Abstract
Rationality comes into play every time we have to make a choice or decide what to do. According to Kant, philosophical tradition identifies three chief contexts for choice: that of belief, that of action, and that of evaluation. They correspond well to our modern-day trio in the social sciences of belief, action and purpose (or preference or desire, etc.), which make up the theory of rationality. A rational agent is one who chooses the action that he believes to be the most appropriate (best or satisfying) means of achieving the end. Belief in the appropriate means will, in turn, have a series of connections with other beliefs in the world, in the causal relationship between means and end, etc.
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Viale, R. (2012). Cognition and Rationality of Beliefs in the Social Sciences. In: Methodological Cognitivism. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24743-9_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24743-9_4
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