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Typology of Derivative Criminal Liability

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The Matrix of Derivative Criminal Liability

Abstract

Derivative criminal liability is by nature derivative. What makes it derivative is its characteristic of derivability, i.e., the ability to be the derivative of another legal object (the object-offense). This characteristic is manifest in all types of derivation and multiple derivation. Derivability, the types of derivation, and multiple derivation are discussed below.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Derivability is discussed below at paragraph 2.1.1. Types of derivation are discussed below at paragraph 2.1.2. Multiple derivations are discussed below at paragraph 2.1.3.

  2. 2.

    People v. Urbana, 18 Ill.2d 81, 163 N.E.2d 511 (1959); State v. Beckwith, 135 Me. 423, 198 A. 739 (1938); Baker v. State, 6 Md.App. 148, 250 A.2d 677 (1969).

  3. 3.

    Multiple derivations are discussed below at paragraph 2.1.3.

  4. 4.

    Above at paragraph 2.1.1.1.

  5. 5.

    S.Z. Feller, The Provisions Relating to the Typical Form of an Offence and Their Application to Its Derivative Forms of Criminal Conduct, 2 Isr. L. Rev. 580 (1967); S.Z. Feller, The Application of Presumptions to the Derivative Forms of an Offence, 3 Isr. L. Rev. 562 (1968).

  6. 6.

    Article 1 of the Suicide Act, 1961, c.60 in Britain; Wallace v. State, 232 Ind. 700, 116 N.E.2d 100 (1953) and State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 251 N.W. 717 (1933) in the United States.

  7. 7.

    State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841 (1970); Bell v. State, 118 Ga.App. 291, 163 S.E.2d 323 (1968); Larsen v. State, 86 Nev. 451, 470 P.2d 417 (1970); State v. Goddard, 74 Wash.2d 848, 447 P.2d 180 (1968).

  8. 8.

    State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426 (Tenn.2000): “…the clear language of the statute evinces a legislative intent to require both an intent to solicit and an intent that the crime solicited be committed”.

  9. 9.

    The mental element requirement of the derivative criminal liability is discussed below at Chap. 5.

  10. 10.

    The types of derivation, internal derivation and external derivation, are discussed below at paragraphs 2.1.2.1 and 2.1.2.2.

  11. 11.

    See above at paragraphs 2.1.1.1–2.1.1.4.

  12. 12.

    The characteristic of assimilation is discussed above at paragraph 2.1.1.4.

  13. 13.

    Ibid.

  14. 14.

    See above at paragraphs 2.1.1.1–2.1.1.4.

  15. 15.

    People v. Bloom, 149 App.Div. 295, 133 N.Y.S. 708 (1912); State v. Furr, 292 N.C. 711, 235 S.E.2d 193 (1977); Moss v. State, 888 P.2d 509 (Okl.Crim.App.1994); Bentley, [1923] 1 K.B. 403.

  16. 16.

    Meyer v. State, 47 Md.App. 679, 425 A.2d 664 (1981); DeKromme, (1892) 17 Cox C.C. 492, (1892) 66 L.T.R. 301.

  17. 17.

    Gabriel Hallevy, A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law 138-141 (2010).

  18. 18.

    Above at paragraph 2.1.1.1.

  19. 19.

    BGH 14, 156; BGH 18, 160; BGH 31, 10.

  20. 20.

    Gabriel Hallevy, A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law 149-152 (2010).

  21. 21.

    In Fig. 2.3, the form of attempt is an example to internal derivation, and the form of incitement is an example to external derivation. Of course, any other suitable form of derivative criminal liability may be set instead of these examples.

  22. 22.

    Joint-inciters (joint-perpetrators of incitement) are not required to fulfill all the factual element requirements of the incitement, but it is enough that these requirements are fulfilled jointly (some in one inciter and some in other inciter). However, parallel inciters, who function separately, are required to fulfill all of the factual element requirements of the incitement separately, i.e., all the factual element requirements of the incitement should be fulfilled in each one of them.

  23. 23.

    For instance, article 22 of the German penal code provides: “Eine Straftat versucht, wer nach seiner Vorstellung von der Tat zur Verwirklichung des Tatbestandes unmittelbar ansetzt”; article 121-5 of the French penal code provides: “La tentative est constituée dès lors que, manifestée par un commencement d'exécution, elle n'a été suspendue ou n'a manqué son effet qu'en raison de circonstances indépendantes de la volonté de son auteur”; and article 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c.47 (Britain) provides: “If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty of attempting to commit the offence”.

  24. 24.

    RG 59, 157; RG 66, 141; RG 69, 327; RG 71, 53; BGH 3, 297; BGH 6, 302; BGH 6, 98; BGH 9, 63; BGH 12, 54; BGH 19, 350; BGH 20, 150; BGH 26, 201; BGH 30, 363; BGH 31, 10; BGH 31, 178; BGH 35, 6; BGH 36, 249; BGH 37, 294.

  25. 25.

    Eagleton, [1855] 6 Cox C.C. 559; Button, [1900] All E.R. 1648, [1900] 2 Q.B. 597, 69 L.J.Q.B. 901, 83 L.T. 288, 64 J.P. 600, 48 W.R. 703, 16 T.L.R. 525, 44 Sol. Jo. 659, 19 Cox. C.C. 568; Robinson, [1915] 2 K.B. 342; People v. Bracey, 41 N.Y.2d 296, 392 N.Y.S.2d 412, 360 N.E.2d 1094 (1977); Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 980, 243 S.E.2d 212 (1978); People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174, 544 N.Y.S.2d 769, 543 N.E.2d 34 (1989); People v. Acosta, 80 N.Y.2d 665, 593 N.Y.S.2d 978, 609 N.E.2d 518 (1993); People v. Warren, 66 N.Y.2d 831, 498 N.Y.S.2d 353, 489 N.E.2d 240 (1985); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 114 (1912).

  26. 26.

    United States v. Desena, 287 F.3d 170 (2nd Cir.2002); Henderson, [1948] 91 Cox C.C. 97.

  27. 27.

    United States v. Colpon, 185 F.2d 629 (1950); Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 59 N.E. 55 (1901).

  28. 28.

    Antony Robin Duff, Criminal Attempts 37-42 (1996).

  29. 29.

    The unequivocality test is also called the Turner test. See J. W. Cecil Turner, Attempts to Commit Crimes, 5 Cambridge L. J. 230 (1933); Leon Radzinowicz and J. W. Cecil Turner, The Modern Approach to Criminal Law 279-280 (1948). See more in Barker, [1924] N.Z.L.R. 865, 874-875.

  30. 30.

    State v. Stewart, 143 Wis.2d 28, 420 N.W.2d 44 (1988); Campbell and Bradley v. Ward, [1955] N.Z.L.R. 471.

  31. 31.

    United States v. Cruz-Jiminez, 977 F.2d 95 (3rd Cir. 1992); United States v. McDowell, 714 F.2d 106 (11thCir. 1983); United States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900 (3rd Cir. 1983); Lemke v. United States, 14 Alaska 587, 211 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1954); State v. Mandel, 78 Ariz. 226, 278 P.2d 413 (1954); People v. Buffum, 40 Cal.2d 709, 256 P.2d 317 (1953); Larsen v. State, 86 Nev. 451, 470 P.2d 417 (1970); People v. Downer, 57 Cal.2d 800, 22 Cal. Rptr. 347, 372 P.2d 107 (1962). The test has been abolished in New Zealand in 1961 by s. 72(3) of the Crimes Act, 1961 which provides: “An act done or omitted with intent to commit an offence may constitute an attempt if it is immediately or proximately connected with the intended offence, whether or not there was any act unequivocally showing the intent to commit that offence”. See more at Wylie, [1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 167 and Duff, supra note 28, at pp. 50–52.

  32. 32.

    Hans Welzel, Das Deutsche Strafrecht—Eine Systematische Darstellung 189 (11 Auf., 1969); Gabriel Hallevy, Complicity in Criminal Law 224-229 (2008).

  33. 33.

    See above at paragraph 1.1.2.1.

  34. 34.

    Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 25-28 (5th ed., 2006); Anthony John Patrick Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (1978); Herbert L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law ch. 6 (1968).

  35. 35.

    See article 22 of the German Penal Code.

  36. 36.

    People v. Hawkins, 311 Ill.App.3d 418, 243 Ill.Dec. 621, 723 N.E.2d 1222 (2000); Boyle, (1987) Cr. App. Rep. 270; Jones, [1990] 3 All E.R. 886, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1057, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 351, 154 J.P. 413; Gullefer, [1990] 3 All E.R. 882, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1063, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 356; Geddes, [1996] 160 J.P. 697; Litholetovs, [2002] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1154; Bowles, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1608.

  37. 37.

    The factual element requirements of the criminal attempt are discussed below at paragraph 4.2.1, and the mental element requirements of the criminal attempt are discussed below at paragraph 5.2.1.

  38. 38.

    Above at paragraph 2.1.2.1.

  39. 39.

    For the distinction between result-offenses and conduct-offenses see Sir Gerald Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland 61 (1st ed., 1967); Treacy v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537, 559, [1971] 1 All E.R. 110, [1971] 2 W.L.R. 112, 55 Cr. App. Rep. 113, 135 J.P. 112.

  40. 40.

    For the factual element requirement in the derivative criminal liability see below at Chap. 4.2.1.

  41. 41.

    Gabriel Hallevy, Victim's Complicity in Criminal Law, 2 Int'l J. of Punishment & Sentencing 72 (2006).

  42. 42.

    Below at paragraph 6.2.1.

  43. 43.

    Below at paragraph 4.3.

  44. 44.

    The criminal attempt definition is discussed above at paragraph 2.2.1.1.

  45. 45.

    The factual element of the criminal attempt is discussed below at paragraph 4.2.1. The mental element of the criminal attempt is discussed below at paragraph 5.2.1.

  46. 46.

    See above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  47. 47.

    Below at paragraph 2.2.2.1.

  48. 48.

    Kenning, [2008] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1534, [2008] All E.R. (D) 317.

  49. 49.

    Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 Geo. L. J. 925 (1977); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 95 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975); People v. Gem Hang, 131 Cal.App.2d 69, 280 P.2d 28 (1955).

  50. 50.

    United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994); State v. Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 91 A.2d 571 (1952).

  51. 51.

    Theodore W. Cousens, Agreement as an Element in Conspiracy, 23 Va. L. Rev. 898 (1937); Suchedina, [2006] E.W.C.A. Crim. 2543, [2007] Crim. L.R. 301.

  52. 52.

    Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 666 (2nd ed., 1961); United States v. Melchor-Lopez, 627 F.2d 886 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Iennaco, 893 F.2d 394 (D.C.Cir.1990); Mondello v. State, 843 P.2d 1152 (Wyo.1992); United States v. Sharif, 817 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir.1982); State v. Mapp, 585 N.W.2d 746 (Iowa 1998); O'Neil v. State, 237 Wis. 391, 296 N.W. 96 (1941); Martinez v. State, 943 P.2d 1178 (Wyo.1997); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 90 L.Ed. 1575 (1946); United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135 (2nd Cir.1996); State v. Gillespie, 336 S.W.2d 677 (Mo.1960); Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225 (Wyo.1993).

  53. 53.

    United States v. Fincher, 723 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.1984).

  54. 54.

    Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947); United States v. Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir.1979); People v. Moran, 166 Cal.App.2d 410, 333 P.2d 243 (1958).

  55. 55.

    United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Michelena-Orovio, 702 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.1983).

  56. 56.

    United States v. Burchinal, 657 F.2d 985 (8th Cir.1981).

  57. 57.

    Webster, [2003] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1946; Singh, [2003] E.W.C.A. Crim. 3712; May & Butcher Ltd., [1934] 2 K.B. 17; Cooke, [1986] 1 A.C. 909, [1986] 2 All E.R. 985, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 327, 83 Cr. App. Rep. 339, 150 J.P. 498; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot, [1973] A.C. 807, [1973] 1 All E.R. 940, [1973] 2 W.L.R. 532, 57 Cr. App. Rep. 600, 137 J.P. 375; Roberts, [1998] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 441, 142 S.J. L.B. 29, 162 J.P. 169; Greenfield, [1973] 3 All E.R. 1050, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1151, 57 Cr. App. Rep. 849, 138 J.P. 58.

  58. 58.

    Hollinshead, [1985] 1 All E.R. 850, [1985] 2 W.L.R. 761, 80 Cr. App. Rep. 285; Hollinshead, [1985] 1 A.C. 975, [1985] 2 All E.R. 769, [1985] 3 W.L.R. 159, 81 Cr. App. Rep. 364; Po Koon-tai, [1980] H.K.L.R. 492.

  59. 59.

    See above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  60. 60.

    Tibbits, [1902] 1 K.B. 77; Mohan, [1967] 2 A.C. 187, [1967] 2 All E.R. 58, [1967] 2 W.L.R. 676; Cooper, [1947] 2 All E.R. 701, 63 T.L.R. 561, 32 Cr. App. Rep. 102, 112 J.P. 38, 46 L.G.R. 83; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Bhagwan, [1972] A.C. 60, [1970] 3 All E.R. 97, [1970] 3 W.L.R. 501, 54 Cr. App. Rep. 460, 134 J.P. 622; Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1973] A.C. 435, [1972] 2 All E.R. 898, [1972] 3 W.L.R. 143, 56 Cr. App. Rep. 633, 136 J.P. 728.

  61. 61.

    Blamires Transport Services Ltd. [1964] 1 Q.B. 278, [1963] 3 All E.R. 170, [1963] 3 W.L.R. 496, 61 L.G.R. 594, 127 J.P. 519, 47 Cr. App. Rep. 272; Welham v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1961] A.C. 103, [1960] 1 All E.R. 805, [1960] 2 W.L.R. 669, 44 Cr. App. Rep. 124; Barnett, [1951] 2 K.B. 425, [1951] 1 All E.R. 917, 49 L.G.R. 401, 115 J.P. 305, 35 Cr. App. Rep. 37, [1951] W.N. 214; West, [1948] 1 K.B. 709, [1948] 1 All E.R. 718, 46 L.G.R. 325, 112 J.P. 222, 32 Cr. App. Rep. 152, [1948] W.N. 136.

  62. 62.

    Above at paragraph 2.1.1.3.

  63. 63.

    Mohan, [1976] Q.B. 1, [1975] 2 All E.R. 193, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 859, 60 Cr. App. Rep. 272, [1975] R.T.R. 337, 139 J.P. 523; State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 612 A.2d 923 (1992); State v. Smith, 170 Wis.2d 701, 490 N.W.2d 40 (App.1992).

  64. 64.

    Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 624 (1941); United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693 (D.C.Cir.1995); Bolton, (1991) 94 Cr. App. Rep. 74, 156 J.P. 138; Anderson, [1986] 1 A.C. 27, [1985] 2 All E.R. 961, [1985] 3 W.L.R. 268, 81 Cr. App. Rep. 253; Liangsiriprasert v. United States Government, [1991] 1 A.C. 225, [1990] 2 All E.R. 866, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 606, 92 Cr. App. Rep. 77; Siracusa, (1989) 90 Cr. App. Rep. 340.

  65. 65.

    United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir.1980); McDonald v. State, 454 So.2d 488 (Miss.1984).

  66. 66.

    State v. King, 104 Iowa 727, 74 N.W. 691 (1898); Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 15 (Wyo.1993); Elkin v. People, 28 N.Y. 177 (1863).

  67. 67.

    Phillips, (1987) 86 Cr. App. Rep. 18, 151 J.P. 467; McDonnell, [1966] 1 Q.B. 233, [1966] 1 All E.R. 193, [1965] 3 W.L.R. 1138, 50 Cr. App. Rep. 5; I.C.R. Haulage Ltd., [1944] K.B. 551, [1944] 1 All E.R. 691. For the requirement of awareness in the criminal conspiracy see e.g., Smith, [1974] Q.B. 354, [1974] 1 All E.R. 632, [1974] 2 W.L.R. 20, 58 Cr. App. Rep. 320, 138 J.P. 236, [1974] R.V.R. 80, 233 E.G., 147, [1975] E.G.D. 292.

  68. 68.

    People v. Cortez, 18 Cal.4th 1223, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537 (1998); Mitchell v. State, 363 Md. 130, 767 A.2d 844 (2001); People v. Hammond, 187 Mich.App. 105, 466 N.W.2d 335 (1991).

  69. 69.

    People v. Harris, 72 Ill.2d 16, 17 Ill.Dec. 838, 377 N.E.2d 28 (1978); State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189 (La.1975); State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 571 A.2d 1227 (1990); Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Smallwood v. State, 106 Md.App. 1, 661 A.2d 747 (1995); Woollin, [1999] A.C. 82, [1998] 4 All E.R. 103, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 382, [1998] Crim. L.R. 890; Pearman, (1984) 80 Cr. App. Rep. 259; Mohan, [1976] Q.B. 1, [1975] 2 All E.R. 193, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 859, 60 Cr. App. Rep. 272, [1975] R.T.R. 337, 139 J.P. 523.

  70. 70.

    See above at paragraph 2.2.1.2.

  71. 71.

    See above at paragraph 1.3.

  72. 72.

    For the assimilation characteristic of the derivative criminal liability see above at paragraph 2.1.1.4.

  73. 73.

    Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393, 394-409 (1922).

  74. 74.

    John Hagan, Victims Before the Law—The Organizational Domination of Criminal Law 8 (1983).

  75. 75.

    Edw. I, c.12 (1285).

  76. 76.

    Edw. I, c.10 (1307).

  77. 77.

    Edw. III, c.11 (1330).

  78. 78.

    Y.B., 24 Edw. III, f.75, pl.99 (1351).

  79. 79.

    See above at paragraph 1.1.1.

  80. 80.

    Poulterers' Case, (1611) 9 Coke Rep. 55b, 77 E.R. 813.

  81. 81.

    Timberley, (1663) 1 Sid. 68, 1 Keble 203, 82 E.R. 974, 83 E.R. 900; Starling, (1664) 1 Sid. 174, 82 E.R. 1039; Sidley, (1664) 1 Sid. 168, 1 Keble 620, 82 E.R. 1036; Daniell, (1704) 6 Mod. 99, 87 E.R. 856; Jones v. Randall, (1774) Lofft 383, 98 E.R. 706.

  82. 82.

    Jones, (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 345, 110 E.R. 485.

  83. 83.

    State v. Burnham, 15 N.H. 396 (1844); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111 (Mass.1842); Kamara v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1974] A.C. 104, [1973] 2 All E.R. 1242, [1973] 3 W.L.R. 198, 57 Cr. App. Rep. 880, 137 J.P. 714.

  84. 84.

    See e.g., sec. 1(1),(2) of the Criminal Law Act, 1977, c.45 as amended by sec. 5 of the Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c.47.

  85. 85.

    People v. Hawkins, 311 Ill.App.3d 418, 243 Ill.Dec. 621, 723 N.E.2d 1222 (2000); Boyle, (1987) Cr. App. Rep. 270; Jones, [1990] 3 All E.R. 886, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1057, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 351, 154 J.P. 413; Gullefer, [1990] 3 All E.R. 882, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1063, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 356; Geddes, [1996] 160 J.P. 697; Litholetovs, [2002] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1154; Bowles, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1608.

  86. 86.

    Below at paragraph 4.3.1.

  87. 87.

    Above at paragraph 2.2.1.1.

  88. 88.

    Above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  89. 89.

    The factual element requirements of the joint-perpetration are discussed below at paragraph 4.2.2, and the mental element requirements of the joint-perpetration are discussed below at paragraph 5.2.2.

  90. 90.

    For the distinction between result-offenses and conduct-offenses see Sir Gerald Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland 61 (1st ed., 1967); Treacy v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537, 559, [1971] 1 All E.R. 110, [1971] 2 W.L.R. 112, 55 Cr. App. Rep. 113, 135 J.P. 112.

  91. 91.

    For the factual element requirement in the derivative criminal liability see below at Chap. 4.

  92. 92.

    The criminal attempt definition is discussed above at paragraph 2.2.1.1.

  93. 93.

    The factual element of the criminal attempt is discussed below at paragraph 4.2.1. The mental element of the criminal attempt is discussed below at paragraph 5.2.1.

  94. 94.

    See above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  95. 95.

    See e.g., Morrisey v. State, 620 A.2d 207 (Del.1993); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 790 A.2d 15 (2002); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 552 S.E.2d 282 (2001); Gallimore v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 441, 436 S.E.2d 421 (1993). Article 25(1) of the German Penal Code provides: “Als Täter wird bestraft, wer die Straftat selbst oder durch einen anderen begeht”.

  96. 96.

    Anon, (1634) Kel 53, 84 E.R. 1079.

  97. 97.

    Above at paragraph 1.1.2.1.

  98. 98.

    Cogan and Leak, [1976] Q.B. 217, [1975] 2 All E.R. 1059, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 316, 61 Cr. App. Rep. 217, 139 J.P. 608, 119 Sol. Jo. 473; Walters v. Lunt, [1951] 2 All E.R. 645, 49 L.G.R. 809, 115 J.P. 512, 35 Cr.App. Rep. 94, [1951] W.N. 472; Director of Public Prosecutions v. K., [1997] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 36.

  99. 99.

    United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88 (3rd Cir.1973); Boushea v. United States, 173 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.1949); People v. Mutchler, 309 Ill. 207, 140 N.E. 820 (1923); State v. Runkles, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d 111 (1992); State v. Thomas, 619 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn.1981).

  100. 100.

    Butt, (1884) 49 J.P. 233, 15 Cox C.C. 564, 51 L.T. 607, 1 T.L.R. 103; Stringer and Banks, (1991) 94 Cr. App. Rep. 13.

  101. 101.

    Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63 (App.D.C.1907); Commonwealth v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136 (1814); Tyler, (1838) 8 Car. & P. 616, 173 E.R. 643.

  102. 102.

    Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70, 38 So. 182 (1904); People v. Monks, 133 Cal.App. 440, 24 P.2d 508 (1933).

  103. 103.

    Manley, (1844) 1 Cox C.C. 104; Mazeau, (1840) 9 Car. & P. 676, 173 E.R. 1006.

  104. 104.

    Bourne, (1952) 36 Cr. App. Rep. 125; Rupert Cross, Duress and Aiding and Abetting (A Reply), 69 L. Q. Rev. 354 (1953).

  105. 105.

    Nicola Lacey and Celia Wells, Reconstructing Criminal Law—Critical Perspectives on Crime and the Criminal Process 53 (2nd ed., 1998).

  106. 106.

    People v. Hawkins, 311 Ill.App.3d 418, 243 Ill.Dec. 621, 723 N.E.2d 1222 (2000); Boyle, (1987) Cr. App. Rep. 270; Jones, [1990] 3 All E.R. 886, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1057, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 351, 154 J.P. 413; Gullefer, [1990] 3 All E.R. 882, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1063, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 356; Geddes, [1996] 160 J.P. 697; Litholetovs, [2002] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1154; Bowles, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1608.

  107. 107.

    Above at paragraph 2.2.3.1.

  108. 108.

    For the distinction between result-offenses and conduct-offenses see Sir Gerald Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland 61 (1st ed., 1967); Treacy v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537, 559, [1971] 1 All E.R. 110, [1971] 2 W.L.R. 112, 55 Cr. App. Rep. 113, 135 J.P. 112.

  109. 109.

    For the factual element requirement in the derivative criminal liability see below at Chap. 4.

  110. 110.

    The criminal attempt definition is discussed above at paragraph 2.2.1.1.

  111. 111.

    The factual element of the criminal attempt is discussed below at paragraph 4.2.1. The mental element of the criminal attempt is discussed below at paragraph 5.2.1.

  112. 112.

    See above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  113. 113.

    For the distinction between perpetration-through-another and incitement see below at paragraph 2.3.2.3.

  114. 114.

    See above at paragraph 2.2.2.1.

  115. 115.

    See above at paragraph 1.1.2.1.

  116. 116.

    Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 25-28 (5th ed., 2006); Anthony John Patrick Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (1978); Herbert L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law ch. 6 (1968).

  117. 117.

    See in general People v. Hawkins, 311 Ill.App.3d 418, 243 Ill.Dec. 621, 723 N.E.2d 1222 (2000); Boyle, (1987) Cr. App. Rep. 270; Jones, [1990] 3 All E.R. 886, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1057, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 351, 154 J.P. 413; Gullefer, [1990] 3 All E.R. 882, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1063, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 356; Geddes, [1996] 160 J.P. 697; Litholetovs, [2002] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1154; Bowles, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1608.

  118. 118.

    For conspiracy as preparatory stage of joint-perpetration (of both the specific offense and the incitement) see above at paragraph 2.2.2.1.

  119. 119.

    If not, the first stage to be incriminated may be the preparatory stage of joint-incitement, which is embodied within the criminal conspiracy (conspiracy to incite).

  120. 120.

    For serial multiple derivations see above at paragraph 2.1.3.1.

  121. 121.

    For the definition of the criminal attempt see above at paragraph 2.2.1.1.

  122. 122.

    The definition of incitement has been presented above at paragraph 2.2.4.

  123. 123.

    State v. Cotton, 109 N.M. 769, 790 P.2d 1050 (App.1990); People v. Bloom, 149 App.Div. 295, 133 N.Y.S. 708 (1912); Krause, (1902) 66 J.P. 121, 18 T.L.R. 238; Banks, (1873) 12 Cox C.C. 393. For more see the explanatory note of article 5.02 of The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code—Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 381 (1962, 1985).

  124. 124.

    Jones, [2007] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1118, [2007] 4 All E.R. 112; Cope, (1921) 16 Cr. App. Rep. 17.

  125. 125.

    Higgins, (1801) 2 East 5, 102 E.R. 269.

  126. 126.

    E.g., article 30(1) of the German penal code provides: “Wer einen anderen zu bestimmen versucht, ein Verbrechen zu begehen oder zu ihm anzustiften, wird nach den Vorschriften über den Versuch des Verbrechens bestraft;…”; See more in BGH 14, 156; BGH 24, 38; BGH 31, 10.

  127. 127.

    E.g., Higgins, (1801) 2 East 5, 102 E.R. 269; Ford v. State, 612 So.2d 1317 (Ala.Cr.App.1992); Braham v. State, 571 P.2d 631 (Alaska 1977); State v. Mandel, 78 Ariz. 226, 278 P.2d 413 (1954); People v. Adami, 36 Cal.App.3d 452, 111 Cal.Rptr. 544 (1973); Griffin v. State, 26 Ga. 493 (1858); State v. Otto, 102 Idaho 250, 629 P.2d 646 (1981); State v. Baxley, 633 So.2d 142 (La.1994); Commonwealth v. Hamel, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 250, 752 N.E.2d 808 (2001); State v. Lowrie, 237 Minn. 240, 54 N.W.2d 265 (1952); State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S.W.2d 609 (1928); State v. Sunzar, 331 N.J.Super. 248, 751 A.2d 627 (1999); Young v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 670 (Ky.1998); Sirat, (1985) 83 Cr. App. Rep. 41; Booth, [1999] Crim. L. R. 144.

  128. 128.

    The factual element of the criminal attempt is discussed below at paragraph 4.2.1. The factual element of the incitement is discussed below at paragraph 4.2.4.

  129. 129.

    The mental element of the criminal attempt is discussed below at paragraph 5.2.1. The mental element of the incitement is discussed below at paragraph 5.2.4. See more at BGH 18, 160.

  130. 130.

    BGH 26, 358; BGH 27, 45.

  131. 131.

    Below at paragraph 4.2.4.

  132. 132.

    This example involves the question of factual impossibility as discussed below at paragraph 6.2.1.1.

  133. 133.

    Yip Chiu-Cheung, [1995] 1 A.C. 111, [1994] 2 All E.R. 924, [1994] 3 W.L.R. 514, [1994] Crim. L.R. 824, 99 Cr. App. Rep. 406.

  134. 134.

    RG 15, 315; RG 44, 172; RG 72, 26; BVerfGE 57, 250; BGH 32, 115; BGH 32, 345; BGH 33, 283; United States v. Barcella, 432 F.2d 570 (1st Cir.1970); Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 253 N.E.2d 346 (1969); Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla.Crim.App.1971); Commonwealth v. Flowers, 479 Pa. 153, 387 A.2d 1268 (1978); State v. Mansir, 440 A.2d 6 (Me.1982); United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir.1973); United States v. Snow, 537 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir.1976); United States v. Marquez, 511 F.2d 62 (10th Cir.1975); State v. Allen, 633 N.W.2d 752 (Iowa 2001).

  135. 135.

    See above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  136. 136.

    Webster, [2006] E.W.C.A. Crim. 415, [2006] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 103; Ellis, [2008] E.W.C.A. Crim. 886, [2008] All E.R. (D) 243.

  137. 137.

    Greatrex, [1999] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 126, [1998] Crim. L.R. 733; Uddin, [1999] Q.B. 431, [1998] 2 All E.R. 744, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1001, [1999] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 319, [1999] Crim. L.R. 1998; McCarthy, [2003] E.W.C.A. Crim. 484, [2003] All E.R. (D) 409; Reid, [2005] E.W.C.A. Crim. 595.

  138. 138.

    See above at paragraph 1.1.2.1.

  139. 139.

    Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 25-28 (5th ed., 2006); Anthony John Patrick Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (1978); Herbert L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law ch. 6 (1968).

  140. 140.

    See in general People v. Hawkins, 311 Ill.App.3d 418, 243 Ill.Dec. 621, 723 N.E.2d 1222 (2000); Boyle, (1987) Cr. App. Rep. 270; Jones, [1990] 3 All E.R. 886, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1057, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 351, 154 J.P. 413; Gullefer, [1990] 3 All E.R. 882, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1063, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 356; Geddes, [1996] 160 J.P. 697; Litholetovs, [2002] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1154; Bowles, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1608.

  141. 141.

    If not, the first stage to be incriminated may be the preparatory stage of joint-accessoryship, which is embodied within the criminal conspiracy (conspiracy to render assistance).

  142. 142.

    Above at paragraph 2.2.5. For the factual element requirements of the accessoryship see below at paragraph 4.2.5.

  143. 143.

    Dunnington, [1984] Q.B. 472; Chief Constable of Hampshire v. Mace, (1986) 84 Cr. App. Rep. 40, 150 J.P. 470. Sub-article 1(4)(b) of the Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c.47 provides: “This section applies to any offence which, if it were completed, would be triable in England and Wales as an indictable offence, other than- (a)…; (b) aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or suborning the commission of an offence”.

  144. 144.

    State v. Tazwell, 30 La.Ann. 884 (1878); State v. Doody, 434 A.2d 523 (Me.1981).

  145. 145.

    See sub-section 2.06(3)(a)(ii) of The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code—Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 30 (1962, 1985) which provides: “A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:…(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it, or…”.

  146. 146.

    . Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz vom 4.8.1953 (BGBl. I. S. 735).

  147. 147.

    See e.g., BGH 14, 156; BGH 31, 10.

  148. 148.

    See above at paragraph 1.3.1.

  149. 149.

    The factual element of the criminal attempt is discussed below at paragraph 4.2.1. The factual element of the accessoryship is discussed below at paragraph 4.2.5.

  150. 150.

    The mental element of the criminal attempt is discussed below at paragraph 5.2.1. The mental element of the accessoryship is discussed below at paragraph 5.2.5.

  151. 151.

    This example involves the question of factual impossibility as discussed below at paragraph 6.2.1.1.

  152. 152.

    Yip Chiu-Cheung, [1995] 1 A.C. 111, [1994] 2 All E.R. 924, [1994] 3 W.L.R. 514, [1994] Crim. L.R. 824, 99 Cr. App. Rep. 406.

  153. 153.

    RG 15, 315; RG 44, 172; RG 72, 26; BVerfGE 57, 250; BGH 32, 115; BGH 32, 345; BGH 33, 283; United States v. Barcella, 432 F.2d 570 (1st Cir.1970); Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 253 N.E.2d 346 (1969); Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla.Crim.App.1971); Commonwealth v. Flowers, 479 Pa. 153, 387 A.2d 1268 (1978); State v. Mansir, 440 A.2d 6 (Me.1982); United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir.1973); United States v. Snow, 537 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir.1976); United States v. Marquez, 511 F.2d 62 (10th Cir.1975); State v. Allen, 633 N.W.2d 752 (Iowa 2001).

  154. 154.

    RG 15, 315; RG 17, 377; RG 60, 23.

  155. 155.

    Howard Newcomb Morse, A Survey of Accessory After the Fact Exemptions, 54 Dick L. Rev. 324 (1949); E.M. Burchell, Who is an Accessory After the Fact?, 88 S. African L. J. 292 (1971).

  156. 156.

    United States v. Thornton, 178 F.Supp. 42 (E.D.N.Y.1959); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir.1978); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir.1979); Jones v. United States, 716 A.2d 160 (D.C.App. 1998).

  157. 157.

    United States v. Lepanto, 817 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir.1987); United States v. Elkins, 732 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir.1984); People v. Farmer, 196 N.Y. 65, 89 N.E. 462 (1909); Harrison v. State, 69 Tex.Cr.R. 291, 153 S.W. 139 (1912); Fields v. State, 213 Ark. 899, 214 S.W.2d 230 (1948); Blakeley v. State, 24 Tex.App. 616, 7 S.W. 233 (1888); People v. Duty, 269 Cal.App.2d 97, 74 Cal.Rptr. 606 (1969); Commonwealth v. Wood, 302 Mass. 265, 19 N.E.2d 320 (1939); State v. Clifford, 263 Or. 436, 502 P.2d 1371 (1972); Lowe v. People, 135 Colo. 209, 309 P.2d 601 (1957); Loyd v. State, 42 Ga. 221 (1871); Maddox v. Commonwealth, 349 S.W.2d 686 (Ky.1960); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 552 S.E.2d 282 (2001).

  158. 158.

    See above at paragraph 2.2.2.

  159. 159.

    Harrel v. State, 39 Miss. 702 (1861); State v. Tollett, 173 Tenn. 447, 121 S.W.2d 525 (1938); People v. Hardin, 207 Cal.App.2d 336, 24 Cal.Rptr. 563 (1962); Poston v. State, 12 Tex.App. 408 (1882); Howard v. People, 97 Colo. 550, 51 P.2d 594 (1935); Heyen v. State, 114 Neb. 783, 210 N.W. 165 (1926); Little v. United States, 709 A.2d 708 (D.C.App.1998); United States v. Nystorm, 39 M.J. 698 (N.M.C.M.R.1993); State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La.1983); State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567 (1979); Baker v. State, 184 Tenn. 503, 201 S.W.2d 667 (1947).

  160. 160.

    For the definition of the accessoryship see above at paragraph 2.2.5.

  161. 161.

    Outlaw v. United States, 632 A.2d 408 (D.C.App.1993); Hearn v. State, 43 Fla. 151, 29 So. 433 (1901); State v. Jett, 69 Kan. 788, 77 P. 546 (1904).

  162. 162.

    Donald, (1986) 83 Cr. App. Rep. 49, 130 Sol. Jo. 284, [1986] L.S.G. 1225.

  163. 163.

    Donaldson v. State, 722 So.2d 177 (Fla.1998); Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622 (Fla.1988); Jordan v. State, 272 Ga. 395, 530 S.E.2d 192 (2000); Crosby v. State, 179 Miss. 149, 175 So. 180 (1937).

  164. 164.

    State v. Butler, 17 Vt. 145 (1845); State v. Collins, 329 S.C. 23, 495 S.E.2d 202 (1998); People v. Hartford, 159 Mich.App. 295, 406 N.W.2d 276 (1987); Smith v. United States, 306 F.2d 286 (D.C.Cir.1962); White v. People, 81 Ill. 333 (1876); Walker v. State, 246 Ind. 386, 204 N.E.2d 850 (1965); Buckley v. State, 511 So.2d 1354 (Miss.1987).

  165. 165.

    Above at paragraph 5.2.5.

  166. 166.

    Hayter, [2005] U.K.H.L. 6, [2005] 2 All E.R. 209, [2005] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 3, [2005] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 4, [2005] Crim. L.R. 720.

  167. 167.

    Sub-article 4(1) of the Criminal Law Act, 1967, c.58 provides: “(1) Where a person has committed an arrestable offence, any other person who, knowing and believing him to be guilty of the offence or of some other arrestable offence, does without lawful authority or reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede his apprehension or prosecution shall be guilty of an offence”.

  168. 168.

    Morgan, [1972] 1 Q.B. 436, [1972] 1 All E.R. 348, [1972] 2 W.L.R. 123, 56 Cr. App. Rep. 181, 136 J.P. 160, 116 Sol. Jo. 76.

  169. 169.

    Holley, [1963] 1 All E.R. 106; Spinks, [1982] 1 All E.R. 587.

  170. 170.

    Above at paragraph 2.2.5. See more at BGH 6, 248; BGH 19, 323.

  171. 171.

    For the general course of the joint-perpetration see above at paragraph 2.2.2.

  172. 172.

    For the general course of the incitement see above at paragraph 2.2.4.

  173. 173.

    For the general course of the perpetration-through-another see above at paragraph 2.2.3.

  174. 174.

    For the general course of the accessoryship see above at paragraph 2.2.5.

  175. 175.

    For the essence of internal derivation see above at paragraph 2.1.2.1.

  176. 176.

    I.e., the principal perpetrator, the joint-perpetrator and the perpetrator-through-another.

  177. 177.

    As aforesaid, if the plan is to use another person without his consent, it is perpetration-through-another. If the other person consents to participate, it is a new plan, and he becomes joint-perpetrator.

  178. 178.

    For the essence of internal derivation see above at paragraph 2.1.2.1.

  179. 179.

    Thus, harsher punishments are imposed for primary contribution and indirect function requires different factual and mental elements than the object-offense.

  180. 180.

    For the general course of the joint-perpetration see above at paragraph 2.2.2. For the general course of the accessoryship see above at paragraph 2.2.5.

  181. 181.

    Keith John Michael Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity 27-30 (1991); Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] Q.B. 773, [1975] 2 All E.R. 684, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 11, 61 Cr. App. Rep. 118, [1975] R.T.R. 473, 139 J.P. 569; S. v. Director of Public Prosecutions., [2003] E.W.C.A Crim. 3, [2003] E.W.H.C. 2717; Percival, [2003] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1561; Rose, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 764, [2004] All E.R. (D) 222.

  182. 182.

    Giannetto, [1997] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 1, [1996] Crim. L.R. 722, 140 Sol. Jo. 167; Thatcher, (1987) 39 D.L.R. (3d) 275; John H. Tate, Distinctions between Accessory before the Fact and Principal, 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 96 (1962); United States v. Bell, 812 F.2d 188 (5th Cir.1987); Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63 (App.D.C.1907); People v. Monks, 133 Cal. App. 440, 24 P.2d 508 (Cal.App.4Dist.1933); Keithler v. State, 18 Miss. 192 (Miss.Err.&App.1848); State v. Sowell, 353 Md. 713, 728 A.2d 712 (Md.1999); State v. Johnson, 367 Md. 418, 788 A.2d 628 (Md.2002).

  183. 183.

    For the boundaries of derivative criminal liability see below at Chap. 6.

  184. 184.

    United States v. Bell, 812 F.2d 188 (5th Cir.1987).

  185. 185.

    For the general course of the joint-perpetration see above at paragraph 2.2.2. For the general course of the incitement see above at paragraph 2.2.4.

  186. 186.

    For the assimilation characteristic of the derivative criminal liability see above at paragraph 2.1.1.4.

  187. 187.

    Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] Q.B. 773, [1975] 2 All E.R. 684, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 11, 61 Cr. App. Rep. 118, [1975] R.T.R. 473, 139 J.P. 569, per Lord Widgery CJ.

  188. 188.

    William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 36 (1765); Moehring v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 290 S.E.2d 891 (Va.1982); Hooker v. State, 716 So.2d 1104 (Miss.1998); State v. Ladd, 210 W.Va. 413, 557 S.E.2d 820 (W.Va.2001); Hilton, [1858] 8 Cox C.C. 87; Workman v. State, 216 Ind. 68, 21 N.E.2d 712 (Ind.1939); State v. Tazwell, 30 La. Ann. 884 (La.1878); Commonwealth v. Balakin, 356 Mass. 547, 254 N.E.2d 422 (Mass.1969); McGhee v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 422, 270 S.E.2d 729 (Va.1980).

  189. 189.

    For the boundaries of derivative criminal liability see below at Chap. 6.

  190. 190.

    See e.g., sub-article 29(c) of the Israeli Penal Code.

  191. 191.

    BGH St. 40, 219.

  192. 192.

    Anon, (1634) Kel 53, 84 E.R. 1079.

  193. 193.

    Michael, (1840) 9 Car. & P. 356, 2 Mood C.C. 120; Butt, (1884) 49 J.P. 233, 15 Cox C.C. 564, 51 L.T. 607, 1 T.L.R. 103; Stringer and Banks, (1991) 94 Cr. App. Rep. 13, [1991] Crim. L.R. 639; Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70, 38 So. 182 (Ala.1905); Morrisey v. State, 620 A.2d 207 (Del.Supr.1993); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 790 A.2d 15 (Md.2002); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 552 S.E.2d 282 (S.C.2001); United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88 (3rd Cir.1973); Boushea v. United States, 173 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.1949); State v. Thomas, 619 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn.1981); Parnell v. State, 323 Ark. 34, 912 S.W.2d 422 (Ark.1996).

  194. 194.

    Cogan and Leak, [1976] Q.B. 217, [1975] 2 All E.R. 1059, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 316, 61 Cr. App. Rep. 217, 139 J.P. 608, [1975] Crim. L.R. 584, 119 Sol. Jo. 473; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan, [1976] A.C. 182, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 913, 61 Cr. App. Rep. 136, 139 J.P. 476; Nicola Lacey and Celia Wells, Reconstructing Criminal Law—Critical Perspectives on Crime and the Criminal Process 53 (2nd ed., 1998); Sanford. H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 323, 388-389 (1985).

  195. 195.

    United States v. Azadian, 436 F. 2d 81 (9th Cir.1971); State v. Haines, 25 So. 372 (1899). For the distinction between perpetration-through-another and incitement see above at paragraph 2.3.2.3.

  196. 196.

    Hans-Heinrich Jescheck und Thomas Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts—Allgemeiner Teil 691-697 (5 Auflage, 1996); BGH St. 18, 87; RG St. 74, 84.

  197. 197.

    Morrisey v. State, 620 A.2d 207 (Del.1993); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 790 A.2d 15 (2002); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 552 S.E.2d 282 (2001); Gallimore v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 441, 436 S.E.2d 421 (1993).

  198. 198.

    For the criminal conspiracy see above at paragraph 2.2.2.1.

  199. 199.

    See above at paragraph 2.3.1.

  200. 200.

    RG 6, 169; RG 58, 113.

  201. 201.

    Wilcox v. Jeffery, [1951] 1 All E.R. 464, 49 L.G.R. 363, 115 J.P. 151, [1951] W.N. 77; People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.3d 547, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318 (1984); State v. Grebe, 461 S.W.2d 265 (Mo.1970). Compare to article 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c.94 as amended by Criminal Law Act, 1977, s. 65(4), which provides: “Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender”.

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    Professor Gabriel Hallevy

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Hallevy, G. (2012). Typology of Derivative Criminal Liability. In: The Matrix of Derivative Criminal Liability. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28105-1_2

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