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Banking on Trust: The German Financial Sector, Global Capital Markets and Corporate Finance and Governance

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German Corporate Governance in International and European Context

Abstract

The remarks are based on Claus Luttermann, ‘Regulierungsperspektiven: War und ist die Finanzkrise die Folge von Hyperspekulation’, (2010) 58 ÖBA 444–48.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Time Magazine, September 2008. On Lehman Brothers Inc – see 7.5.2.

  2. 2.

    Claus Luttermann, in: Jean J. du Plessis, Bernard Großfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger and Otto Sandrock, German Corporate Governace in International and European Context (Springer Verlag, Heidelberg 2007) at 177–204.

  3. 3.

    The World's Billionaires: #488 Michael Milken (<www.forbes.com>, 2010-10-03).

  4. 4.

    It should again be emphasised (see 5.2, 5.3.2 and 5.3.6.4) that Germany recovered fast and thoroughly from the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 and the ongoing European financial crisis of 2009–2011. Claus Luttermann, ‘Kopernikanische Wende zum Wahrheitsgebot oder eine europäische Ratingagentur nach US-Mustern?’, 22 (2011) Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (EWS) 330.

  5. 5.

    Based on Claus Luttermann, Unternehmen, Kapital und Genußrechte: Eine Studie über Grundlagen der Unternehmensfinanzierung und zum internationalen Kapitalmarktrecht (Verlag Mohr/Siebeck, Tübingen 1998).

  6. 6.

    See Chap. 7.

  7. 7.

    See 7.12.

  8. 8.

    For a succinct exposition of this concept, see Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (Bullock Report) Cmnd 6706 (HMSO, London 1977) 59 para 2.

  9. 9.

    Wedderburn of Charlton, ‘Companies and Employees: Common Law or Social Dimension?’ [1993] LQR 230. Also AJ Boyle, ‘Draft Fifth Directive: Implications for directors’ Duties, Board Structure and Employee Participation’ (1992) 13 Company Lawyer 9.

  10. 10.

    Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’ (1992) American Journal of Comparative Law (AJCL) 503. Also Martin Peltzer, ‘Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regeln zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften?’ (1996) JZ 842 et seq. See below Sect. 8.7.3 as well as Thomas J Andre (Jr), ‘Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards’ (1996) 70 Tulane L Rev 1819 para 1834 et seq.

  11. 11.

    Carsten P Claussen, ‘Aktienrechtsreform 1997’ (1996) 41 AG 482–84. See generally (1997) AG (Special Edition) 7–8.

  12. 12.

    See Helmut Kohl, ‘Corporate Governance: Path Dependence and German Corporate Law: Some Skeptical Remarks from the Sideline’ (1999) 5 Colum J Eur L 197.

  13. 13.

    Carsten P Claussen, ‘Aktienrechtsreform 1997’ (1996) 41 AG 482–84. See generally (1997) AG (Special Edition) 7–8. See also Martin Peltzer, ‘Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regeln zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften?’ (1996) JZ 841 (fn 1).

  14. 14.

    Klaus J. Hopt, ‘Modernizing the Board of Directors’ in Mads Ansenas et al (eds), Liber Amicorum Guido Alpa: Private Law Beyond the National System (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London 2007) 532 at 536–540.

  15. 15.

    Martin Peltzer, ‘Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regeln zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften?’ (1996) JZ 841 at 851.

  16. 16.

    Ibid 843.

  17. 17.

    Take, for instance, Peltzer, to whom we refer often in several chapters: He is obviously active in the sphere of the Deutsche Bank AG, in particular (1961–65) starting as head of the office of the supervisory board of Hermann J. Abs (Sprecher des Vorstands – chairman of the board).

  18. 18.

    Cf. on the practice of the ‘revolving-doors’ in the USA Claus Luttermann, Bilanzrecht in den USA und internationale Konzernrechnungslegung (Mohr/Siebeck, Tübingen 1999) 42–48, 99–100.

  19. 19.

    See Sect. 8.5.

  20. 20.

    Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’ (1992) American Journal of Comparative Law (AJCL) 503, 505. This is remarkable when compared with the position in America, where the five largest shareholders together rarely control as much as 5% of a large firm’s shares – see Mark J Roe, ‘Some differences in corporate structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States’ (1993) Yale LJ 1936–93.

  21. 21.

    Wedderburn of Charlton, ‘Companies and Employees: Common Law or Social Dimension?’ (1993) LQR 237.

  22. 22.

    B Großfeld and U Lehmann, ‘Management structures and worker’s codetermination in Germany with European perspectives’ (1994) 1 Corporate Law Development Series 47; Bernhard Großfeld and Werner Ebke, ‘Controlling the Modern Corporation: A Comparative View of Corporate Power in the United States and Europe’ (1978) AJCL 397.

  23. 23.

    See Detlev F Vagts, ‘Reforming the ‘Modern’ Corporation: Perspectives from the German’ (1966) Harvard L Rev 53–54.

  24. 24.

    Mark J Roe, ‘Some differences in corporate structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States’ (1993) Yale LJ 1971.

  25. 25.

    Ss 135(1) and (2) AktG. Martin Peltzer, ‘Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regeln zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften?’ (1996) JZ 842.

  26. 26.

    For statistics in this respect, see Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’ (1992) AJCL 503 507–08.

  27. 27.

    Ibid 506–07.

  28. 28.

    Carsten P Claussen, ‘Aktienrechtsreform 1997’ (1996) 41 AG 482–83. See generally (1997) AG (Special Edition) 7–8.

  29. 29.

    Martin Peltzer, ‘Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regeln zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften?’ (1996) JZ 842, 845–46.

  30. 30.

    Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’ (1992) AJCL 503, 508–09.

  31. 31.

    Ibid 505 (n 16). See in general also Mark J Roe, ‘Some differences in corporate structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States’ (1993) Yale L J 1930, 1936 et seq.

  32. 32.

    See 7.3.1.

  33. 33.

    See 5.2.3.3.

  34. 34.

    Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’ (1992) American Journal of Comparative Law (AJCL) 503, 507. Also Detlev F Vagts, ‘Reforming the ‘Modern’ Corporation: Perspectives from the German’ (1966) Harvard L Rev 58. Also see Sect. 8.4.1.

  35. 35.

    These representatives have indeed been appointed by the shareholders, but as explained above, they are actually bank representatives, since the banks very often control the votes at the shareholder meetings.

  36. 36.

    Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’ (1992) AJCL 503, 504–05.

  37. 37.

    Martin Peltzer, ‘Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regeln zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften?’ (1996) JZ 842, 844 points out that the possibility of misuse of their dominant position lies in the fact that banks may appoint their own representatives to supervisory boards or ensure that supervisory boards are filled with people who will sympathise with bank interests.

  38. 38.

    Martin Peltzer, ‘Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regeln zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften?’ (1996) JZ 842, 850. Also see Sect. 8.4.1. See 5.2.3.3 and 5.2.3.4 for the number of seats held by employee representatives in supervisory board of companies falling under German codetermination legislation.

  39. 39.

    See in particular 4.6.

  40. 40.

    Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’ (1992) AJCL 503, 513 et seq also discusses other control mechanisms, but considers these methods to be the most important ones.

  41. 41.

    See 4.6.1.

  42. 42.

    Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’ (1992) AJCL 503, 509.

  43. 43.

    In terms of S 84(3) AktG a member of the management board can only be dismissed by the supervisory board for cause (eg in the case of a criminal offence committed by a member of the management board). Apart from criminal cases, dismissal for other causes rarely occurs as it will reflect very negatively on the company’s ‘reputation’ – see Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’ (1992) AJCL 503, 515.

  44. 44.

    Ibid 514. Also B Großfeld and U Lehmann, ‘Management structures and worker’s codetermination in Germany with European perspectives’ (1994) 1 Corporate Law Development Series 47.

  45. 45.

    See 4.6.1 and 4.6.3.8.

  46. 46.

    B Großfeld and U Lehmann, ‘Management structures and worker’s codetermination in Germany with European perspectives’ (1994) 1 Corporate Law Development Series 47.

  47. 47.

    See 4.3.8 and 4.3.8.

  48. 48.

    See 4.2 and 4.6.3.8.

  49. 49.

    Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’ (1992) AJCL 503, 511. See further Sect. 8.4.1 and 8.7.3.

  50. 50.

    In general see Claus Luttermann, ‘Kreditversicherung (Credit Default Swaps): Vertrag, Restrukturierung und Regulierung (Hedge-Fonds, Rating, Schattenbanken), (2008) 54 RIW 737–43. See Sect. 8.5.

  51. 51.

    Claus Luttermann in Bruno Kropff and Johannes Semler (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (2nd ed, CH Beck Verlag, München 2003) vol 5/1 (S 264 HGB) 786 para 79.

  52. 52.

    Deutsches Aktieninstitut (DAI), DAI-Factbook 2006 (Oct 2006) 08.5–1, 2006.

  53. 53.

    The merger of the former Bayerische Vereinsbank AG and the Bayerische Hypothekenbank AG.

  54. 54.

    Deutsches Aktieninstitut (DAI) Factbook 2006, 08.5–1, 2006 (DAI Factbook 2010).

  55. 55.

    Ibid 2005 and 2000.

  56. 56.

    Data of Dec 31, 2010 (<http://geschaeftsbericht2010.commerzbank.de>). On the involvement of the German taxpayers in the context of the world debt crisis see in Sect. 8.6.3.

  57. 57.

    Ibid 2006 and 1996.

  58. 58.

    See 7.1 as well as Sect. 8.5.4.

  59. 59.

    On the Commerzbank AG Sect. 8.6.3.

  60. 60.

    See Sect. 8.6.1. Claus Luttermann, ‘Kopernikanische Wende zum Wahrheitsgebot oder eine europäische Ratingagentur nach US-Mustern?’, 22 (2011) Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (EWS) 330.

  61. 61.

    See Sect. 8.6.1.

  62. 62.

    E.g., at the point of the rescue decision, the Greek state bonds in danger of loss at European banks (ca. 162 billion Euros) were mainly located at French banks (ca. 54 billion Euros) and German banks (ca. 33 billion Euros); data from the Bank for International Settlements (status Oct. 2009; <www.bis.org>).

  63. 63.

    See 7.1.

  64. 64.

    Claus Luttermann, FAZ of 23.6.2008, p. 22. See also Otto Depenheuer (Ed.), Eigentumsverfassung und Finanzmarktkrise (Springer Verlag, Heidelberg 2009).

  65. 65.

    See already Chap. 7. Particularly urgently Arthur Levitt, ‘The ‘Numbers Game” 28 Sept 1998, speech at NYU Center for Law and Business, <www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt>. Claus Luttermann, ‘Kopernikanische Wende zum Wahrheitsgebot oder eine europäische Ratingagentur nach US-Mustern?‘, 22 (2011) Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (EWS) 330.

  66. 66.

    Claus Luttermann, Juristische Analyse von Ökonomie, Staat und Gesellschaft, ZRP 2010, 1–4; already id. (Fn. 1), 465–85.

  67. 67.

    Frank Knight, ʻRisk, Uncertainty and Profit’ (first publication 1921, Chicago 1971) 11–12.

  68. 68.

    Informative Charles Morris, ʻThe Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers, and the Great Credit Crash” (Public Affairs, New York 2008).

  69. 69.

    See 7.5.2.

  70. 70.

    SEC, Litigation Release No. 21489, April 16, 2010: SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre, 10 Civ. 3229 (BJ) (S.D.N.Y.), <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm>.

  71. 71.

    With Credit Default Swaps (CDSs): see SEC (preceding footnote) as well as generally Sect. 8.5.4.

  72. 72.

    See on this The New York Times, 15 July 2010: ‘Goldman Settles with S.E.C. for US$550 Million’, <http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/goldman-to-settle-with-s-e-c-for-550-million>.

  73. 73.

    More in Sect. 8.5.5.

  74. 74.

    Overall Claus Luttermann, Kreditversicherung (Credit Default Swaps): Vertrag, Restrukturierung und Regulierung (Hedge Fonds, Rating, Schattenbanken), Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 2008, 737–43.

  75. 75.

    See Sect. 8.6.

  76. 76.

    See Sect. 8.5.5.

  77. 77.

    The usual structure of the product: Super-senior tranche (= 30-100%, cover system risks, valuated with ‘AAA’), one or more senior tranches (30-10%) or mezzanine tranches (10-3%, for losses, ‘AA’ to ‘BB’) and equity tranche (for first up to 3% losses [idiosyncratic risks], non-valuated – ‘toxic waste’). International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2006, 53–4, 62. Rules of valuation: FASB, FAS 157 – Fair Value Measurement.

  78. 78.

    This means ‘CDOs from CDOs’; also: leveraged super-senior products and CDOs with asset-backed securities (ABSs).

  79. 79.

    International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA): The notional amount outstanding of CDSs is $26.3 trillion (June 30, 2010; <www.isda.org>). See also in the private sector, e.g., The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (<www.dtcc.com>).

  80. 80.

    Berkshire Hathaway, Annual Report to Shareholders 2002.

  81. 81.

    See Sects. 8.2.3 and 8.7.3.

  82. 82.

    In general 7.5.2.

  83. 83.

    On this already in 2008 Claus Luttermann, ʻKreditversicherung (Credit Default Swaps): Vertrag, Restrukturierung und Regulierung (Hedge Fonds, Rating, Schattenbanken)ʻ, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 2008, 741 and 742. Overview on CDS-counterparties: David Mengle, Credit Derivatives: An Overview, May 15, 2007, 46.

  84. 84.

    The Wall Street Jounal, May 4, 2011, 17: ‘U.S.: Deutsche Bank lied over loans’. However, it did not purchase the mortgage subsidiary until 2007, but the deals in question go back to 1999.

  85. 85.

    US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, April 13, 2011, 7 and 11 (under the heading: ‘Investment Bank Abuses’).

  86. 86.

    US Senate, ibid., 10. On rating agencies: Claus Luttermann, 'Kopernikanische Wende zum Wahrheitsgebot oder eine europäische Ratingagentur nach US-Mustern?', 22 (2011) Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (EWS) 330.

  87. 87.

    Data according to US Senate, ibid, 333–35.

  88. 88.

    See Sect. 8.6.3.

  89. 89.

    See, e.g., on the Deutsche Bank AG: Bundesgerichtshof, 22.03.2011 (XI ZR 33/10), NZG 2011, 591 (CMS Spread Ladder Swap).

  90. 90.

    A popular strategy seems to be to treat ‘foreign’ clients in a special manner; see, e.g., Siemens AG and Daimler AG under the regime of the US SEC.

  91. 91.

    Bloomberg, Dec 28, 2010: Banks were ranked on the impact their failure would have on the global financial system’ (<www.bloomberg.com>). See on ‘systemic risk’ Sect. 8.6.1.

  92. 92.

    Speech of March 10, 2009 (<federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm>); also in his hearing before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, thereto: The Wall Street Journal vom 6.9.2010, S. 11.

  93. 93.

    Proportion of industry in GB dropped to 13% of 21% (2000); increase of financial sector e.g. in Germany from 5.5% (2000) of the gross inland production to 8.5% (2008) and in Ireland from 7% (2000) to 11% (2008). Data according to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 16.4.2009 (<www.faz.net>).

  94. 94.

    The Wall Street Journal, 18 of April, 2011, 11 (‘Proxies vs. Profits’).

  95. 95.

    ICB, Interim Report: Consultation on Reform Options (Executive Summary, April 2011), 2. Seminally, Wolfgang Fikentscher, ‘Finanzkrise, Wettbewerb und Regulierung’, (2009) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil (GRUR Int) 635–46. Wernhard Möschel, ‘Die Finanzkrise: Wie soll es weitergehen?’, (2009) ZRP, 129–33.

  96. 96.

    Disapprovingly already Claus Luttermann, review of Alfred Rappaport, Shareholder Value, (2nd ed, Verlag Schäffer-Poeschel, Stuttgart 1999) in: (2000) AG 143.

  97. 97.

    In detail Claus Luttermann, Juristische Analyse von Ökonomie, Staat und Gesellschaft, 1 (2010) ZRP, 1–4.

  98. 98.

    See in details Chap. 7. Claus Luttermann, 'Kopernikanische Wende zum Wahrheitsgebot oder eine europäische Ratingagentur nach US-Mustern?', 22 (2011) Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (EWS) 330.

  99. 99.

    Data under Feb 23, 2011 according to <www.handelsblatt.com>.

  100. 100.

    The Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2011, p. 23.

  101. 101.

    The Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2011, p. 1 and 3.

  102. 102.

    See Sect. 8.5.2.

  103. 103.

    Claus Luttermann, Juristische Analyse von Ökonomie, Staat und Gesellschaft, 1 (2010) ZRP 1, 2.

  104. 104.

    COM(2010) 284 final (2.6.2010).

  105. 105.

    See, e.g., also in 7.8.2 and 7.10 (on financial reporting and auditors) and 10.2.4 and 10.2.7.

  106. 106.

    In Chap. 7.

  107. 107.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.7.

  108. 108.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 1.

  109. 109.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 1 with reference to: Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (February 25, 2009). Mr Jacques de Larosière was chairman of the group.

  110. 110.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 1.

  111. 111.

    See 7.1 and 7.5.

  112. 112.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.5.

  113. 113.

    See Sect. 8.5. Details in Chap. 7. Claus Luttermann, 'Kopernikanische Wende zum Wahrheitsgebot oder eine europäische Ratingagentur nach US-Mustern?', 22 (2011) Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (EWS) 330.

  114. 114.

    See on politicians, supervisory authorities, auditors etc. Sect. 8.6.

  115. 115.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.3.

  116. 116.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.3.

  117. 117.

    See, e.g., 7.1 and 7.3–4, 7.8.2. Cf. COM(2010) 284 final, 3.7 and 3.6.

  118. 118.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.3; note there also 3.4 (risk management).

  119. 119.

    See Chap. 8.

  120. 120.

    Council Directive 86/635/EEC of 8 December 1986 on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions, OJ L 372, 31 Dec 1986, and generally Council Directive 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, OJ L 222, 14 Aug 1978; see above Chap. 7.

  121. 121.

    See also S 252(1) No 2 HGB (going concern) as well as, e.g., S 285 No 3 HGB (notes on risks), S 285 No 18 and 19 HGB (notes on financial instruments with fair value measurement resp. financial derivatives – Pflichtangaben); for banks and other financial institutions: Ss 285 No 20, 340e(3)(1) HGB. On the auditor’s duties, e.g., S 317(1) and (4) HGB.

  122. 122.

    See 7.11.

  123. 123.

    Art 5.4.1 (last paragraph) GCGC.

  124. 124.

    See again 4.3.4.

  125. 125.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.3.

  126. 126.

    Above in Sect. 8.7.2.

  127. 127.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.3.

  128. 128.

    See already in Sect. 8.2.3.

  129. 129.

    Time, June 16, 1967 (<www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,843981,00.html>).

  130. 130.

    At that time, the IG Farben also conducted building projects for Auschwitz and its external camps with the help of forced laborers. Cf. in detail Lothar Gall, Der Bankier Hermann Josef Abs (2nd ed, CH Beck Verlag, München 2005).

  131. 131.

    of these at some points as chairman.

  132. 132.

    See discussion in 4.3.9.

  133. 133.

    See, e.g., contributions by Theodor Baums and Klaus J Hopt in (1997) AG, Special Edition (August). No 5.4.5 GCGC (May 2010): only 3 mandates instead of 5 mandates (June 2009). Already in favour of only 4 mandates by law: Claus Luttermann, ‘Unabhängige Bilanzexperten in Aufsichtsrat und Beirat’ (2003) BB 745–50.

  134. 134.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.3 (1st en-dash).

  135. 135.

    Ibid.

  136. 136.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 5.1. Claus Luttermann, 'Unabhðngige Bilanzexperten in Aufsichtsrat und Beirat', 58 (2003) Betriebs-Berater (BB) 745–50.

  137. 137.

    See S 100(5) AktG (on this see 7.11) and in general Chap. 7.

  138. 138.

    See again 1.4 and final paragraph under 2.6.4.

  139. 139.

    See Sect. 8.4.1.

  140. 140.

    ‘The world’s biggest money manager’, according to <www.bloomberg.com> (21.4.2011). See also sovereign wealth funds (like Kuwait Investment Authority, China Investment Corporation, Temasek Holdings/Singapore etc.)

  141. 141.

    See Sect. 8.6.1.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Chair of International Business Law, Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Auf der Schanz 49, 85049, Ingoldstadt, Germany

    Claus Luttermann

  2. Deakin University, Geelong Waurn Ponds Campus 75 Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds, VIC, 3216, Australia

    Jean J. du Plessis

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Luttermann, C., du Plessis, J.J. (2012). Banking on Trust: The German Financial Sector, Global Capital Markets and Corporate Finance and Governance. In: German Corporate Governance in International and European Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23005-9_8

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