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The Principle of Personal Liability and Its Applicability to Derivative Criminal Liability

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Abstract

The principle of personal liability in criminal law is the fourth fundamental principle in the general theory of criminal law. The other three are the principle of legality, the principle of conduct, and the principle of culpability. The principle of personal liability relates to the personal aspects of the imposition of criminal liability, including the identity of those involved in the perpetration of the offense as well as the course of the offense itself, from planning to full completion. The most important application of the principle of personal liability in criminal law is derivative criminal liability.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See in general in Gabriel Hallevy, A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law 1-5 (2010).

  2. 2.

    Law 116 of the Code of Hammurabi (L. W. King trans.) provided: “If the prisoner dies in prison from blows or maltreatment, the master of the prisoner shall convict the merchant before the judge. If he was a free-born man, the son of the merchant shall be put to death; if it was a slave, he shall pay one-third of a mina of gold, and all that the master of the prisoner gave he shall forfeit”.

  3. 3.

    Laws 209-210 of the Code of Hammurabi (L. W. King trans.) provided: “209. If a man strikes a free-born woman so that she loses her unborn child, he shall pay ten shekels for her loss. 210. If the woman dies, his daughter shall be put to death”.

  4. 4.

    Laws 22-230 of the Code of Hammurabi (L. W. King trans.) provided: “229. If a builder builds a house for some one, and does not construct it properly, and the house which he built fall in and kill its owner, then that builder shall be put to death. 230. If it kills the son of the owner the son of that builder shall be put to death”.

  5. 5.

    Law 5 of the Assyrian Laws. See James B. Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament (3rd ed., 1969).

  6. 6.

    Laws 1-4 and 44 of the Hittites Laws. See ibid.

  7. 7.

    Mogens H. Hansen, Graphe or dike traumatos?, 24 GRBS 307, 308 (1983); N. R. H. Fisher, The Law of hubris in Athens, Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society 123, 133 (Cartledge, Millett and Todd eds., 1990).

  8. 8.

    Plato, Laws 876a-877a.

  9. 9.

    Douglas M. MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators 62-63 (1963); Michael Gagarin, Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law 30-37 (1981); Raphael Sealey, The Athenian Republic: Democracy or the Rule of Law? 70-77 (1987).

  10. 10.

    Digesta, 4.3.15.1; Ulpian, 11 ad ed; Olivia F. Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome 15-16 (1995).

  11. 11.

    Digesta, 9.1; Institutions of Justinian, 4.9.

  12. 12.

    Laurent Chevailler, Contribution à l’Étude de la Complicité en Droit Pénal Romain, 31 RHD 200 (1953).

  13. 13.

    Digesta, 50.16.53.2.

  14. 14.

    See e.g., Digesta, 42.8.10.2; Codex Justinianus, 9.13.1.3; Ulpian, 73 ad ed.

  15. 15.

    Digesta, 47.2.91.1; Joseph A. C. Thomas, Delictal and Criminal Liability of the Young in Roman Law, 38 Rec. Bodin—L’Enfant 9, 17 (1977).

  16. 16.

    Digesta, 47.2.36.1,3; Ulpian, 36 ad Sab., 41 ad Sab.

  17. 17.

    Digesta, 47.2.50.2; Ulpian, 37 ad ed., 56 ad ed.; Codex Theodosianus, 9.16.3; Codex Justinianus, 9.8.4.1.

  18. 18.

    Digesta, 48.9.2; Codex Theodosianus, 9.29.2; Codex Justinianus, 9.39.1.1.

  19. 19.

    Digesta, 29.5.1; Ulpian, 50 ad ed.

  20. 20.

    Codex Theodosianus, 9.14.3.1; Codex Justinianus, 9.8.5.2.

  21. 21.

    Digesta, 9.2.27.21; Ulpian, 18 ad ed., 37 ad ed.

  22. 22.

    Digesta, 47.2.36; Ulpian, 41 ad Sab.

  23. 23.

    Digesta, 47.2.50.3; Ulpian, 37 ad ed.

  24. 24.

    Digesta, 50.17.152.2; Ulpian, 69 ad ed.

  25. 25.

    Digesta, 2.10.1.1; Ulpian, 7 ad ed.

  26. 26.

    Digesta, 9.4.2; Ulpian, 18 ad ed.

  27. 27.

    Digesta, 47.2.48.1; Ulpian, 42 ad ed., 50 ad ed.

  28. 28.

    Codex Theodosianus, 9.21.2.4-5, 9.21.4.1, 9.39.2, 16.5.21; Codex Justinianus, 9.24.1.4, 6-7.

  29. 29.

    Digesta, 47.16.1.

  30. 30.

    Digesta, 43.24.15.2, 47.10.15.8; Ulpian, 29 ad ed., 71 ad ed., 77 ad ed.; Codex Theodosianus, 9.29.1; Codex Justinianus, 9.14.3,6.

  31. 31.

    Robinson, supra note 10, at p.19; Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 559 (2nd ed., 1960, 2005).

  32. 32.

    Robinson, ibid, at p.18.

  33. 33.

    Allan Chester Johnson, Paul Robinson Coleman-Norton and Frank Card Bourne, Ancient Roman Statutes 27 (2003).

  34. 34.

    Exodus 20:2-5: “I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me”.

  35. 35.

    Jeremiah 31:28-29: “And it shall come to pass, that like as I have watched over them, to pluck up, and to break down, and to throw down, and to destroy, and to afflict; so will I watch over them, to build, and to plant, saith the Lord. In those days they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children’s teeth are set on edge”.

  36. 36.

    P. J. Verdam, On ne Fera Point Mourir Les Enfants pour Les Peres en Droit Biblique, 3 Revue Internationale des Droits de L’antiqué 393 (1949).

  37. 37.

    Kings 22.

  38. 38.

    Deuteronomy 24:16.

  39. 39.

    Jeremiah 31:28-29; Ezekiel 18:1-17.

  40. 40.

    Law 15 of the Code of Hammurabi (L. W. King trans.) provided: “If any one takes a male or female slave of the court, or a male or female slave of a freed man, outside the city gates, he shall be put to death”; Law 16 of the Code of Hammurabi (L. W. King trans.) provided: “If any one receives into his house a runaway male or female slave of the court, or of a freedman, and does not bring it out at the public proclamation of the major domus, the master of the house shall be put to death”; Law 227 of the Code of Hammurabi (L. W. King trans.) provided: “If any one deceives a barber, and have him mark a slave not for sale with the sign of a slave, he shall be put to death, and buried in his house. The barber shall swear: ‘I did not mark him wittingly’, and shall be guiltless”.

  41. 41.

    Deuteronomy 23:15: “Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee”.

  42. 42.

    Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat (Saturday) Chapter, pages 75B, 90B, 91A.

  43. 43.

    Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin (Court) Chapter, page 8A.

  44. 44.

    Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat (Saturday) Chapter, page 93A.

  45. 45.

    George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law 188-190 (1998).

  46. 46.

    Deuteronomy 13:2-19.

  47. 47.

    Canon 1418(1) of the Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium provides: “(1) Qui aliquid ad delictum patrandum egit vel omisit nec tamen praeter suam voluntatem delictum consummavit, non tenetur poena in delictum consummatum statuta, nisi lex vel praeceptum aliter cavet”.

  48. 48.

    Canon 1418(2) of the Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium provides: “(2) Si vero actus vel omissiones natura sua ad delicti exsecutionem conducunt, auctor congrua poena puniatur, praesertim si scandalum aliudve grave damnum evenit, leviore tamen quam ea, quae in delictum consummatum constituta est”.

  49. 49.

    Canon 1329 of the Codex Juris Canonici provides: “(1) Qui communi delinquendi consilio in delictum concurrunt, neque in lege vel praecepto expresse nominantur, si poenae ferendae sententiae in auctorem principalem constitutae sint, iisdem poenis subiciuntur vel aliis eiusdem vel minoris gravitates; (2) In poenam latae sententiae delicto adnexam incurrunt complices,qui in lege vel praecepto non nominantur, si sine eorum opera delictum patratum non esset, et poena sit talis naturae, ut ipsos afficere possit; secus poenis ferendae sententiae puniri possunt”; and Canon 1417 of the Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium provides: “Qui communi delinquendi consilio in delictum concurrunt neque in lege vel praecepto expresse nominantur, eisdem poenis ac auctor principalis puniri possunt vel ad prudentiam judicis aliis poenis eiusdem vel minoris gravitatis”.

  50. 50.

    Article 22 of the German Penal Code provides: “Eine Straftat versucht, wer nach seiner Vorstellung von der Tat zur Verwirklichung des Tatbestandes unmittelbar ansetzt”.

  51. 51.

    Hans-Heinrich Jescheck und Thomas Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts—Allgemeiner Teil 509-528 (5 Auf., 1996); Heribert Schumann, Criminal Law, Introduction to German Law 387, 402 (2nd ed., Mathias Reimann and Joachim Zekoll eds., 2005); Nigel Foster, German Legal System & Laws 209-210 (2nd ed., 1996).

  52. 52.

    Articles 23(1) and (2) of the German Penal Code provide: “(1) Der Versuch eines Verbrechens ist stets strafbar, der Versuch eines Vergehens nur dann, wenn das Gesetz es ausdrücklich bestimmt; (2) Der Versuch kann milder bestraft werden als die vollendete Tat (§ 49 Abs. 1);”.

  53. 53.

    “Jescheck und Weigend, supra note 51, at pp. 529-536; Article 23(3) of the German Penal Code provides: (3) Hat der Täter aus grobem Unverstand verkannt, dass der Versuch nach der Art des Gegenstandes, an dem, oder des Mittels, mit dem die Tat begangen werden sollte, überhaupt nicht zur Vollendung führen konnte, so kann das Gericht von Strafe absehen oder die Strafe nach seinem Ermessen mildern (§ 49 Abs. 2)”.

  54. 54.

    Jescheck und Weigend, supra note 51, at pp. 536-551; Schumann, supra note 51, at pp. 403-404; Article 24(1) of the German Penal Code provides: “(1) Wegen Versuchs wird nicht bestraft, wer freiwillig die weitere Ausführung der Tat aufgibt oder deren Vollendung verhindert. Wird die Tat ohne Zutun des Zurücktretenden nicht vollendet, so wird er straflos, wenn er sich freiwillig und ernsthaft bemüht, die Vollendung zu verhindern”.

  55. 55.

    Article 24(2) of the German Penal Code provides: “(2) Sind an der Tat mehrere beteiligt, so wird wegen Versuchs nicht bestraft, wer freiwillig die Vollendung verhindert. Jedoch genügt zu seiner Straflosigkeit sein freiwilliges und ernsthaftes Bemühen, die Vollendung der Tat zu verhindern, wenn sie ohne sein Zutun nicht vollendet oder unabhängig von seinem früheren Tatbeitrag begangen wird”.

  56. 56.

    Jescheck und Weigend, supra note 51, at pp. 662-673; Article 25(1) of the German Penal Code provides: “(1) Als Täter wird bestraft, wer die Straftat selbst oder durch einen anderen begeht”.

  57. 57.

    Jescheck und Weigend, supra note 51, at pp. 673-682; Article 25(2) of the German Penal Code provides: “(2) Begehen mehrere die Straftat gemeinschaftlich, so wird jeder als Täter bestraft (Mittäter)”.

  58. 58.

    Article 26 of the German Penal Code provides: “Als Anstifter wird gleich einem Täter bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einen anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat bestimmt hat”; Jescheck und Weigend, supra note 51, at pp. 686-691.

  59. 59.

    Jescheck und Weigend, supra note 51, at pp. 691-697; Article 27(1) of the German Penal Code provides: “(1) Als Gehilfe wird bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einem anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat Hilfe geleistet hat”.

  60. 60.

    Article 27(2) of the German Penal Code provides: “(2) Die Strafe für den Gehilfen richtet sich nach der Strafdrohung für den Täter. Sie ist nach § 49 Abs. 1 zu mildern”.

  61. 61.

    Article 29 of the German Penal Code provides: “Jeder Beteiligte wird ohne Rücksicht auf die Schuld des anderen nach seiner Schuld bestraft”.

  62. 62.

    Jescheck und Weigend, supra note 51, at pp. 703-705; Article 30(1) of the German Penal Code provides: “(1) Wer einen anderen zu bestimmen versucht, ein Verbrechen zu begehen oder zu ihm anzustiften, wird nach den Vorschriften über den Versuch des Verbrechens bestraft. Jedoch ist die Strafe nach § 49 Abs. 1 zu mildern. § 23 Abs. 3 gilt entsprechend”; Article 30(2) of the German Penal Code provides: “(2) Ebenso wird bestraft, wer sich bereit erklärt, wer das Erbieten eines anderen annimmt oder wer mit einem anderen verabredet, ein Verbrechen zu begehen oder zu ihm anzustiften”.

  63. 63.

    Article 31(1) of the German Penal Code provides: “(1) Nach § 30 wird nicht bestraft, wer freiwillig- 1. den Versuch aufgibt, einen anderen zu einem Verbrechen zu bestimmen, und eine etwa bestehende Gefahr, dass der andere die Tat begeht, abwendet, 2. nachdem er sich zu einem Verbrechen bereit erklärt hatte, sein Vorhaben aufgibt oder, 3. nachdem er ein Verbrechen verabredet oder das Erbieten eines anderen zu einem Verbrechen angenommen hatte, die Tat verhindert”.

  64. 64.

    Article 31(2) of the German Penal Code provides: “(2) Unterbleibt die Tat ohne Zutun des Zurücktretenden oder wird sie unabhängig von seinem früheren Verhalten begangen, so genügt zu seiner Straflosigkeit sein freiwilliges und ernsthaftes Bemühen, die Tat zu verhindern”.

  65. 65.

    Article 28 of the German Penal Code provides: “(1) Fehlen besondere persönliche Merkmale (§ 14 Abs. 1), welche die Strafbarkeit des Täters begründen, beim Teilnehmer (Anstifter oder Gehilfe), so ist dessen Strafe nach § 49 Abs. 1 zu mildern; (2) Bestimmt das Gesetz, dass besondere persönliche Merkmale die Strafe schärfen, mildern oder ausschließen, so gilt das nur für den Beteiligten (Täter oder Teilnehmer), bei dem sie vorliegen”.

  66. 66.

    Article 121-5 of the French Penal Code provides: “La tentative est constituée dès lors que, manifestée par un commencement d’exécution, elle n'a été suspendue ou n'a manqué son effet qu'en raison de circonstances indépendantes de la volonté de son auteur”.

  67. 67.

    Article 121-4(2) of the French Penal Code provides: “Est auteur de l’infraction la personne qui: (1)…; (2) Tente de commettre un crime ou, dans les cas prévus par la loi, un délit”.

  68. 68.

    Article 121-7 of the French Penal Code provides: “Est complice d’un crime ou d’un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité la préparation ou la consommation.Est également complice la personne qui par don, promesse, menace, ordre, abus d’autorité ou de pouvoir aura provoqué à une infraction ou donné des instructions pour la commettre”.

  69. 69.

    Article 121-6 of the French Penal Code provides: “Sera puni comme auteur le complice de l’infraction, au sens de l’article 121-7”.

  70. 70.

    See article 121-7 of the French Penal Code, supra note 68.

  71. 71.

    Article 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c.47 provides: “(1) If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty of attempting to commit the offence”; Walker, (1989) 90 Cr. App. Rep. 226, [1990] Crim. L.R. 44; Tosti, [1997] Crim. L.R. 746; MH, [2004] W.L. 137 2419.

  72. 72.

    See e.g., Gibbins, (1918) 13 Cr. App. Rep. 134, 82 J.P. 287.

  73. 73.

    Taylor, (1859) 1F. & F. 511, 175 E.R. 831; Lankford, [1959] Crim. L.R. 209.

  74. 74.

    Article 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c.94 as amended by the Criminal Law Act, 1977, c.45, s.65(4) provides: “Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender”.

  75. 75.

    Gabriel Hallevy, Complicity in Criminal Law 66-70 (2008); Higgins, (1801) 2 East 5, 102 E.R. 269 per Lord Kenyon.

  76. 76.

    Krause, (1902) 66 J.P. 121, 18 T.L.R. 238, 243.

  77. 77.

    People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal.2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953); State v. Bereman, 177 Kan. 141, 276 P.2d 364 (1954).

  78. 78.

    Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 59 N.E. 55 (1901); Bell v. State, 118 Ga.App. 291, 163 S.E. 2d 323 (1968).

  79. 79.

    State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992); State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 527 S.E.2d 45 (2000).

  80. 80.

    State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500 (1862); People v. Moran, 123 N.Y. 254, 25 N.E. 412 (1890); People v. Keister, 46 Cal.App.4th 1318, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 (1996); State v. Townsend, 105 Wash.App. 622, 20 P.3d 1027 (2001).

  81. 81.

    Wilson v. State, 85 Miss. 687, 38 So. 46 (1905); People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906); People v. Rollino, 37 Misc.2d 14, 233 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1962); but see State v. Curtis, 157 Vt. 629, 603 A.2d 356 (1991).

  82. 82.

    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 312 Pa. 140, 167 A. 344 (1933); People v. Elmore, 128 Ill.App.2d 312, 261 N.E.2d 736 (1970).

  83. 83.

    State v. Alston, 311 N.J.Super. 113, 709 A.2d 310 (1998); State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307 (1883); United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1982).

  84. 84.

    State v. Sowell, 353 Md. 713, 728 A.2d 712 (1999); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 552 S.E..2d 282 (2001); State v. Ladd, 210 W.Va. 413, 557 S.E.2d 820 (2001); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 790 A.2d 15 (2002).

  85. 85.

    Commonwealth v. Perry, 357 Mass. 149, 256 N.E.2d 745 (1970); United States v. Whitney, 229F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Henry, 253 Conn. 354, 752 A.2d 40 (2000); State v. Cronin, 142 Wash.2d 568, 14 P.3d 752 (2000).

  86. 86.

    State v. Forsha, 190 Mo. 296, 88 S.W. 746 (1905); People v. Rybka, 16 Ill.2d 394, 158 N.E.2d 17 (1959); Plater v. United States, 745 A.2d 953 (D.C.App. 2000).

  87. 87.

    United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 35 S.Ct. 682, 59 L.Ed. 1211 (1915); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 81.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975).

  88. 88.

    Little v. United States, 709 A.2d 708 (D.C.App. 1998); State v. Anderson, 10 Neb.App. 163, 626 N.W.2d 627 (2001); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 552 S.E.2d 282 (2001).

  89. 89.

    For the development of the law as science in the Middle Ages and afterwards in Europe see Harold J. Berman and Charles J. Reid Jr., Roman Law in Europe and the Jus Commune: A Historical Overview with Emphasis on the New Legal Science of the Sixteenth Century, 20 Syracuse J. Int’lL. & Com. 1 (1994).

  90. 90.

    University of Bologna was established in 1088 AD, and it is considered as the first university in Europe. For the development of the law as science in the European universities see Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages 135 (1935).

  91. 91.

    John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 7-14, 27-34 (1969).

  92. 92.

    W. D. Lewis, The Law of England Considered as a Science, 10 L. Rev. & Q. J. Brit. & Foreign Jurisprudence 23 (1849); George W. Goble, Law as a Science, 9 Ind. L. J. 294 (1934); John D. Appel, Law as a Social Science in the Undergraduate Curriculum, 10 J. Legal Educ. 485 (1958); John J. Bonsignore, Law as a Hard Science: On the Madness in Method, 2 ALSA F. 49 (1977); Marcia Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 Vt. L. Rev. 1 (1980); Lynn R. Campbell, Law as a Social Science, 9 Dalhousie L. J. 404 (1984); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 Emory L. J. 1005 (1989).

  93. 93.

    George L. Priest, Social Science: Theory and Legal Education: The Law School As University, 33 J. Legal Educ. 437 (1983); Mark Warren Bailey, Early Legal Education in the United States: Natural Law Theory and Law as a Moral Science, 48 J. Legal Educ. 311 (1998).

  94. 94.

    Stephen W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time 18 (1989).

  95. 95.

    Ibid, at pp. 19-22, 147-160.

  96. 96.

    Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 25-28 (5th ed., 2006); Anthony John Patrick Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (1978); Herbert L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law ch. 6 (1968).

  97. 97.

    Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 180 (1977); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 425 (1986); Barbara Hudson, Pushing the Poor: a Critique of the Dominance of Legal Reasoning in Penal Policy and Practice, Penal Theory and Practice 302 (Robin Antony Duff ed., 1994); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 181-204 (1985).

  98. 98.

    Paul R. Dimond and Gene Sperling, Of Cultural Determinism and the Limits of Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1065 (1985); Morris D. Forkosch, Determinism and the Law, 60 Ky. L. J. 350 (1952); John L. Hill, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of Responsibility in the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 Geo. L. J. 2045 (1988); Ian Shrank, Determinism and the Law of Consent - A Reformulation of Individual Accountability for Choices Made without Free Will, 12 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 796 (1978); Jos Andenaes, Determinism and Criminal Law, 47 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 406 (1957); Michele Cotton. A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism out of the Criminal Law, 15 B. U. Pub. Int. L. J. 5 (2006).

  99. 99.

    Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 157-248 (5th ed., 2006).

  100. 100.

    See 2 Kings 14:6: “But he did not execute the sons of the assassins. He obeyed the Lord’s commandment as recorded in the law scroll of Moses, Fathers must not be put to death for what their sons do, and sons must not be put to death for what their fathers do. A man must be put to death only for his own sin”; Ezekiel 18:20: “The person who sins is the one who will die. A son will not suffer for his father’s iniquity, and a father will not suffer for his son’s iniquity; the righteous person will be judged according to his righteousness, and the wicked person according to his wickedness”.

  101. 101.

    See e.g., article 58(c)(1) of the Soviet Criminal Code, 1926, as amended in 1950.

  102. 102.

    Above at paragraph 1.1.2.2.

  103. 103.

    Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 68 (1991); Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and Dictum, 39 J. Legal Educ. 431 (1989).

  104. 104.

    For the social risk embodied in the criminal attempt see below at paragraph 1.3.1.1. Antony Robin Duff, Criminal Attempts 128-151 (1996).

  105. 105.

    Langforth Bridge, (1635) Cro. Car. 365, 79 E.R. 919; Clifton (Inhabitants), (1794) 5 T.R. 498, 101 E.R. 280; Great Broughton (Inhabitants), (1771) 5 Burr. 2700, 98 E.R. 418; Stratford-upon-Avon Corporation, (1811) 14 East 348, 104 E.R. 636; Liverpool (Mayor), (1802) 3 East 82, 102 E.R. 529; Saintiff, (1705) 6 Mod. 255, 87 E.R. 1002; Severn and Wye Railway Co., (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 646, 106 E.R. 501; Birmingham, &c., Railway Co., (1842) 3 Q. B. 223, 114 E.R. 492; New York Cent. & H.R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 29 S.Ct. 304, 53 L.Ed. 613 (1909); Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir.1945); United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 67 F.Supp. 626 (E.D.Ill.1946); Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Banking Co., 386 Ill. 284, 54 N.E.2d 210 (1944); State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 13 N.J.Super. 172, 80 A.2d 342 (1951); United States v. Thompson-Powell Drilling Co., 196 F.Supp. 571 (N.D.Tex.1961); United States v. Dye Construction Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir.1975); United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.1963); State v. I. & M. Amusements, Inc., 10 Ohio App.2d 153, 226 N.E.2d 567 (1966); United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149F. 823 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1906).

  106. 106.

    United States v. Alaska Packers’ Association, 1 Alaska 217 (1901).

  107. 107.

    For the criminal liability of Artificial Intelligence entities see Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities—from Science Fiction to Legal Social Control, 4 Akron Intell. Prop. J. 171 (2010); Gabriel Hallevy, “I, Robot—I, Criminal”—When Science Fiction Becomes Reality—Legal Liability of AI Robots Committing Criminal Offenses, 2010 Syracuse Sci. & Tech. L. Rep. 1 (2010); Gabriel Hallevy, Virtual Criminal Responsibility, 6 Orig. L. Rev. 121 (2010); Gabriel Hallevy, Unmanned Vehicles—Subordination to Criminal Law under the Modern Concept of Criminal Liability, 21 J. L. Inf. & Sci. 311 (2011).

  108. 108.

    For the criminal conspiracy characterized by the partial participation characteristics see e.g., Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1922).

  109. 109.

    This secondary principle includes, in fact, the criminal liability of all non-human legal entities, incorporated or not. See e.g., supra note 107.

  110. 110.

    See e.g., People v. Bloom, 149 App.Div. 295, 133 N.Y.S. 708 (1912); State v. Furr, 292 N.C. 711, 235 S.E.2d 193 (1977); Moss v. State, 888 P.2d 509 (Okl.Crim.App.1994); Bentley, [1923] 1 K.B. 403.

  111. 111.

    Since there are four secondary principles, and the usage of the same secondary principle is legal in order to impose criminal liability, the number of basic types would be 4n. The variable “n” is the number of usages of the secondary principles on the same participant. Thus, triple usage creates 64 basic types (43 = 64), quadruple use creates 256 basic types (44 = 256), etc.

  112. 112.

    Below at paragraph 1.3.3.

  113. 113.

    Below at paragraph 2.1.2.

  114. 114.

    See above at paragraph 1.1.1.

  115. 115.

    Constitutio Criminalis Carolina or “Keyser Karls des fünften, und heyligen Römischen Reichs peinlich Gerichtsordnung”.

  116. 116.

    E.g., Ordonnance de Blois, 1579. See Chamcommunal, Étude Critique de Législation Comparée sur la Tentative, 24 Rev. Crit. 43 (1895).

  117. 117.

    Hans-Heinrich Jescheck und Thomas Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts—Allgemeiner Teil 93-94 (5 Auf., 1996).

  118. 118.

    Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 822 (1928).

  119. 119.

    Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 337, f. 128, 13 (1260; G. E. Woodbine ed., S. E. Thorne trans., 1968-1977); James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 222 (1883, 1964).

  120. 120.

    Sayre, supra note 118, at pp. 823-827.

  121. 121.

    Sir Edward Coke, Institutions of the Laws of England—Third Part 69 (6th ed., 1681, 1817, 2001); Sir William Staunford, Pleas of the Crown 27 (1557).

  122. 122.

    Stephen, supra note 119, at pp. 223-224; Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 565-568 (2nd ed., 1960, 2005). Compare Sayre, supra note 118.

  123. 123.

    Coke, supra note 121, at pp. 5, 69, 161.

  124. 124.

    William Hudson, Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber, 2 Hargrave Collectanea Juridica 108 (1882): “Attempts to coin money, to commit burglary, or poison or murder, are in ordinary example; of which the attempt by Frizier against Baptista Basiman, in 5. Eliz. is famous; and that attempt of the two brothers who were whipped and gazed in Fleet-street in 44. Eliz. is yet fresh in memory”. He concludes at pp. 112-113: “Infinite more are the causes usually punished in this court, for which, for which the law provideth no remedy in any sort or ordinary course, whereby the necessary use of this court to the state appeareth; and the subjects may as safely repose themselves in the bosoms of those honourable lords, reverend prelates, grave judges, and worthy chancellors, as in the heady current of burgesses and meaner men, who run too often in a stream of passion after their own or some private man’s affections, the equality of whose justice let them speak of who have made trial of it, being no subject fit for me to discourse of”.

  125. 125.

    See e.g., Sidley, (1664) 1 Sid. 168, 1 Keble 620, 82 E.R. 1036; See more in Stephen, supra note 119, at p. 224.

  126. 126.

    See e.g., Bacon, (1664) 1 Lev. 146, 1 Sid. 230, 1 Keble 809, 83 E.R. 341; Johnson, (1678) 2 Shaw. K.B. 1, 89 E.R. 753; Cowper, (1696) 5 Mod. 206, 87 E.R. 611.

  127. 127.

    Langley, (1703) 2 Salk. 697, 91 E.R. 590; Pigot, (1707) Holt 758, 90 E.R. 1317; Sutton, (1736) Cas. T. Hard. 370, 95 E.R. 240; Vaughan, (1769) 4 Burr. 2494, 98 E.R. 308.

  128. 128.

    Scofield, (1784) Cald. Mag. Rep. 397.

  129. 129.

    Ibid, at p. 400.

  130. 130.

    Higgins, (1801) 2 East 5, 20-21, 102 E.R. 269: “All offences of a public nature, that is, all such acts or attempts as tend to the prejudice of the community, are indictable…”.

  131. 131.

    Butler, (1834) 6 Car. & P. 368, 172 E.R. 1280: “an attempt to commit a misdemeanour created by statute is a misdemeanour itself”; Roderick, (1837) 7 Car. & P. 795, 173 E.R. 347: “an attempt to commit a misdemeanour is a misdemeanour, whether the offense is created by statute, or was an offense at common law”.

  132. 132.

    Sayre, supra note 118, at pp. 836-837.

  133. 133.

    See e.g., State v. Redmon, 121 S.C. 139, 113 S.E. 467 (1922); Whitesides v. State, 79 Tenn. 474 (1883).

  134. 134.

    See e.g., in Britain Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c.47. Article 1(1) provides: “(1) If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty of attempting to commit the offence”. Walker, (1989) 90 Cr. App. Rep. 226, [1990] Crim. L.R. 44; Tosti, [1997] Crim. L.R. 746; MH, [2004] W.L. 137 2419.

  135. 135.

    Antony Robin Duff, Criminal Attempts 140-143 (1996); Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 Rutgers L. J. 725 (1988).

  136. 136.

    For the modern development of culpability see Gabriel Hallevy, Theory of Criminal Law vol. II 37-48 (2009).

  137. 137.

    Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 337, f. 128, 13 (1260; G. E. Woodbine ed., S. E. Thorne trans., 1968-1977); James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 222 (1883, 1964).

  138. 138.

    P. R. Glazebrook, Should We Have a Law of Attempted Crimes?, 85 L. Q. Rev. 29 (1969).

  139. 139.

    Donald Stuart, The Actus Reus in Attempts, [1970] Crim. L.R. 505, 511 (1970).

  140. 140.

    Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 39 (1968); Wayne R. LaFave, Penal Code Revision: Considering the Problems and Practices of the Police, 45 Tex. L. Rev. 434 (1967).

  141. 141.

    A. D. Ullmann, Reasons for Punishing Attempted Crimes, 51 Jurid. Rev. 353 (1939).

  142. 142.

    Paul Kichyun Ryu, Contemporary Problems of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1170 (1957); Nils Jareborg, Criminal Attempts and Moral Luck, 27 Isr. L. Rev. 213 (1993).

  143. 143.

    See e.g., Bell v. State, 118 Ga. App. 291, 163 S.E.2d 323 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

  144. 144.

    Andrew Ashworth, Defining Criminal Offences without Harm, Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of J.C. Smith 7 (1987); Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offences, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 151 (1995).

  145. 145.

    Glanville Williams, Convictions and Fair Labelling, 42 Cambridge L. J. 85 (1983).

  146. 146.

    Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 179 (1789).

  147. 147.

    Ronald J. Allen, Retribution in Modern Penal Law: The Principle of Aggravated Harm, 25 Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1976); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1497 (1974).

  148. 148.

    David Lewis, The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance, 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 53 (1989); Duff, supra note 135, at 122-124.

  149. 149.

    See e.g., Carmichael, (1930) 22 Cr. App. Rep. 142.

  150. 150.

    See e.g., Westbeer, (1739) 1 Leach 12, 168 E.R. 108, and compare Hanna v. People, 19 Mich. 316 (1869).

  151. 151.

    For the historical legal development of the modern criminal attempt see above at paragraph 1.1.1.

  152. 152.

    Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. Crim. L. &. Criminology 679 (1994); Leo Kats, Why the Successful Assassin is More Wicked than the Unsuccessful One, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 791 (2000); Paul H. Robinson, Some Doubts about Argument by Hypothetical, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 813 (2000).

  153. 153.

    Compare the legal status in France to Germany and Britain. Article 121-4 of the French Penal code provides: “Est auteur de l’infraction la personne qui: (1) Commet les faits incriminés; (2) Tente de commettre un crime ou, dans les cas prévus par la loi, un délit.”; Article 23(2) of the German Penal Code provides: “Der Versuch kann milder bestraft werden als die vollendete Tat”; Sub-sections 4(1)-(4) of the Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c.47 provide: “(1) A person guilty by virtue of section 1 above of attempting to commit an offence shall: (a) if the offence attempted is murder or any other offence the sentence for which is fixed by law, be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life; and; (b) if the offence attempted is indictable but does not fall within paragraph (a) above, be liable on conviction on indictment to any penalty to which he would have been liable on conviction on indictment of that offence; and (c) if the offence attempted is triable either way, be liable on summary conviction to any penalty to which he would have been liable on summary conviction of that offence; (2) In any case in which a court may proceed to summary trial of an information charging a person with an offence and an information charging him with an offence under section 1 above of attempting to commit it or an attempt under a special statutory provision, the court may, without his consent, try the informations together; (3) Where, in proceedings against a person for an offence under section 1 above, there is evidence sufficient in law to support a finding that he did an act falling within subsection (1) of that section, the question whether or not his act fell within that subsection is a question of fact; (4) Where, in proceedings against a person for an attempt under a special statutory provision, there is evidence sufficient in law to support a finding that he did an act falling within subsection (3) of section 3 above, the question whether or not his act fell within that subsection is a question of fact”.

  154. 154.

    William A. Bonger, Criminality and Economic Conditions (1916).

  155. 155.

    Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, Criminology (4th ed., 1970).

  156. 156.

    Ibid.

  157. 157.

    Below at paragraph 2.2.2.1.

  158. 158.

    Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 689-690 (1930).

  159. 159.

    Digesta, 9.4.2; Ulpian, 18 ad ed.; Olivia F. Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome 15-16 (1995).

  160. 160.

    Y.BB. 32-33 Edw. I (R. S.), 318, 320 (1304); Seaman v. Browning, (1589) 4 Leonard 123, 74 E.R. 771.

  161. 161.

    Edw. I, St. I, c.2, art. 3, c.II, c.43 (1285). See also Frederick Pollock and Frederick William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I 533 (rev. 2nd ed., 1898); Oliver W. Holmes, Agency, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 356 (1891).

  162. 162.

    Kingston v. Booth, (1685) Skinner 228, 90 E.R. 105.

  163. 163.

    Boson v. Sandford, (1690) 2 Salkeld 440, 91 E.R. 382: “The owners are liable in respect of the freight, and as employing the master; for whoever employs another is answerable for him, and undertakes for his care to all that make use of him”; Turberwill v. Stamp, (1697) Skinner 681, 90 E.R. 303; Middleton v. Fowler, (1699) 1 Salkeld 282, 91 E.R. 247; Jones v. Hart, (1699) 2 Salkeld 441, 91 E.R. 382; Hern v. Nichols, (1708) 1 Salkeld 289, 91 E.R. 256.

  164. 164.

    Sayre, supra note 158, at pp. 693-694; William Paley, A Treatise on the Law of Principal and Agent (2nd ed., 1847); Huggins, (1730) 2 Strange 882, 93 E.R. 915; Holbrook, (1878) 4 Q.B.D. 42; Chisholm v. Doulton, (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 736; Hardcastle v. Bielby, [1892] 1 Q.B. 709.

  165. 165.

    Glanville Williams, Innocent Agency and Causation, 3 Crim. L. F. 289 (1992); Peter Alldridge, The Doctrine of Innocent Agency, 2 Crim. L. F. 45 (1990).

  166. 166.

    For the principle of personal liability see above at paragraph 1.1.

  167. 167.

    John W. Curran, Solicitation: A Substantive Crime, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 499 (1933); James B. Blackburn, Solicitation to Crimes, 40 W.Va. L. Rev. 135 (1934); Walter Harrison Hitchler, Solicitations, 41 Dick. L. Rev. 225 (1937); Herbert Wechsler, William Kenneth Jones and Harold L. Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 571 (1961).

  168. 168.

    Daniell, (1704) 6 Mod. 99, 87 E.R. 856; Collingwood, (1704) 6 Mod. 288, 87 E.R. 1029; Vaughan, (1769) 4 Burr. 2494, 98 E.R. 308.

  169. 169.

    Higgins, (1801) 2 East 5, 102 E.R. 269.

  170. 170.

    State v. Lampe, 131 Minn. 65, 154 N.W. 737 (1915).

  171. 171.

    Gregory, (1867) 1 Crim. C.R. 77.

  172. 172.

    United States v. Lyles, 4 Cranch C.C. 469, Fed.Cas.No. 15,646 (1834); Cox v. People, 82 Ill. 191 (1876); Allen v. State, 91 Md.App. 705, 605 A.2d 960 (1992); Commonwealth v. Barsell, 424 Mass. 737, 678 N.E.2d 143 (1997); Commonwealth v. Flagg, 135 Mass. 545 (1883); State v. Beckwith, 135 Me. 423, 198 A. 739 (1938); State v. Hampton, 210 N.C. 283, 186 S.E. 251 (1936).

  173. 173.

    State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266 (1828); State v. Foster, 379 A.2d 1219 (Me.1977); State v. Blechman, 135 N.J.L. 99, 50 A.2d 152 (1946). Compare Serious Crimes Act, 2007, c.27, s.44.

  174. 174.

    Smith v. Commonwealth, 54 Pa. 209 (1867).

  175. 175.

    State v. Sullivan, 110 Mo.App. 75, 84 S.W. 105 (1904).

  176. 176.

    Article 26 of the German Penal Code provides: “Als Anstifter wird gleich einem Täter bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einen anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat bestimmt hat”; The end of article 121-7 of the French Penal Code provides: “Est également complice la personne qui par don, promesse, menace, ordre, abus d’autorité ou de pouvoir aura provoqué à une infraction ou donné des instructions pour la commettre”. See more RG 36, 402; RG 53, 189; BGH 6, 359; BGH 7, 234; BGH 8, 137; BGH 34, 63.

  177. 177.

    Director of Public Prosecutions v. Armstrong, (1999) 143 S.J. L.B. 279, [2000] Crim. L.R. 379; Goldman, [2001] Crim. L.R. 894; Jessica Holroyd, Incitement—A Tale of Three Agents, 65 J. Crim. L. 515 (2001).

  178. 178.

    See e.g., in Britain Serious Crimes Act, 2007, c.27, s.59.

  179. 179.

    Gabriel Hallevy, Incapacitating Terrorism through Legal Fight—The Need to Redefine Inchoate Offenses under the Liberal Concept of Criminal Law, 3 Alabama CR-CL L. Rev. (2012).

  180. 180.

    People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925); Hicks v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 223, 9 S.E. 1024 (1889).

  181. 181.

    State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S.W.2d 609 (1928); Gervin v. State, 212 Tenn. 653, 371 S.W.2d 449 (1963).

  182. 182.

    State v. Sexton, 232 Kan. 539, 657 P.2d 43 (1983); People v. Kauten, 324 Ill.App.3d 588, 258 Ill.Dec. 197, 755 N.E.2d 1016 (2001).

  183. 183.

    State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 A. 805 (Dist.Ct.1923).

  184. 184.

    People v. Lubow, 29 N.Y.2d 58, 323 N.Y.S.2d, 272 N.E.2d 331 (1971).

  185. 185.

    People v. Burt, 45 Cal.2d 311, 288 P.2d 503 (1955).

  186. 186.

    State v. Butler, 8 Wash. 194, 35 P. 1093 (1894); Roderick, (1837) 7 Car. & P. 795, 173 E.R. 347.

  187. 187.

    City of Columbus v. Scott, 47 Ohio App.2d 287, 353 N.E.2d 858 (1975).

  188. 188.

    United States v. Carson, 319 A.2d 329 (D.C.App.1974).

  189. 189.

    See above at paragraph 1.1.1.

  190. 190.

    Stephen, supra note 119, at pp. 235–236.

  191. 191.

    Mackalley, (1611) 9 Co. Rep. 61b; Fitzgerald, [1992] Crim. L.R. 660.

  192. 192.

    Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c.94.

  193. 193.

    Criminal Law Act, 1977, s. 65(4).

  194. 194.

    See e.g., the distinction between articles 26 and 27 of the German Penal Code.

  195. 195.

    RG 38, 156; RG 58, 113; RG 73, 52; BGH 8, 390.

  196. 196.

    Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1764).

  197. 197.

    Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789).

  198. 198.

    Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).

  199. 199.

    The benefit may include various values featured from the commission of the offense, both material and spiritual.

  200. 200.

    For the direct complicity see below at paragraph 2.3.1.

  201. 201.

    For the general course of the perpetration-through-another see below at paragraph 2.2.3.

  202. 202.

    For the general course of the joint-perpetration see below at paragraph 2.2.2.

  203. 203.

    For the general course of the incitement see below at paragraph 2.2.4.

  204. 204.

    The inciter takes the risk of being incriminated by the perpetrator. During the investigation of the offense, after the perpetrator is captured, the perpetrator may confess he was incited by the inciter. However, the inciter would be criminally liable for incitement, not for the commission of the specific offense.

  205. 205.

    For the distinctions between the accomplices see below at paragraphs 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.

  206. 206.

    For the distinction between perpetration and accessoryship see below at paragraphs 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.4.

  207. 207.

    Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 237-265 (1985).

  208. 208.

    For instance, the costs of freedom loss, if the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, are part of these costs.

  209. 209.

    Above at paragraph 1.3.2.1. In general, the potential perpetrator should balance the expected value of the risk (capture, punishment, loss of time, attorney-fee, public disgrace, etc.) with the expected value of benefit. If the benefit is marked by W, the risks and punishments by P, and the probability to be captured by R, the commission of the offense would be worthwhile from the potential perpetrator point of view only if:

    $$ {\hbox{W}} \cdot (1 - {\hbox{R}}) > {\hbox{P}} \cdot {\hbox{R}} $$

    It means that the expected value of benefit is higher than the expected value of the risks. In any other situation the potential perpetrator has no effective incentive to commit the offense.

  210. 210.

    Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1985).

  211. 211.

    For the mental element requirement of the incitement see below at paragraph 5.2.4. For the mental element requirement of the accessoryship see below at paragraph 5.2.5. See more in Rollin M. Perkins and Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 745-747 (3rd ed., 1982).

  212. 212.

    See e.g., Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958); United States v. Azadian, 436 F. 2d 81 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973).

  213. 213.

    Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 Hastings L. J. 91, 114-120 (1985).

  214. 214.

    Boyce and Perkins, supra note 211, at p. 764.

  215. 215.

    George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 641 (1978, 2000).

  216. 216.

    Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785).

  217. 217.

    Ibid at p. 95: “Handle so, dass du die Menschheit sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden anderen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst”.

  218. 218.

    Ibid at pp. 92–93.

  219. 219.

    Ibid, at pp. 102–103: “Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, dass sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde”.

  220. 220.

    Ibid, at pp. 100.

  221. 221.

    Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273, 287, 49 J.P. 69, 54 L.J.M.C. 32, 15 Cox C.C. 624, 33 W.R. 347, [1881-5] All E.R. Rep. 61, 52 L.T. 107, 1 T.L.R. 118.

  222. 222.

    See above at paragraphs 1.3.1.

  223. 223.

    John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863).

  224. 224.

    Ibid, at p.16: “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest-Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure”.

  225. 225.

    See e.g., Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind 54-60 (1954).

  226. 226.

    Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory 389 (1959); John J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism—For and Against 18-20 (1973).

  227. 227.

    For the mental element of the accessoryship see below at paragraph 5.2.5.

  228. 228.

    See e.g., John von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944, 1947, 1953).

  229. 229.

    Since the inciter is the auteur intellectuel of the offense, this assumption (in comparison to the perpetrator) is realistic.

  230. 230.

    David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (1965).

  231. 231.

    Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 181-204 (1985); John Rawls, Political Liberalism 289-299, 324-331, 334-363 (1993).

  232. 232.

    John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).

  233. 233.

    Ibid, at p. 120.

  234. 234.

    Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice 89-90 (1973).

  235. 235.

    See above at paragraph 1.3.2.

  236. 236.

    In this case he would probably be classified as the other person in perpetration-through-another, which is used instrumentally for the commission of the offense. For the general course of the perpetration-through-another see below at paragraph 2.2.3.

  237. 237.

    For the risk-deflection analysis see above at paragraph 1.3.2.1.

  238. 238.

    For the attempted incitement see below at paragraph 2.2.4.2.

  239. 239.

    For the derivative criminal liability characteristic of assimilation see below at paragraph 2.1.1.4.

  240. 240.

    The fruits of the offense for the inciter in option a(2) is the very commission of the offense, which is his purpose.

  241. 241.

    E.g., the feelings of successful revenge are not material fruit or profit of the offense.

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  1. Faculty of Law, Ono Academic College, Kiryat Ono, Israel

    Professor Gabriel Hallevy

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hallevy, G. (2012). The Principle of Personal Liability and Its Applicability to Derivative Criminal Liability. In: The Matrix of Derivative Criminal Liability. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28105-1_1

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