 N.E.2d 854 (1973); Workman v. State, 216 Ind. 68, 21 N.E.2d 712 (1939); People v. Wright, 26 Cal.App.2d 197, 79 P.2d 102 (1938); Commonwealth v. Morrow, 363 Mass. 601, 296 N.E.2d 468 (1973); Skidmore v. State, 80 Neb. 698, 115 N.W. 288 (1908); State v. Chastain, 104 N.C. 900, 10 S.E. 519 (1889); Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 14 S.Ct. 144, 37 L.Ed. 1137 (1893).

  51. 51.

    Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979); United States v. Andrews, 75F.3d 552 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Minieri, 303 F.2d 550 (2nd Cir.1962); State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 928 P.2d 706 (App.1996); State v. Gomez, 102 Ariz. 432, 432 P.2d 444 (1967); McGill v. State, 252 Ind. 293, 247 N.E.2d 514 (1969); State v. Irby, 423 S.W.2d 800 (Mo.1968); Rodriguez v. State, 107 Nev. 432, 813 P.2d 992 (1991); State v. Scott, 289 N.C. 712, 224 S.E.2d 185 (1976); Commonwealth v. Flowers, 479 Pa. 153, 387 A.2d 1268 (1978); State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816 (R.I.1980); State v. Hoselton, 179 W.Va. 645, 371 S.E.2d 366 (1988); White v. People, 81 Ill. 333 (1876); State v. Horner, 248 N.C. 342, 103 S.E.2d 694 (1958); Dalton v. State, 252 A.2d 104 (Del.1969).

  52. 52.

    See e.g., People v. Heitzman, 9 Cal.4th 189, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229 (1994); State v. Wilson, 267 Kan. 550, 987 P.2d 1060 (1999).

  53. 53.

    Rollin M. Perkins, Negative Acts in Criminal Law, 22 Iowa L. Rev. 659 (1937); Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 Yale L. J. 590 (1958); Lionel H. Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A Legal Microcosm, 11 Wayne L. Rev. 367 (1965).

  54. 54.

    Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky.1997); State v. Jackson, 137 Wash.2d 712, 976 P.2d 1229 (1999); Rachel S. Zahniser, Morally and Legally: A Parent’s Duty to Prevent the Abuse of a Child as Defined by Lane v. Commonwealth, 86 Ky. L. J. 1209 (1998).

  55. 55.

    Mavji, [1987] 2 All E.R. 758, [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1388, [1986] S.T.C. 508, Cr. App. Rep. 31, [1987] Crim. L.R. 39; Firth, (1990) 91 Cr. App. Rep. 217, 154 J.P. 576, [1990] Crim. L.R. 326.

  56. 56.

    E.g., in section 16 of The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales Vol. 1: Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill 51 (Law Com. No. 177, 1989) it has been proposed: “For the Purpose of an offence which consists wholly or in part of an omission, state of affairs or occurrence in this Act to an ‘act’ shall, where the context permits, be read as including references to the omission, state of affairs or occurrence by reason of which a person may be guilty of the offence, and references to a person’s acting or doing an act shall be construed accordingly”; Shama, [1990] 2 All E.R. 602, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 661, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 138; Article 13(1) of the German penal code provides: “Wer es unterläßt, einen Erfolg abzuwenden, der zum Tatbestand eines Strafgesetzes gehört, ist nach diesem Gesetz nur dann strafbar, wenn er rechtlich dafür einzustehen hat, daß der Erfolg nicht eintritt, und wenn das Unterlassen der Verwirklichung des gesetzlichen Tatbestandes durch ein Tun entspricht”; BVerfGE 45, 187; BVerfGE 64, 261; BVerfGE 92, 277; BVerfGE 109, 133; Compare with section 2.01(3) of The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code—Official Draft and Explanatory Notes (1962, 1985).

  57. 57.

    David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law 394 (12th ed., 2008); Nevard, [2006] E.W.C.A. Crim. 2896.

  58. 58.

    See e.g., in New Zealand. Sub-article 72(1) of the Crimes Act, 1961 provides: “Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits an act for the purpose of accomplishing his object, is guilty of an attempt to commit the offence intended, whether in the circumstances it was possible to commit the offence or not” (emphasis not in original).

  59. 59.

    Gibbins, (1918) 13 Cr. App. Rep. 134, 82 J.P. 287.

  60. 60.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.2.

  61. 61.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.3.

  62. 62.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.4.

  63. 63.

    RG 36, 402; RG 53, 189; BGH 6, 359; BGH 7, 234; BGH 8, 137; BGH 34, 63.

  64. 64.

    Banks, (1873) 12 Cox C.C. 393; Commonwealth v. Willard, 39 Mass. 476 (1839); State v. Baldwin, 291 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 1980); State v. McGrath, 574 N.W.2d (Minn.App.1998); Commonwealth v. Flagg, 135 Mass. 545 (1883); State v. Blechman, 135 N.J.L. 99, 50 A.2d 152 (1946); State v. Ray, 267 Mont. 128, 882 P.2d 1013 (1994).

  65. 65.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.5; D. (an infant) v. Parsons, [1960] 2 All E.R. 493, [1960] 1 W.L.R. 797, 58 L.G.R. 325; Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] Q.B. 773, [1975] 2 All E.R. 684, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 11, 61 Cr. App. Rep. 118, [1975] R.T.R. 473, 139 J.P. 569; Ferguson v. Weaving, [1951] 1 K.B. 814, [1951] 1 All E.R. 412, 49 L.G.R. 339, 115 J.P. 142, [1951] W.N. 99; Lynch v. Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, [1975] A.C. 653, [1975] 1 All E.R. 913, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 641, 61 Cr. App. Rep. 6, 139 J.P. 312; National Coal Board v. Gamble, [1959] 1 Q.B. 11, [1958] 3 All E.R. 203, [1958] 3 W.L.R. 434, 42 Cr. App. Rep. 240; Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v. Maxwell, [1978] 3 All E.R. 1140, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1350, 68 Cr. App. Rep. 128, 143 J.P. 63; Du Cros v. Lambourne, [1907] K.B. 40; Clarkson, [1971] 3 All E.R. 344, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1402, 55 Cr. App. Rep. 445, 135 JP 533; Giannetto, [1997] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 1, [1996] Crim. L.R. 722, 140 Sol. Jo. 167; Calhaem, [1985] 1 Q.B. 808, [1985] 2 All E.R. 266, [1985] 2 W.L.R. 826, 81 Cr. App. Rep. 131; Beatty v. Gillbanks, (1882) 9 Q.B. D. 308; Coney, (1882) 8 Q.B. D. 534; RG 6, 169; RG 11, 63; RG 58, 113; RG 67, 191; RG 71, 176; RG 73, 153.

  66. 66.

    BGH 8, 390; OGH 1, 321; OGH 2, 23.

  67. 67.

    McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89 (1910); People v. Chapman, 62 Mich. 280, 28 N.W. 896 (1886); State v. Scott, 80 Conn. 317, 68 A. 258 (1907); United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir.2000); Alonzi v. People, 198 Colo. 160, 597 P.2d 560 (1979); State v. Wilson, 39 N.M. 284, 46 P.2d 57 (1935); McGhee v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 422, 270 S.E.2d 729 (1980); State v. Haddad, 189 Conn. 383, 456 A.2d 316 (1983); Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 293 N.E.2d 854 (1973); Workman v. State, 216 Ind. 68, 21 N.E.2d 712 (1939); People v. Wright, 26 Cal.App.2d 197, 79 P.2d 102 (1938); Commonwealth v. Morrow, 363 Mass. 601, 296 N.E.2d 468 (1973); Skidmore v. State, 80 Neb. 698, 115 N.W. 288 (1908); State v. Chastain, 104 N.C. 900, 10 S.E. 519 (1889); Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 14 S.Ct. 144, 37 L.Ed. 1137 (1893).

  68. 68.

    See e.g., sub-article 58(c)(1) of the Soviet Penal Code of 1926 as amended in 1950. This sub-article provided that mature relatives of the first degree of convicted traitor are punished with 5 years of exile.

  69. 69.

    Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961); Larsonneur, (1933) 24 Cr. App. R. 74, 97 J.P. 206, 149 L.T. 542; Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 106-107 (5th ed., 2006); Finau v. Department of Labour, [1984] 2 N.Z.L.R. 396; Tifaga v. Department of Labour, [1980] 2 N.Z.L.R. 235; Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 41 S.Ct. 271, 65 L.Ed. 597 (1921); Anderson v. State, 66 Okl.Cr. 291, 91 P.2d 794 (1939); State v. Asher, 50 Ark. 427, 8 S.W. 177 (1888); Peebles v. State, 101 Ga. 585, 28 S.E. 920 (1897); Howard v. State, 73 Ga.App. 265, 36 S.E.2d 161 (1945); Childs v. State, 109 Nev. 1050, 864 P.2d 277 (1993); Article 121-1 of the French penal “code provides: “Nul n’est responsable pénalement que de son propre fait”; See more at Salas v. Texas, 365 S.W.2d 174 (1963); State v. Margo, 40 N.J. 188, 191 A.2d 43 (1963); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968); Ex Parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223, 36 S.W. 628 (1896); Proctor v. State, 15 Okl.Cr. 338, 176 P. 771 (1918); State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962); In re Leory, 285 Md. 508, 403 A.2d 1226 (1979).

  70. 70.

    For the general course of the criminal attempt see above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  71. 71.

    People v. Volpe, 122 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1953); People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 (1927). See more at section 5.01(2)(a) of The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code—Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 74 (1962, 1985).

  72. 72.

    Bell v. State, 118 Ga. App. 291, 163 S.E.2d 323 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

  73. 73.

    Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 337, f. 128, 13 (1260; G. E. Woodbine ed., S. E. Thorne trans., 1968-1977); James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 222 (1883, 1964).

  74. 74.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.2.

  75. 75.

    For the collective conduct concept of derivative criminal liability see above at paragraph 4.2.2.

  76. 76.

    Kennedy, [2005] E.W.C.A. Crim. 685, [2005] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 348.

  77. 77.

    Morris v. Tolman, [1923] 1 K.B. 166, 92 L.J.K.B. 215, 128 L.T. 118, 86 J.P. 221, 39 T.L.R. 39, 67 Sol. Jo. 169, 20 L.G.R. 803, 27 Cox C.C. 345; Rodgers, [2003] E.W.C.A. Crim. 945; Giannetto, [1997] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 1, [1996] Crim. L.R. 722, 140 Sol. Jo. 167; Mohan, [1967] 2 A.C. 187, [1967] 2 All E.R. 58, [1967] 2 W.L.R. 676; Lane, (1986) 82 Cr. App. Rep. 5; Swindall, (1846) 2 Car. & K. 402, 175 E.R. 95; Macklin, (1838) 2 Lewin 225, 168 E.R. 1136.

  78. 78.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.3.

  79. 79.

    For the collective conduct concept of derivative criminal liability see above at paragraph 4.2.2.

  80. 80.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.4.

  81. 81.

    Gardner v. State, 41 Md.App. 187, 396 A.2d 303 (1979); Allen v. State, 91 Md.App. 705, 605 A.2d 960 (1992); State v. Davis, 110 N.C.App. 272, 429 S.E.2d 403 (1993).

  82. 82.

    State v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722 (1894); State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425 (Minn.1981); State v. Davis, 319 N.C. 620, 356 S.E.2d 340 (1987); RG 58, 113; BGH 59, 185.

  83. 83.

    Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979); United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Minieri, 303 F.2d 550 (2nd Cir.1962); State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 928 P.2d 706 (App.1996); State v. Gomez, 102 Ariz. 432, 432 P.2d 444 (1967); McGill v. State, 252 Ind. 293, 247 N.E.2d 514 (1969); State v. Irby, 423 S.W.2d 800 (Mo.1968); Rodriguez v. State, 107 Nev. 432, 813 P.2d 992 (1991); State v. Scott, 289 N.C. 712, 224 S.E.2d 185 (1976); Commonwealth v. Flowers, 479 Pa. 153, 387 A.2d 1268 (1978); State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816 (R.I.1980); State v. Hoselton, 179 W.Va. 645, 371 S.E.2d 366 (1988); White v. People, 81 Ill. 333 (1876); State v. Horner, 248 N.C. 342, 103 S.E.2d 694 (1958); Dalton v. State, 252 A.2d 104 (Del.1969).

  84. 84.

    For the accessoryship through omission see above at paragraph 4.3.1.2.

  85. 85.

    State v. Powell, 168 N.C. 134, 83 S.E. 310 (1914); Commonwealth v. Raposo, 413 Mass. 182, 595 N.E.2d 773 (1992); State v. Conde, 67 Conn.App. 474, 787 A.2d 571 (2001); Powell v. United States, 2 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.1924); Tuck v. Robson, [1970] 1 All E.R. 1171, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 741, 134 J.P. 389.

  86. 86.

    State v. Jackson, 137 Wash.2d 712, 976 P.2d 1229 (1999); State v. Rundle, 176 Wis.2d 985, 500 N.W.2d 916 (1993); Du Cros v. Lambourne, [1907] K.B. 40; Swindall, (1846) 2 Car. & K. 402, 175 E.R. 95; RG 53, 292; RG 69, 349; RG 71, 176; RG 73, 53; BGH 4, 327; BGH 14, 229; BGH 17, 321; BGH 30, 391.

  87. 87.

    Tuck v. Robson, [1970] 1 All E.R. 1171, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 741, 134 J.P. 389; Rubie v. Faulkner, [1940] 1 K.B. 571, [1940] 1 All E.R. 285; J. F. Alford Transport Ltd., [1997] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 326; Gaunt, [2003] E.W.C.A. Crim. 3925, [2004] 2 Cr. App. Rep (S) 194; Pinto, [2006] E.W.C.A. Crim. 749, [2006] 2 Cr. App. Rep. (S) 579, [2006] All E.R. (D) 404.

  88. 88.

    See e.g., Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119 (Wyo.1998).

  89. 89.

    For the results component in derivative criminal liability see below at paragraph 4.3.3.

  90. 90.

    Factual impossibility is discussed below at paragraph 6.2.1.1.

  91. 91.

    See above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  92. 92.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.2.

  93. 93.

    For the relevant questions of the factual element requirement in criminal law see above at paragraph 4.1.

  94. 94.

    Hereinafter at paragraph 6.2.3.

  95. 95.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.3.

  96. 96.

    Cogan and Leak, [1976] Q.B. 217, [1975] 2 All E.R. 1059, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 316, 61 Cr. App. Rep. 217, 139 J.P. 608, 119 Sol. Jo. 473.

  97. 97.

    Most, [1881] 7 Q.B.D. 244, 45 J.P. 696, 50 L.J.M.C. 113, 14 Cox C.C. 583, 29 W.R. 748, 44 L.T. 79; Invicta Plastics Ltd. v. Clare, [1976] R.T.R. 251, [1976] Crim. L.R. 131, 120 Sol. Jo. 62; State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 A. 805 (Dist.Ct.1923); United States v. Galleanni, 245 F. 977 (D.Mass.1917); Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law 335 (2nd ed., 1983).

  98. 98.

    El-Faisal, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 343; Looseley, [2001] U.K.H.L. 53, [2001] 4 All E.R. 897, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 2060, [2002] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 360; O’Shea, [2004] All E.R. (D) 78.

  99. 99.

    For the accessoryship-after-the-fact see above at paragraph 2.2.5.4.

  100. 100.

    Workman v. State, 216 Ind. 68, 21 N.E.2d 712 (1939); State v. Tazwell, 30 La.Ann. 884 (1878); Commonwealth v. Balakin, 356 Mass. 547, 254 N.E.2d 422 (1969); McGhee v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 422, 270 S.E.2d 729 (1980); People v. Wright, 26 Cal.App.2d 197, 79 P.2d 102 (1938); King, (1817) Russ. & Ry. 332, 168 E.R. 830; Kelly, (1820) Russ. & Ry. 421, 168 E.R. 876; Percival, [2003] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1561.

  101. 101.

    RG 23, 292; RG 59, 376; RG 61, 360; RG 71, 193; BGH 6, 248; BGH 19, 323; OGH 3, 1.

  102. 102.

    For the circumstances component in derivative criminal liability see above at paragraph 4.3.2.

  103. 103.

    This is the results component of all homicide offenses. See Sir Edward Coke, Institutions of the Laws of England—Third Part 47 (6th ed., 1681, 1817, 2001): “Murder is when a man of sound memory, and of the age of discretion, unlawfully killeth within any county of the realm any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the king’s peace, with malice aforethought, either expressed by the party or implied by law, [so as the party wounded, or hurt, etc die of the wound or hurt, etc within a year and a day after the same]”.

  104. 104.

    Richeson v. State, 685 N.E.2d 709 (Ind.App.1997); State v. Brown, 479 A.2d 1317 (Me.1984).

  105. 105.

    See above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  106. 106.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.2.

  107. 107.

    See above at paragraph 4.2.3.

  108. 108.

    RG 13, 121; RG 36, 402; RG 67, 343; RG 70, 293; RG 72, 373; BGH 2, 223; BGH 11, 66; BGH 19, 339.

  109. 109.

    Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 Hastings L. J. 91 (1985); Daniel B. Yeager, Dangerous Games and the Criminal Law, 16 Crim. Just. Ethics 3 (1997); Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 217 (2000).

  110. 110.

    I. R. Scott, The Common Law Offence of Incitement to Commit Crime, 4 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 289 (1975); Race Relations Board v. Applin, [1973] Q.B. 815, [1973] All E.R. 1190, [1973] 2 W.L.R. 895, 117 Sol. Jo. 417; BGH 2, 223; BGH 19, 339. See more: article 26 of the German penal code, article 121-7 of the French penal code, article 20(3) of the Lithuanian penal code and article 2 of chapter 5 of the Finnish penal code.

  111. 111.

    Luffman, [2008] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1379; Bryce, [2004] Crim. L.R. 936, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1231, [2004] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 592; Schriek, [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 139; Turner v. LaBelle, 251 F.Supp. 443 (D.Conn.1966); Allen v. State, 91 Md.App. 705, 605 A.2d 960 (1992); Horton v. Mead, [1913] 1 K.B. 154, [1913] All E.R. Rep. 954.

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    Professor Gabriel Hallevy

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Hallevy, G. (2012). The Factual Element Requirement. In: The Matrix of Derivative Criminal Liability. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28105-1_4

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