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Corporate Governance in the EU, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Corporate Governance in Selected Other Jurisdictions

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Abstract

Good corporate governance is a top priority in business worldwide. We have witnessed scandalous corporate collapses like Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Tyco (all USA), Parmalat (Italy), Livedoor (Japan), SK Group (South Korea), Satyam (India) and others in many countries. When financing companies in global markets, the temptations of corporate corruption have to be viewed from an international perspective. In the aftermath of the ‘Enron’-era we saw a powerful global tide towards higher standards in corporate governance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a summary of the circumstances that led to the collapse of Enron, see K Fred Skousen, Steven M. Glover and Douglas F. Prawitt, An Introduction to Corporate Governance and the SEC, (Thomson South-West, Mason 2005) 3–5.

  2. 2.

    Claus Luttermann, ʻJuristische Analyse von Ökonomie, Staat und Gesellschaft‘ (2010) 43 ZRP 1–4. See also Chap. 8.

  3. 3.

    Claus Luttermann, ‘Dialog der Kulturen’ in Ulrich Hübner and Werner F Ebke (eds), Festschrift für Bernhard Großfeld (Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg 1999) 771–89.

  4. 4.

    COM (2003) 284 final. European Parliament resolution on that topic: OJ C 104 E 30 Apr 2004, 0714. See generally Klaus J. Hopt, ‘European Company Law and Corporate Governance: Where Does the Action Plan of the European Commission Lead?’ in Klaus J. Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda and Harald Baum (eds), Corporate Governace in Context: Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, Japan, and the US (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005) 119; Klaus J. Hopt, ‘Die internationalen europarechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der Corporate Governance’ in Peter Hommelhoff, Klaus J Hopt and Axel von Werder (eds), Handbuch Corporate Governance: Leitung und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und Wirtschaftspraxis (2nd ed, Otto Schmidt Verlag, Köln 2009) 51–57.

  5. 5.

    Koen Geen and Klaus J. Hopt, The European Company Law Action Plan Revisited (Leuven University Press, Leuven 2010).

  6. 6.

    See EC Treaty Art 14.

  7. 7.

    See Simon Kempny, Coordination and Creation: Two Aspects of European Company Law (Saarbrücker Verlag für Rechtswissenschaften, Saarbrücker 2010) for a concise overview of company law developments and harmonisation of national company laws in the EU.

  8. 8.

    Andrew Johnston, EC Regulation of Corporate Governance (CUP, Cambridge 2009) at 359.

  9. 9.

    Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (AEI Press, Washington 1993). See generally Klaus J. Hopt, ‘Comparative Company Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 1161 at 1174–1178.

  10. 10.

    Conducted by main contractor RiskMetrics Group et al., 23 Sept 2009.

  11. 11.

    Ibid, p. 188.

  12. 12.

    COM (2003) 284 final. European Parliament resolution on that topic: OJ C 104 E 30 Apr 2004, 0714.

  13. 13.

    Oct 2005, on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, OJ 25 Nov 2005 L 309/15.

  14. 14.

    For current information see <http://www.oecd.org>. Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money Laundering, 2004.

  15. 15.

    See 10.2.5 and Chap. 8.

  16. 16.

    IAS/IFRS Reg (EC) 1606/2002, Art 4 and 5; see 7.3.3–7.3.7.

  17. 17.

    For IASB and IFRIC Projects see <http://www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/intro.htm>.

  18. 18.

    See 7.3.3.

  19. 19.

    See 7.3.1, 7.8.4–5, 7.9 and 7.6.3.

  20. 20.

    Claus Luttermann, Rechnungslegung als Teil der Corporate Governance in Familienunternehmen in Zeiten von BilMoG und IFRS, in Knut-Werner Lange and Stefan Leible (eds.), Governance in Familienunternehmen (Jenaer Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft, Jena 2010), 105–121. For updates see <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/index_en.htm>. Valuable information on that topic also from the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group: <http://www.efrag.org>.

  21. 21.

    The IASB has announced an Exposure Draft for the third quarter 2007. About the project: <http://www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/IASB+Projects/IASB+Work+Plan.htm> (Small and Medium-sized Entities). See most recently: Proposal for a Directive on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, COM(2011) 684/2.

  22. 22.

    See 7.3.6. On IAS/IFRS for SME see Werner F Ebke, Claus Luttermann and Stanley Siegel (eds), Internationale Rechnungslegung für börsenunabhängige Unternehmen (Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 2007).

  23. 23.

    Overview and updates: European Corporate Governance Forum, <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm>.

  24. 24.

    Commission, Recommendation on the regime for the remuneration of directors oflisted companies, 29 Apr 2009 (IP/09/673).

  25. 25.

    Commission Recommendation, OJ L 52, 25 Feb 2005, 51. Claus Luttermann, ‘Unabhängige Bilanzexperten in Aufsichtsrat und Beirat’ (2003) 58 BB 745–50. See Commission, Report on the application by the Member States oft he EU oft he Commission Recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board, 13 Jul 2007 (SEC 2007) 1021.

  26. 26.

    EC Treaty, Art 44(2)(g) and 48.

  27. 27.

    See for example Court of Justice, Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes plc (2006) OJ C 281 of 18 Nov 2006, 5 (= 2006 ECR I-7995, confirmed: Joined Cases C-436/08, C-437/08 Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel Betriebs-GmbH, 10 February 2011, para 34); Case C-9/02 de Lasteyrie du Saillant (2004) ECR I-02409; Case C-212/97 Centros (1999) ECR I-1459. Claus Luttermann, ‘Mit dem Europäischen Gerichtshof (Centros) zum Internationalen Unternehmens- und Kapitalmarktrecht. Kollisionsrecht in den Zeiten des Internet’ (2000) ZEuP, 907–21.

  28. 28.

    EC Treaty Art 56.

  29. 29.

    OJ L 345, 31 Dec 2003, 64, amending Dir 2001/34/EC.

  30. 30.

    EC Commission, Draft Commission Reg, amending Commission Reg (EC) 809/2004 of 29 Apr 2004 implementing Dir 2003/71/EC of the EP and of the Council as regards information contained in prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements, Working Document ESC/23/2006–rev3. On the implementation of financial services legislation OJ C 284 E 21 Nov 2002, 115 (Lamfalussy report).

  31. 31.

    June 2010, Report to the European Securities Committee and to the European Parliament on convergence between IFRS and third country national Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAPs): COM(2010)292 final; see 7.7.8 and <http://ec.europa.eu>.

  32. 32.

    See 7.3.3.

  33. 33.

    April 2008, Report on convergence between IFRS and third country national Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and on the progress towards the elimination of reconciliation requirements that apply to Community issuers under the rules of these third countries.

  34. 34.

    On that topic Claus Luttermann, Bilanzrecht in den USA und internationale Konzernrechnungslegung (Mohr and Siebeck Verlag, Tübingen 1999) 134–6 (calling for an ‘International Court of Accounting’).

  35. 35.

    See <http://www.fasb.org/intl/convergence_iasb.shtml>.

  36. 36.

    See EUCGF Statement, 20 February 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf_empty_voting_en.pdf.

  37. 37.

    See EUCGF Statement, 23 March 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-crossborder_en.pdf.

  38. 38.

    Final Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe (Final Winter Report) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/modern/index_en.htm#background> at 12, Item III.16.

  39. 39.

    See Press Release, ‘Corporate governance: Commission creates European Forum to promote convergence in Europe’ (IP/04/1241, 18 October 2004) <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1241&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en>. The current webadress for the ECFG is <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1241&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en>.

  40. 40.

    See The European Commission: The EU Single Market, European Corporate Governance Forum < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm>.

  41. 41.

    Since 2008 they were: (1) Antonio Borges (PT), Chairman of the Hedge Fund Standards Board and of the European Corporate Governance Institute; board member for several corporations; (2) Bistra Boeva (BG), University for National and World Economic Studies Sofia; (3) Niklas Bruun (FI), Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, (Hanken); (4) Bertrand Collomb (FR), Honorary Chairman of Lafarge and former Chairman of ‘Association Française des Entreprises Privées’ (AFEP); (5) David Devlin (IE), Partner PricewaterhouseCoopers; (6) Jose Maria Garrido Garcia (ES), University of Castilla - La Mancha, member of the Spanish Commission for Corporate Governance; (7) Peter Montagnon (UK), Head of Investment Affairs, Association of British Insurers; (8) Klaus-Peter Müller (DE), Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Commerzbank, President of the German Corporate Governance Code Commission; (9) Colette Neuville (FR), Chairman of the Association de défense des actionnaires minoritaires (ADAM); (10) Roland Oetker (DE), Chairman of Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (DSW); (11) Marek Sowa (PL), President of the Management Board of Agora SA; (12) Rolf Skog (SE), University of Stockholm; (13) Trelawny Williams (UK), Director Corporate Finance, Fidelity International; (14) Jaap Winter (NL), Partner at De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek and Professor at the University of Amsterdam; (15) Eddy Wymeersch (BE), Chairman of the Belgian Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (CBFA) and of the Committee of European Securities Regulators. See Press Release, ‘Corporate governance: Commission appoints new members of European Corporate Governance Forum’ (IP/08/1081, 2 July 2008) < http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1241&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en>.

  42. 42.

    See The European Commission: The EU Single Market, European Corporate Governance Forum < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm>.

  43. 43.

    DG Internal Market, Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate Governance in the Member States, EU Commission (23 September 2009) < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/studies/comply-or-explain-090923_en.pdf >.

  44. 44.

    Ibid 9 and 11.

  45. 45.

    Ibid 75.

  46. 46.

    Ibid 76.

  47. 47.

    Ibid 76. See also EUCGF Statement, 23 March 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-remuneration_en.pdf.

  48. 48.

    Ibid 76.

  49. 49.

    Ibid 76.

  50. 50.

    Ibid 77.

  51. 51.

    Ibid 76.

  52. 52.

    Ibid 16.

  53. 53.

    Statement of the ECGF, ‘Cross-border issues of Corporate Governance Codes’ (23 March 2009) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-crossborder_en.pdf> at 2.

  54. 54.

    Andrew Johnston, EC Regulation of Corporate Governance (CUP, Cambridge 2009) 355–356.

  55. 55.

    See again 8.1.

  56. 56.

    See 8.7.

  57. 57.

    European Commission, Green Paper: The EU corporate governance framework, 5.4.2011, COM(2011) 164 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2011-164_en.pdf> at 2.

  58. 58.

    Ibid 3.

  59. 59.

    Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate Governance in the Member States (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/studies/comply-or-explain-090923_en.pdf>).

  60. 60.

    See 8.7.3.

  61. 61.

    Contributions on the mentioned Green Paper were possible until 22 July 2011. See, e.g., commentary Handelsrechtsausschuss des Deutschen Anwaltvereins on COM(2011) 164/3, 14 (2011) Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 936–42.

  62. 62.

    See 10.2.8. Conclusions of the European Council of 17 June 2010 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/euDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/115346.pdf).

  63. 63.

    View before the world financial crisis: EC-Directorate General for Internal Market and Services (Ed), Consultation and Hearing on Future Priorities for the Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union, 2006; on this 1st Ed., 9.2.3 (p. 218–19).

  64. 64.

    Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law, 5 April 2011 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf>. There also pp. 3–4, on the member who do not represent particular institutions or Member States, und work of the “Reflection Group”.

  65. 65.

    The Report, 10 (1.3.).

  66. 66.

    The Report, 11 (1.3.).

  67. 67.

    Ibid.

  68. 68.

    The Report, 13 (1.3.).

  69. 69.

    See Chap. 7.

  70. 70.

    See Chap. 8.

  71. 71.

    William Shakespeare, Macbeth.

  72. 72.

    See 7.11. and Claus Luttermann, ‘Kopernikanische Wende zum Wahrheitsgebot oder eine europäische Ratingagentur nach US-Mustern?’, 22 (2011) Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (EWS) 330.

  73. 73.

    EC-Directorate General for Internal Market and Services (Ed), Consultation and Hearing on Future Priorities for the Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union, 2006, 3 (No 13).

  74. 74.

    See 10.2.7 and 8.7. Updates on EU policies on company law and corporate governance are available at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/index_en.htm>.

  75. 75.

    See ‘About OECD’ <http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html >.

  76. 76.

    See< http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html>.

  77. 77.

    OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999).

  78. 78.

    OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) <http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,2340,en_2649_37439_31530865_1_1_1_37439,00.html>.

  79. 79.

    Ibid 9.

  80. 80.

    Ibid 11.

  81. 81.

    Ibid 13.

  82. 82.

    Ibid 11.

  83. 83.

    Ibid 14.

  84. 84.

    Ibid 29.

  85. 85.

    Ibid 30.

  86. 86.

    Ibid.

  87. 87.

    Ibid 31.

  88. 88.

    Ibid.

  89. 89.

    Ibid 29.

  90. 90.

    Ibid 29–31.

  91. 91.

    Ibid 49.

  92. 92.

    Ibid 50–53.

  93. 93.

    Ibid 54.

  94. 94.

    Ibid 54.

  95. 95.

    Ibid 56.

  96. 96.

    Ibid 49.

  97. 97.

    Ibid.

  98. 98.

    Ibid 49–50.

  99. 99.

    Klaus J Hopt, ‘Preface’ in Theodor Baums, Richard M Buxbaum and Klaus J Hopt (eds), Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (de Gruyter, Berlin 1993) i; Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Harcourt Brace & World, New York 1932).

  100. 100.

    Myles L Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality (Harvard Business School Press, Harvard 1971).

  101. 101.

    E Norman Veasey, ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a New Legal Discipline’ (1993) 48 Business Lawyer 1267.

  102. 102.

    Irna M Millstein, ‘The Evolution of the Certifying Board’ (1993) 48 Business Lawyer 1485, 1489.

  103. 103.

    See Walter A Effross, Corporate Governance: Principles and Practices (Wolters Kluwer, Austin 2010).

  104. 104.

    See generally Nigel Kendall and Arthur Kendall, Real-World Corporate Governance (Pitman, London 1998) 22; and Bob Garratt, The Fish Rots from the Head (Harper Collins Business, London 1997) 123.

  105. 105.

    American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Analysis and Recommendations (2004), S 2.01(a).

  106. 106.

    See Jean Jacques du Plessis, Anil Hargovan and Mirko Bagaric, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011) 5–9.

  107. 107.

    Stephen M Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1735.

  108. 108.

    Stephen M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 11.

  109. 109.

    Walter A Effross, Corporate Governance: Principles and Practices (Wolters Kluwer, Austin 2010) 10–12.

  110. 110.

    Bayless Manning, ‘Principles of Corporate Governance: One Viewer’s Perspective on the ALI Project’ (1993) 48 Business Lawyer 1319, 1320.

  111. 111.

    Ibid 1319, 1324.

  112. 112.

    Ibid 1319, 1325.

  113. 113.

    Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance’ (1993) 48 Business Lawyer 1271, 1295.

  114. 114.

    E Norman Veasey, ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a New Legal Discipline’ (1993) 48 Business Lawyer 1267.

  115. 115.

    See in particular Stephen M Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics (Foundation Press, New York 2002) 218; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance’ (1993) 48 Business Lawyer 1273–4; and Bayless Manning, ‘Principles of Corporate Governance: One Viewer’s Perspective on the ALI Project’ (1993) 48 Business Lawyer 1319, 1321, 1328–1329.

  116. 116.

    Bayless Manning, ‘Principles of Corporate Governance: One Viewer’s Perspective on the ALI Project’ (1993) 48 Business Lawyer 1278.

  117. 117.

    S 8.01(b) of the Model Business Corporations Act (1984 and Supplement) reads as follows: ‘All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors …’

  118. 118.

    Jean J du Plessis, Anil Hargovan and Mirko Bagaric, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011) 81.

  119. 119.

    Stephen M Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics (Foundation Press, New York 2002) 195.

  120. 120.

    As quoted by K Fred Skousen, Steven M Glover and Douglas F Prawitt, An Introduction to Corporate Governance and the SEC, (Thomson South-West, Mason 2005) 48.

  121. 121.

    Ibid 2–3 and 31–32.

  122. 122.

    Ibid 35–36.

  123. 123.

    Ibid 5.

  124. 124.

    Ibid 39 and 40–44 and 49 et seq.

  125. 125.

    George Bush, address delivered at the University of Cologne 5 Feb 2003 (<http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch020503psa.htm>).

  126. 126.

    See <www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-89a.htm>.

  127. 127.

    K Fred Skousen, Steven M Glover and Douglas F Prawitt, An Introduction to Corporate Governance and the SEC (Mason, Thomson South-Western 2005) 5.

  128. 128.

    See also Petri Mäntysaari, Comparative Corporate Governance, (Springer, Berlin 2005) at 44.

  129. 129.

    S 201(b) Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002.

  130. 130.

    See also Robert AG Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance (3rd ed, Malden 2004) 248–49[JEAN, GET REF TO THE 2008 EDITION!]; Richard Smerdon, A Practical Guide to Corporate Governance (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010) 628 et seq.

  131. 131.

    For a similar view expressed later, see Sir Bryan Nicholson, ‘The role of the regulator’ in Ken Rushton (ed) The Business Case for Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 100 at 103–106 and 118; Keith Johnstone and Will Chalk, ‘What sanctions are necessary’ in Ken Rushton (ed), The Business Case for Corporate Governance (CUP, Cambridge 2008) 146 at 154.

  132. 132.

    Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) 19. See also Sir Bryan Nicholson, ‘The role of the regulator’ in Ken Rushton (ed) The Business Case for Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 100 and 107–108.

  133. 133.

    Commentators like Skousen, Glover and Prawitt, An Introduction to Corporate Governance and the SEC, (Thomson South-West, Mason 2005), 6 provide a very clear picture of unacceptable compensation practices in the USA, especially as far as compensation by way of overvalued stock was concerned.

  134. 134.

    See Annalisa Barrett and Paula Todd, ‘NACD Blue Ribbon Commission Report on Executive Compensation and the Role of the Compensation Committee’ <http://corpgov.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NACD_BRC_Report.pdf>.

  135. 135.

    King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 (King (2009) Report), Institute of directors (2009) 9 <http://african.ipapercms.dk/IOD/KINGIII/kingiiireport/>at 6 and 9.

  136. 136.

    Thomas Clarke and Jean-Francois Chanlat, ‘Introduction: A new World disorder?’ in European Corporate Governance, (Routledge, London 2009) 1.

  137. 137.

    King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 (King (2009) Report), Institute of directors (2009) at 6.

  138. 138.

    Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 158.

  139. 139.

    Principles that must guide financial regulation. June 15 2009, Financial Times.< http://www.nyse.com/about/nyseviewpoint/1245147557416.html>.

  140. 140.

    NYSE Corporate Governance Rules (3 Nov 2004) <http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303A_final_rules.pdf> 1.

  141. 141.

    Ibid 3.

  142. 142.

    Ibid s 303A.06.

  143. 143.

    Ibid s 303A.11.

  144. 144.

    Ibid s 303A.12(b).

  145. 145.

    Ibid s 303A.12(c).

  146. 146.

    See <www.csair.com/en/investor/other/20090722_eng.PDF> for the ‘Foreign Private Issuer Annual Written Affirmation Form’.

  147. 147.

    See <http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/help/lcm-rules-map.html> for the full text to the NYSE Listed Company Manual.

  148. 148.

    See <http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/help/lcm-rules-map.html> for the full text to the NYSE Listed Company Manual.

  149. 149.

    Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and in Practice, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 177.

  150. 150.

    Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodd-Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_and_Consumer_Protection_Act>.

  151. 151.

    Bericht der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex an die Bundesregierung, November 2010 <http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/ger/download/16122010/Governance_Bericht_Nov_2010.pdf> at 96.

  152. 152.

    Some of the bullet points extracted from Bericht der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex an die Bundesregierung, November 2010 <> at 102–103.

  153. 153.

    See <http://sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf> for new provisions adopted on 4 April 2011.

  154. 154.

    The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: Draft Report (hereafter ‘Cadbury Report (Draft)’) Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) 7 para 2.1; Charlotte Villiers, ‘Draft Report by the Cadbury Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance’ (1992) 13 Company Lawyer 214.

  155. 155.

    John C Shaw, ‘The Cadbury Report, Two Years Later’ in Klaus J Hopt, Hideki K Kanda, Mark J Roe, Eddy Wymeersch and Srefan Prigge (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research (OUP, Oxford 1998) 21, 23; Christopher Stanley, ‘Corporate Accountability: Cadbury Committee: Part 1’ (1993) 11 Intl Banking and Financial L 104.

  156. 156.

    Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (hereafter Cadbury Report (1992)) Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992).

  157. 157.

    The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: Draft Report, Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) 5 para 1.1.

  158. 158.

    Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) 11 para 1.3.

  159. 159.

    Ibid 58 et seq.

  160. 160.

    Ibid 20 et seq.

  161. 161.

    Ibid 36 et seq.

  162. 162.

    Ibid 48 et seq.

  163. 163.

    Ibid 12 para 1.9.

  164. 164.

    Ibid 16 para 3.2.

  165. 165.

    Ibid 16 para 3.1.

  166. 166.

    Ibid 17 paras 3.7–3.9.

  167. 167.

    Ibid 16 para 3.1.

  168. 168.

    John C Shaw, ‘The Cadbury Report, Two Years Later’ in Klaus J Hopt, Hideki K Kanda, Mark J Roe, Eddy Wymeersch and Srefan Prigge (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research (OUP, Oxford 1998) 24.

  169. 169.

    See < http://www.frc.org.uk/about/ >.

  170. 170.

    See < http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/reviewCombined.cfm>.

  171. 171.

    See < http://www.frc.org.uk/press/pub0583.html>.

  172. 172.

    See < http://www.frc.org.uk/about/organisation.cfm>.

  173. 173.

    See <http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/FRC%20The%20UK%20Approach%20to%20Corporate%20Governance%20final.pdf>.

  174. 174.

    See <http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/Draft%20FRC%20Reg%20Strat%20-%20Plan%20and%20Budget07-08%20FINAL.pdf>.

  175. 175.

    See <http://www.frc.org.uk/about/>.

  176. 176.

    Ibid.

  177. 177.

    See <www.dti.gov.uk/cld/cgaai-final.pdf>.

  178. 178.

    See < http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file20686.pdf >.

  179. 179.

    Sir Sir Bryan Nicholson, ‘The role of the regulator’ in Ken Rushton (ed), The Business Case for Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 108–9.

  180. 180.

    Nigel Kendall and Arthur Kendall, Real-World Corporate Governance (Pitman, London 1998) 23.

  181. 181.

    Hampel Commission Corporate Governance (Hampel Report 1998) para 1.6.

  182. 182.

    Ibid para 1.7.

  183. 183.

    Ibid paras 1.12–1.14.

  184. 184.

    Hampel Commission Corporate Governance (Hampel Report 1998) para 1.16.

  185. 185.

    Ibid paras 3.7–3.8.

  186. 186.

    A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> at 9.

  187. 187.

    A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities (Walker Review) <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf>.

  188. 188.

    A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities (Walker Review) <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> at 11–13.

  189. 189.

    FRC, 2009 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report (December 2009) < http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/reviewCombined.cfm>.

  190. 190.

    See <http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/combinedcode.cfm>.

  191. 191.

    This is ensured through the LSE Listing Rule 12.43A.

  192. 192.

    Sir Bryan Nicholson, ‘The role of the regulator’ in Ken Rushton (ed), The Business Case for Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 103–106; Keith Johnstone and Will Chalk, ‘What Sanctions are Necessary?’ in Ken Rushton (ed), The Business Case for Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 146 at 168–70; Simon Low, ‘Is the UK Model Working?’ in Ken Rushton (ed), The Business Case for Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 222 at 240–1.

  193. 193.

    Sir Bryan Nicholson, ‘The role of the regulator’ in Ken Rushton (ed) The Business Case for Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 100 at 107.

  194. 194.

    FRC, 2009 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report (December 2009) < http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/reviewCombined.cfm>.

  195. 195.

    See FRC, Consultation on the Revised UK Corporate Governance Code (December 2009) <http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/Consultation%20on%20the%20Revised%20Corporate%20Governance%20Code1.pdf>.

  196. 196.

    See < http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/reviewCombined.cfm>.

  197. 197.

    See <http://www.frc.org.uk/press/pub2175.html>.

  198. 198.

    FRC, 2009 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report (December 2009) < http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/reviewCombined.cfm> at 3.

  199. 199.

    Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (Higgs Report (2003)), (January 2003), available at <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23012.pdf > 18.

  200. 200.

    This part is based on Jean J du Plessis, ‘Reverberations after the HIH and other Recent Australian Corporate Collapses: The Role of ASIC’ (2003) 15 Australian J C L 225, 227–30.

  201. 201.

    John H Farrar, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand (OUP, Melbourne 2001) 6.

  202. 202.

    Frederick G Hilmer, Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to Enhance Company Performance (Hilmer Report) (Australian Print Group, Melbourne 1993) 1, 4.

  203. 203.

    Trevor Sykes, The Bold Riders (Allen & Unwin, St Leonards 1996).

  204. 204.

    See Rick Sarre, ‘Responding to Corporate Collapses: Is there a Role for Corporate Social Responsibility?’ (2002) 7 Deakin L Rev 1.

  205. 205.

    Rich v ASIC (2004) HCA 42 (9 Sept 2004) [62].

  206. 206.

    Ibid [117]–[118].

  207. 207.

    See generally HIH Royal Commission Final Report, xiii–xiv; and F Clarke and G Dean, ‘Corporate Collapses Analysed’ in Collapse Incorporated: Tales, Safeguards & Responsibilities of Corporate Australia (CCH Australia Ltd, Sydney 2001) 72, 89.

  208. 208.

    Robert Baxt, ‘The Necessity of Appropriate Reform’, in Collapse Incorporated: Tales, Safeguards & Responsibilities of Corporate Australia (CCH Australia Ltd, Sydney 2001) 329 (see also Baxt’s critical comments of several recent pieces of legislation on 329–334).

  209. 209.

    It is promising to note that there seems to be some mention of a core and modern corporate law—Robert Baxt, ‘The Necessity of Appropriate Reform’, in Collapse Incorporated: Tales, Safeguards & Responsibilities of Corporate Australia (CCH Australia Ltd, Sydney 2001) 335.

  210. 210.

    Rick Sarre, ‘Responding to Corporate Collapses: Is there a Role for Corporate Social Responsibility?’ (2002) 7 Deakin L Rev 1; Rick Sarre, ‘Risk Management and Regulatory Weakness’, in Collapse Incorporated: Tales, Safeguards & Responsibilities of Corporate Australia (CCH Australia Ltd, Sydney 2001) 295. See also David Knott, ‘Protecting the Investor: The Regulator and Audit’ Address to the CPA Congress 2002 Conference, Perth Western Australia, 15 May 2002, <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic_pub.nsf> (Speeches) 4.

  211. 211.

    David Knott, ‘Protecting the Investor: The Regulator and Audit’ Address to the CPA Congress 2002 Conference, Perth Western Australia, 15 May 2002, <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic_pub.nsf> (Speeches) 4.

  212. 212.

    See David Knott, ‘Corporate Governance: The 1980s Revisited?’ Monash Law School Foundation Lecture 23 Aug 2001, <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic_pub.nsf> (Speeches) 3–4; Jillian Segal, ‘Corporate Governance: Substance over Form’ (2002) 25 UNSW L J 320.

  213. 213.

    Morten Huse, Boards, Governance and Value Creation Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007) 26–27.

  214. 214.

    David Knott, ‘Corporate Governance: The 1980s Revisited?’ Monash Law School Foundation Lecture 23 Aug 2001, <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic_pub.nsf> (Speeches) 11.

  215. 215.

    See Productivity Commission, Executive Remuneration in Australia, Report No. 49, Final Inquiry Report (Commonwealth of Australia Melbourne December 2009) <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/executive-remuneration/report>.

  216. 216.

    See, for instance, Allan Fels, Shareholders can turn up the heat on executive pay, The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 2010, 20.

  217. 217.

    See Productivity Commission, Executive Remuneration in Australia, Report No. 49, Final Inquiry Report (Commonwealth of Australia Melbourne December 2009) <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/executive-remuneration/report> at XXXII and 296–301.

  218. 218.

    The following two parts are based on Chap. 5 of Jean J du Plessis, Anil Hargovan and Mirko Bagaric, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011).

  219. 219.

    Business Council of Australia, Corporate Practices and Conduct (hereafter referred to as the Bosch Report (1991)).

  220. 220.

    Business Council of Australia, Corporate Practices and Conduct, 2nd ed (hereafter referred to as the Bosch Report (1993)).

  221. 221.

    Business Council of Australia, Corporate Practices and Conduct, 3rd ed (hereafter referred to as the Bosch Report (1995)).

  222. 222.

    Bosch Report (1991), ‘Foreword’.

  223. 223.

    Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (hereafter ‘Cadbury Report’) Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992).

  224. 224.

    John C Shaw, ‘The Cadbury Report, Two Years Later’, in Klaus J Hopt, Hideki K Kanda, Mark J Roe, Eddy Wymeersch and Srefan Prigge (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research (OUP, Oxford 1998) 21, 23; Stanley Christopher, ‘Corporate Accountability: Cadbury Committee: Part 1’ (1993) 11 Intl Banking and Financial L 104.

  225. 225.

    Bosch Report (1991),‘Foreword’.

  226. 226.

    HIH Royal Commission Final Report, Vol I, Part III, 102.

  227. 227.

    Bosch Report (1993) 1–2.

  228. 228.

    Ibid 9.

  229. 229.

    Ibid 1.

  230. 230.

    Ibid 2.

  231. 231.

    Ibid 1.

  232. 232.

    See Bosch Report (1995) 4–5.

  233. 233.

    Ibid 1.

  234. 234.

    Cf (for example) John H Farrar, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand (3rd ed, OUP, Melbourne 2008) 381–383; RP Austin, HAJ Ford and IM Ramsay, Company Directors: Principles of Law and Corporate Governance (LexisNexis/Butterworths, Chatswood 2005) 15–17.

  235. 235.

    Bosch Report (1995), 3; Phillip Lipton, ‘The Practice of Corporate Governance in Australia: Regulation, Disclosure and Case Studies’ in Low Chee Keong (ed), Corporate Governance: An Asian-Pacific Critique (Sweet & Maxwell, Hong Kong 2002) 105, 131.

  236. 236.

    See Phillip Lipton, ‘The Practice of Corporate Governance in Australia: Regulation, Disclosure and Case Studies’ in Low Chee Keong (ed), Corporate Governance: An Asian-Pacific Critique (Sweet & Maxwell, Hong Kong 2002) 132–33 for the matters listed in Appendix 4A.

  237. 237.

    Ibid 131–32.

  238. 238.

    AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 ACSR 759.

  239. 239.

    Frederick G Hilmer, Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to Enhance Company Performance (Hilmer Report) (Australian Print Group, Melbourne 1993), 1–3.

  240. 240.

    Daniels v Anderson (1995) 13 ACLC 614.

  241. 241.

    Final Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Tricontinental Group of Companies, 1992, vol 2, ch 19, paras 19.53–19.56.

  242. 242.

    Daniels v Anderson (1995) 13 ACLC 663.

  243. 243.

    Ibid 663–64.

  244. 244.

    Andrew Rogers, ‘Update’, in Frederick G Hilmer, Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to Enhance Company Performance (Hilmer Report) (Australian Print Group, Melbourne 1993), 77.

  245. 245.

    See Explanatory Memorandum to the CLERP Bill 1998, paras 6.98–6.105; and the current ss 189–190 and 198D Corporations Act.

  246. 246.

    Frederick G Hilmer, Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to Enhance Company Performance (Hilmer Report) (Australian Print Group, Melbourne 1993), 4.

  247. 247.

    Ibid ch 3.

  248. 248.

    Ibid ch 4.

  249. 249.

    Frederick G Hilmer, Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to Enhance Company Performance (Hilmer Report 1998) i–ii.

  250. 250.

    Ibid 1–7.

  251. 251.

    Frederick G Hilmer and Lex Donaldson, ‘The Fallacy of Independence’ in Frederick G Hilmer, Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to Enhance Company Performance (Hilmer Report 1998) 81.

  252. 252.

    Frederick G Hilmer, Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to Enhance Company Performance (Hilmer Report 1998).

  253. 253.

    Frederick G Hilmer and Lex Donaldson, ‘The Fallacy of Independence’ in Frederick G Hilmer, Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to Enhance Company Performance (Hilmer Report 1998) 81. 58, 86.

  254. 254.

    See Jean J du Plessis, ‘Reverberations after the HIH and other Recent Australian Corporate Collapses: The Role of ASIC’ (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 229 and Rich v ASIC [2004] HCA 42 (9 Sept 2004) [117].

  255. 255.

    As referred to in Ian Ramsay and Richard Hoad, Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices by Australian Companies, Research Paper (Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne (1997) 10 fn 25.

  256. 256.

    As referred to in Ian Ramsay and Richard Hoad, Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices by Australian Companies, Research Paper (Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne (1997) 3, 10 (fn 25) – also published as Ian M Ramsay and Richard Hoad, ‘Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices by Australian Companies’ (1997) 15 Company and Securities L J 454.

  257. 257.

    IFSA Guidance Note No. 2.00: Corporate Governance: A Guide for Investment Managers and A Statement of Recommended Corporate Practice (3rd ed, July 1999) (hereafter referred to as IFSA Guidance Note No 2.00 (1999)), 1.

  258. 258.

    IFSA Guidance Note No 2.00: Corporate Governance: A Guide for Fund Managers and Corporations (Dec 2002) (hereafter referred to as IFSA Blue Book (2002)).

  259. 259.

    IFSA Guidance Note No 2.00: Corporate Governance: A Guide for Fund Managers and Corporations (Oct 2004) (hereafter referred to as IFSA Blue Book (2004)) <http://www.ifsa.com.au>.

  260. 260.

    IFSA Media Release 21 Oct 2004 ‘Enhanced Corporate Governance Guidelines Issued by IFSA: Proxy Voting Summary to Appear on Member Company Websites’, <http://www.ifsa.com.au>.

  261. 261.

    Guidance Note No. 2.00: Corporate Governance: A Guide for Fund Managers and Corporations (June 2009) (hereafter referred to as IFSA Blue Book (2009)) – a copy of this guide is available in pdf format at <http://www.ifsa.com.au//2009%20Documents/2009_0703_June%202009%20Blue%20Book%20FINAL.pdf>.

  262. 262.

    IFSA Blue Book (2002) 9, para 9/2/1.

  263. 263.

    IFSA Blue Book (2004) 9 para 9.2.1.

  264. 264.

    Ibid 26, para 11.11.

  265. 265.

    This part is based on part of the following article: Jean J du Plessis, ‘Reverberations after the HIH and other Recent Australian Corporate Collapses: The Role of ASIC’ (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 225, 230; and Jean Jacques du Plessis, Anil Hargovan and Mirko Bagaric, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011) 180 et seq.

  266. 266.

    ASIC Annual Report 2008–09 at 59, available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ASIC_Annual_Report_08-09_full.pdf/$file/ASIC_Annual_Report_08-09_full.pdf.

  267. 267.

    Australian Securities and Investments Commission: ‘Our Role’ available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/Our%20role.

  268. 268.

    Ibid.

  269. 269.

    Ibid.

  270. 270.

    For fuller discussion, see Jason Harris, Anil Hargovan and Michael Adams, Australian Corporate Law (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Butterworths 2009, Chap. 2 ‘ASIC: Role and Powers’).

  271. 271.

    See also George Gilligan, Helen Bird and Ian Ramsay, ‘Civil Penalties and the Enforcement of Directors’ Duties’ (1999) 22 University of New South Wales Law Journal 417, 433–6; George Gilligan, Helen Bird and Ian Ramsay, ‘The Efficiency of Civil Penalty Sanctions Under the Australian Corporations Law’ (1999) 136 (November) Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1.

  272. 272.

    Jillian Segal, ‘Corporate Governance: Substance Over Form’ (2002) 25 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1 at 5.

  273. 273.

    Berna Collier, The Role of ASIC in Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance Summit, (27 November 2002) 5. Avalailable at http://fido.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/corporate_governance_summit.pdf/$file/corporate_governance_summit.pdf.

  274. 274.

    For discussion of enforcement actions against officers of GIO Insurance Ltd, HIH Insurance Ltd, One Tel Ltd and Water Wheel Holdings Ltd, see Jason Harris, Anil Hargovan and Michael Adams, Australian Corporate Law (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Butterworths 2009, Chaps. 16–19 on Directors and Officers Duties).

  275. 275.

    For example, see ASIC v Macdonald (No 11) (2009) 256 ALR 199 – discussed in Anil Hargovan, ‘Corporate Governance Lessons from James Hardie’ (2009) 33 Melbourne Uni LR 984.

  276. 276.

    See further Jean Jacques du Plessis, Anil Hargovan and Mirko Bagaric, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011) 185 et seq.

  277. 277.

    (2009) 256 ALR 199.

  278. 278.

    James Hardie Proceedings, ASIC Media Release 09–69, 23 April 2009, http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/09-69+James+Hardie+proceedings?openDocument.

  279. 279.

    See Commonwealth of Australia. The Treasury. Corporate and Financial Services Division. Review of Corporate Sanctions. (2007) http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1182/PDF/Review_of_Sanctions.pdf and <http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=037&ContentID=1182>.

  280. 280.

    Segal, above n 14 Jillian Segal, ‘Institutional Self-regulation: What Should be the Role of the Regulator?’ Address to the National Institute for Governance Twilight Seminar, Canberra, 8 November 2001, http://fido.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/NIGConf_081101.pdf/$file/NIGConf_081101.pdf13; Knott, ’Corporate Governance: The 1980s Revisited?’ Monash Law School Foundation Lecture, 23 August 2001, 3. Several causes can potentially play a role in any business failure, see J Adams and N Jones, ‘Distressed Businesses – Preventing Failure’, in Collapse Incorporated: Tales, Safeguards & Responsibilities of Corporate Australia, Sydney, CCH Australia (2001) 205–10.

  281. 281.

    See J Adams and N Jones, ‘Distressed Businesses – Preventing Failure’, in Collapse Incorporated: Tales, Safeguards & Responsibilities of Corporate Australia, Sydney, CCH Australia (2001) 210–16.

  282. 282.

    The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) launched a new brand structure on 1 August 2010, when it became known as ASX Group – see < http://www.asxgroup.com.au/history.htm>.

  283. 283.

    See Paul Redmond, Companies and Securities Law (3rd edn, LBC Information Service, Sydney 2008) 268 and Phillip Lipton, ‘The Practice of Corporate Governance in Australia: Regulation, Disclosure and Case Studies’ in Low Chee Keong (ed), Corporate Governance: An Asian-Pacific Critique (Sweet & Maxwell, Hong Kong 2002) 105 at 131.

  284. 284.

    Phillip Lipton and Abe Herzberg, Understanding Company Law (11th ed, Thomson Lawbook Co, Sydney 2003) 296.

  285. 285.

    Bosch Report (1995) 3.

  286. 286.

    Ian Ramsay and Richard Hoad, Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices by Australian Companies, Research Paper (Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne (1997) 1–2.

  287. 287.

    Bosch Report (1995) 3.

  288. 288.

    The CGC had its 5th meeting on Thursday 20 Feb 2003—Alan Kohler, ‘Directors Face D-day as Old Rules go by the Board’ Australian Financial Rev, 20 Feb 2003.

  289. 289.

    In 2010 the following associations, institutes, councils and groups formed the Corporate Governance Council: Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia Ltd; Australian Council of Superannuation Investors; Australian Financial Markets Association Limited; Australian Institute of Company Directors; Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees; Australasian Investor Relations Association Limited; Australian Shareholders’ Association Limited; ASX Limited (trading as Australian Securities Exchange); Business Council of Australia; Chartered Secretaries Australia; CPA Australia Ltd; Financial Services Institute of Australasia; Group of 100 Inc; The Institute of Actuaries of Australia; The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia; The Institute of Internal Auditors – Australia; Investment and Financial Services Association Limited; Law Council of Australia Limited; National Institute of Accountants; Property Council of Australia Limited; and Securities & Derivatives Industry Association Limited.

  290. 290.

    Listing Rule 4.10.3 – see < http://www.asxgroup.com.au/media/PDFs/Chapter04.pdf>.

  291. 291.

    Gudance Rule 9A – see http://www.asxgroup.com.au/media/PDFs/gn09a_corporate_governance_principles.pdf>.

  292. 292.

    Principle 8 has been incorporated into current principles 1 and 2, while Principle 2 has been incorporated into current principles 3 and 7. Principle 9 became Principle 8.

  293. 293.

    ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations with 2010 Amendments – see < http://www.asx.com.au/documents/about/cg_principles_recommendations_with_2010_amendments.pdf >.

  294. 294.

    See Jean J Du Plessis, ‘Reflections on Some Recent Corporate Governance Reforms in Germany: A Transformation of the German Aktienrecht?’ (2003) 8 Deakin L Rev 382–83.

  295. 295.

    Paul Davies, ‘Employee Representation and Corporate Law Reform: A Comment from the United Kingdom’ (2000) Comb Lab L & Policy J 135, paras 135–36.

  296. 296.

    John H Farrar, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand (3rd ed, OUP, Melbourne 2008) 6–7.

  297. 297.

    See and compare John C Coffee Jr, ‘The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications’ (1999) 93 Northwestern U L Rev 641 et seq; Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown L J 439 et seq; Douglas M Branson, ‘The Very Uncertain Prospect Of “Global” Convergence In Corporate Governance’(2001) 34 Cornell Intl LJ 321 et seq; Kwek Mean Luck, ‘The End of History for Corporate Governance or just another Moment in Time? (2001) 19 Company and Securities L J 305 et seq; Paul von Nessen, ‘Corporate Governance in Australia: Converging with International Developments’ (2003) 15 Australian J of Corp Law 189, 206 (fn 72); Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Rechnungslegung als Unternehmensverfassung’ (2003) 6 NZG 842, 844–45.

  298. 298.

    Weil, Gotshal and Manges, Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and its Members, <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/corpgov/corp-gov-codes-rpt-part1_en.pdf> 6–7.

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  1. Deakin University, Geelong Waurn Ponds Campus 75 Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds, VIC, 3216, Australia

    Jean J. du Plessis

  2. Chair of International Business Law, Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Auf der Schanz 49, 85049, Ingoldstadt, Germany

    Claus Luttermann

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du Plessis, J.J., Luttermann, C. (2012). Corporate Governance in the EU, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Corporate Governance in Selected Other Jurisdictions. In: German Corporate Governance in International and European Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23005-9_10

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