Abstract
Given the ubiquity of the term ‘soft power’ it is clear that the concept represents, without doubt, one of the key elements of international relations. The strength of the concept lies in the fact that it allows theorists and practitioners to think about power in more complex and dynamic ways – at least in ways more complex than some Realist assertions of hard power. And yet the manner and conditions under which soft power is manifested makes it one of the most nebulous and ambiguous concepts within the field of International Relations [IR], granted that the field of IR is rife with ambiguous concepts. Even though the concept is frequently used, the fact is that it is one of those terms that defy generalization – one of the elements of theory building. Scholars are puzzled by the processes through which soft power unfolds and its impact on bringing about the desired policy change. Intuitively we understand that soft power must exist and yet our attempts to grasp it leave us with some clarity but much confusion as well.
I owe this quote to the Animaniacs cartoon series ‘Pinky and the Brain’.
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Notes
- 1.
The term has existed both in the public and academic discourse for about two decades now. There are countless articles and books on soft power of various states and international organizations; United States, China, Turkey, Russia, Japan, India and European Union (see Nye 2002, 2004, 2010; Fraser 2005; Rugh 2006; Watanabe and Mc Connell 2008; Bell 2009; Wang and Lu 2008; Cho and Jeong 2008; Hunter 2009; Li 2009; Ding 2008; Oguzlu 2007; Tsygankov 2006; Parmar and Cox 2010; Kurlantzick 2005; Kurlantzick 2007 others).
- 2.
It must be noted though that while the concept of soft power seems to have captured our attention in a significant manner – the idea in itself may be seen in Gramsci’s articulation of the concept of hegemony. Zahran and Ramos (2010) discuss the resemblance between the two concepts.
- 3.
Typically this discussion plays out in the context of hard power capabilities of states. Changing economic and military indicators are used to understand and evaluate shifts in power. Even Nye who focuses on soft power, considers these material shifts significant. That said, this is an attempt to integrate material and less tangible shifts in power.
- 4.
Lebow (2005) makes a distinction between two kinds of persuasion; dolos and peitho, wherein the former is persuasion through deceit and false logic and the latter involves building a friendship and is based on common identities, mutually valued norms and practices. Peitho has the potential to foster cooperation, and is clearly the better of the two.
- 5.
By uncontested I do not mean to suggest that critics have not sought to question the usefulness of the concept. There is ample critique of the concept itself and the difficulties associated with identifying the specific outcomes related to soft power resources. What I do suggest, in this context, is that the initial definition set out by Nye has been used by a number of scholars.
- 6.
While I have sought to distinguish these three broad strands of literature, I understand that these strands overlap in some instances.
- 7.
- 8.
For instance, an issue of concern is that states may be engaging in hard (economic/military) and soft power tactics at the same time. In that case how are we to distinguish between actions of state A that may be shaped by carrots for instance, or by possible military repercussions and not necessarily by attractiveness to other states. How do we know that state A is not able to realize its policy because of poor extension of soft power as opposed to state B’s receptivity to soft power, but necessity to respond to more strategic concerns? See critiques and attempts to refine the concept in the edited book by Parmar and Cox (2010). In particular see Layne (2010) for a trenchant critique of the concept, the relationship between resources and outcomes and more importantly how we measure outcomes.
- 9.
Nye agrees that this articulation of the relationship between command power and co-optive power is important contribution to our understanding of soft power (Nye 2010). It is noteworthy that while Nye states that soft power is not dependent on hard power, he also finds that the two are inexorably intertwined (2004: 30). In ‘The Paradox of American Power’ Nye seems to consider the relationship between hard and soft power a tad more seriously – for instance his discussion of the closest competitors (China, Russia, India, Japan) of the US hinges on their economic and military capacity. Furthermore he states “if our economy fails, we will lose the basis for our hard power as well as our soft power” (2002: 111).
- 10.
Geiger (2010: 88) states “American soft power is not just the innocent product of the attractiveness of American values, democracy and capitalism, but rather arises from the USA’s superior power resources and its ability to augment its power by constantly renegotiating the terms of domination and subordination.”
- 11.
Oguzlu (2007: 82) argues that middle sized countries are more likely to use soft power (no choice) for non-securitized issues. He examines the case of Turkey to understand the conditions under which middle sized countries “could be considered as acting as a soft power.” It could be argued that the Feminist theoretical tradition would agree with this line of reasoning, in the sense that feminists would argue that women by their subordinate position and so also weak states, are more likely to use soft power as a means to their goal. This certainly needs further consideration.
- 12.
The question of structure can be seen to be drawn from at least four theoretical traditions: Realism, Marxism and Constructivism and Liberal Institutionalism.
- 13.
In this regard the argument forwarded by Susan Strange is very prescient. Strange distinguishes between relational and structural power and defines the latter as a power “that confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people or relate to corporate enterprises” (Strange 1994: 25). Strange distinguishes between four interrelated sources of structural power; security, production, finance and knowledge/ideas/beliefs.
- 14.
I borrow the concepts of core, periphery and semi-periphery from Wallerstein’s (1974) work on world systems. As Wallerstein suggests there is mobility between the core and the semi-periphery and this mobility might explain the shifts in global power- for instance the rise of China within the capitalist world system.
- 15.
While clearly constructivists have engaged more thoroughly in examining the significance of identity and norms in international relations, the idea that the international system may have some common norms of operation goes back to some of the arguments of the English school – specially their articulation of international society (see Bull 1977). More recently constructivists have indicated the presence of global norms (Price 1997; Tannenwald 2007).
- 16.
Hedley Bull (1977: 27–33) notes this engagement in his discussion of the Christian international society that mitigates anarchy.
- 17.
Mustafa Dhada notes that the concept of ‘ummah’ or an Islamic community of states evolved outside of statecraft. It was a community of faithful “sharing a cardinal set of norms and values grooved around monotheism”. The concept was useful in the context of inter-tribal warfare and functioned with qualified success during the first four caliphs. Eventually it fell prey to “tribalism, sectarianism and ethnocentricity”. However it was retrieved by some scholars such as Ibn Khaldun who revived notions of soft power in the context of relations between the world of peace (primarily inhabited by the Muslim faithful) and Darul Jihad (Place of war). This was seen as a tactical compromise (personal communication with Dr. Dhada, May 13, 2011).
- 18.
It is possible that certain religious traditions will become more acceptable that others in a secular structure. Buddhism with its meditative traditions might become more culturally acceptable in a secular world – how this necessarily translates into extension of soft power is a problematic issue.
- 19.
Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 283) examine how hegemonic power is sustained not only by the use of material incentives but more importantly at the level of substantive beliefs. Acquiescence of leaders in secondary nations is achieved through socialization. Elites in these states consent to the norms articulated by the hegemon and pursue policies consistent with the hegemon’s preferences. An interesting argument forwarded in this context is that of John Owen (2001: 121) who contends that the presence of political liberalism as a transnational movement explains the acceptance of the hegemonic power of the United States. Thus hegemonic power is sustained because liberal states do not challenge the hegemon.
- 20.
Of course it does not necessarily have to be one or the other – states may be able to balance their appeal. For instance, there has been some conversation about the emergence of Turkey as a model state for states that are experiencing civil unrest in the North African and Middle Eastern region (early 2011). Turkey is seen by some to have balanced the demands of secular and religious traditions without significantly sacrificing one for the other. For states with large Muslim populations, Turkey presents a more appropriate model of statehood than the classic liberal Western states. Nevertheless, this may not be the perception of states within the European Union that see Turkey as an ‘other’ and not quite a state that has managed to overcome or balance its Islamic heritage (see Neumann 1999).
- 21.
In this regard, Ikenberry’s (2001) argument about ‘binding institutions’ becomes relevant to the extent that the winning state is not perceived as a threat and is able to create conditions for cooperation with and amongst other states in the international system. Similar arguments may be seen in Owen (2001).
- 22.
I disagree with Nye that the Soviets did not have soft power – I think that depends on which part of the world one is looking from and at.
- 23.
Nye (2004: 73–89) discusses the extension of soft power by other states such as Soviet Union, France, Japan among others. However he contends that the United States has the most appropriate resources for the extension of soft power. That said, Nye makes a reference to ‘soft balancing’ (2004: 26–27) wherein states will align with each other and extend their power in such a manner as to make it difficult for the United States to use hard power. He discusses this in the context of denial of legitimacy to the US for actions against Iraq.
- 24.
Edward Lock (2010: 42) persuasively argues that one of the problematic elements of soft power is its inability to account for relational and structural power. In essence, Lock argues that to understand power we have to understand not only how the agent extends power, but also how receptive the subject is to the extension of that power. “The successful exercise of power, by definition, requires the subject of power to decide to act in a manner consistent with one’s intention.”
- 25.
Oguzlu (2007: 85) seems to support this argument. He argues that Turkey lost soft power in the Middle Eastern region when it was seen to be an extension of NATO, which was viewed as an agent of imperial powers.
- 26.
However it is not clear whether this is a general condition. Consider a similar situation with China having a close relationship with North Korea, another pariah state. It appears that China is able to use this relationship to its advantage – in the sense that it does not seem to have adversely affected the extension of Chinese soft power in a significant manner, though it is also a fact that China’s neighbors (South Korea and Japan) are cautious. Perhaps the difference lies in the perception that the US is having an enabling affect on Israel, whereas China is seen as having a moderating effect on North Korea.
- 27.
Nye (2010: 4) states “soft power is a relationship of attraction that depends on the eyes of the beholders” (emphasis added). Wang and Lu also raise the question of the target audience – elites or masses and control over policy formulation. They argue that during the Cold War, citizens in Eastern Europe might have found Western culture attractive, but not the elites (see Wang and Lu 2008: 446).
- 28.
Notions of moral authority and legitimacy again are not without contention, even as they are deployed in the scholarly world and the practical arena of international relations. They raise significant questions regarding ‘who’ bestows moral authority (civil society, state, non-governmental organizations, international organizations like the UN) or recognizes actions as legitimate or illegitimate.
- 29.
While Nye does refer to hypocrisy (understood as the difference between rhetoric and action) as one of the criteria for loss of soft power, it is not included in this specific discussion since almost all states are hypocritical. The question is: At what point does hypocrisy become damaging to soft power? And who is recognizing the hypocrisy of the nation, because obviously nations get away with a lot of hypocrisy unless they are called on it, and it depends a lot on who is doing the calling.
- 30.
North Korea having distrust of the US obviously doesn’t matter much at all regarding US soft power, but losing the trust of Britain would probably have a significant impact.
- 31.
However, it is important to clarify that this degree of closeness really depends on whether the state in question is democratic or not. Totalitarian states exhibit a fusion of state and society, but that is not seen as a legitimate mode of governance.
- 32.
In this regard, Miller’s (2005) state-to-nation balance or imbalance becomes a key factor. Miller argues in a different context that the greater the state-to-nation imbalance in a region, the greater the war propensity within the region. It could be argued that Miller’s ideas may be applied within the context of the state – those states that are challenged by demands for secession where there are several national articulations are less likely to have cohesive state-society relations.
- 33.
Nye (2004) discusses the challenge within the US from the media and other organizations, to the war in Vietnam. It made the actions of the state less legitimate.
- 34.
Parmar (2010) observes that institutions like the Ford foundation were significant in promoting Americanism and combating Anti-Americanism, as they worked through elite universities such as Harvard. In particular he refers to the success of Henry Kissinger’s Harvard and Salzburg Seminar Series, where in elites from other states were invited to the United States, exposed to the institutions and principles of the United States, along with the experience of living in the country – so that they may appreciate the unique nature of the American system.
- 35.
Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 284) discuss the socialization of norms thus ensuring the extension of hegemonic power. They hypothesize that one of the first conditions is that “socialization occurs primarily after wars and political crisis, periods marked by international turmoil and restructuring as well as the fragmentation of ruling coalitions and legitimacy crises at the domestic level. The simultaneity of international and domestic instability creates the conditions conducive to socialization.”
- 36.
Ashis Nandy (1988) discusses the complex identity constructions in colonizing and colonized states in the context of relationship between Britain and India.
- 37.
Post-colonial states are not merely at the receiving end of the extension of soft power by the erstwhile colonizing state. For instance, the United States may be seen as a post-colonial state of sorts – but one which is able to extend power in the international system because it is a beneficiary of the legacy of British colonialism in terms of language, political structures and liberal philosophy. It is also possible that erstwhile colonizers are able to extend power when their rule over the colonized state lasted for a substantial period of time, was accompanied by significant structural change within the state and allowed for the embedding of the colonized state in an international structure that favored the imperial states. The difference between the European and the Japanese imperial expansions comes to mind in this regard.
- 38.
Ferguson (2003) writes that it was the archetype Bengali babu quoting Shakespeare and working for the British, that was the bane of the British empire in India (see also the discussion in Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). In the context of Turkey, Oguzlu (2007: 85) points out that the imperial legacy of the Ottoman empire has made the other states suspicious of Turkey.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Robert Etcheverry in the preparation of this paper.
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Commuri, G. (2012). “Are You Pondering What I Am Pondering?” Understanding the Conditions Under Which States Gain and Loose Soft Power. In: Fels, E., Kremer, JF., Kronenberg, K. (eds) Power in the 21st Century. Global Power Shift. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25082-8_3
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