Abstract
In [Mil03,LM05], Millen-Lynch-Meadows proved that, under some restrictions on messages, including identities for canceling an encryption and a decryption within the same term during analysis will be redundant. i.e., they will not lead to any new attacks that were not found without them. In this paper, we prove that slightly modified restrictions are sufficient to safely remove those identities, even when protocols contain operators such as the notorious Exclusive-OR operator that break the free algebra assumption with their own identities, in addition to the identities considered by Millen-Lynch-Meadows.
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Malladi, S. (2012). Soundness of Removing Cancellation Identities in Protocol Analysis under Exclusive-OR. In: Mödersheim, S., Palamidessi, C. (eds) Theory of Security and Applications. TOSCA 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6993. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27375-9_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27375-9_12
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