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An Overview of German Business or Enterprise Law and the One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted

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German Corporate Governance in International and European Context

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Abstract

It is hardly possible to judge the merits of the German corporate governance system without also having a basic knowledge of German business or enterprise law and without analysing it within its wider cultural context and linguistic background. Whereas business law or enterprise law refer to all legal aspects pertaining to businesses or enterprises, the focus of this book is on corporate governance in context of primarily large companies or corporations. A distinctive feature of German companies or corporations is the particular relationship amongst the various corporate organs and the unique synthesis between corporations law and labour law. Understanding this synthesis is fundamental when the merits of the English and American one-tier system and the German two-tier system (the management board and the supervisory board) with employee participation are analysed and compared. These aspects have often been neglected in the academic literature attempting to analyse the German corporate governance system from a traditional Anglo-American perspective.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In Germany, phrases like company law, corporate law and corporations law have different meanings and are often associated with specific political or academic theories. See and compare, for example, Thomas Raiser, ‘The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany’ [1988] AJCL 111, 122 et seq; Gunter Teubner, ‘Enterprise Corporation: New Industrial Policy and the “Essence” of the Legal Person’ [1988] AJCL 130 et seq. For the purposes of this book these terms will be used interchangeably.

  2. 2.

    See Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Comparative Law as a Comprehensive Approach’ (2000) 1 Richmond J of Global L and Bus 1; Bernhard Großfeld, Core Questions of Comparative Law (Carolina Academic Press, Durham NC 2004).

  3. 3.

    Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Comparatists and Languages’ in Legrand and Munday (eds) Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (OUP, Oxford 2003) 154.

  4. 4.

    For a general overview see Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Management and Control of Marketable Share Companies’ in International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Mohr and Siebeck Verlag, Tuebingen 1973); AR Oquendo, ‘Breaking on Through to the Other Side: Understanding Continental European Corporate Governance’ (2001) 22 U Pennsylvania J of Intl Eco L 975.

  5. 5.

    See in particular Rudolf Wiethölter, Interessen und Organisation der Aktiengesellschaft im Amerikanischen und Deutschen Recht (CF Müller Verlag, Karlsruhe 1961) 272 et seq; Bernhard Großfeld, Aktiengesellschaft, Unternehmenskonzentration und Kleinaktionär (Mohr and Siebeck Verlag, Tuebingen 1968) 113 et seq; Friedrich Kübler and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht (6th ed, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg 2006) 5 et seq; Bernhard Großfeld and Ulrich Irriger, ‘Intertemporales Unternehmensrecht’ (1988) 43 JZ 531.

  6. 6.

    For purposes of this book, the term codetermination (Mitbestimmung) will be used in its legal context, indicating the codetermination of employees in terms of various statutory provisions – see Chap. 5 for a closer description of the different ways in which the term codetermination is used. The term Mitbestimmung is also sometimes used in more general terms – see Christene Windbichler, ‘Grenzen der Mitbestimmung in einer markwirtschaftlichen Ordnung’ [1991] ZfA 35. See generally Detlev F Vagts, ‘Reforming the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives from the German’ [1966] Harvard L Rev 23, 26 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Thomas Raiser, ‘The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany’ [1988] AJCL 111, 113.

  8. 8.

    Ibid 114.

  9. 9.

    See especially the comprehensive exposition by Dieter Reuter, ‘Der Einfluß der Mitbestimmung auf das Gesellschafts – und Arbeitsrecht’ [1979] AcP 509–566.

  10. 10.

    Ibid 409–517.

  11. 11.

    Thomas Raiser, ‘The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany’ [1988] AJCL 111, 118, 122 et seq.

  12. 12.

    See especially Bernhard Großfeld and Werner Ebke, ‘Probleme der Unternehmensverfassung in rechtshistorisher und rechtsvergleichender Sicht (I)’ (1977) 22 AG 59, 62 et seq. See also Klaus-Peter Martens, ‘Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und das Gesellschaftsrecht’ (1979) 8 ZGR 493, 508–9.

  13. 13.

    Eckard Rehbinder, ‘Das Mitbestimmungsurteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts aus unternehmensrechlicher Sicht’ (1979) 8 ZGR 471, 478, 480–81; Friedrich Kübler and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht (6th ed, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg 2006) 176 et seq.

  14. 14.

    Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Global Accounting: Where Internet Meets Geography’ (2000) 48 Am J Comp L 261; Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance: Generally Accepted Accounting Principles v International Accounting Standards?’ (2003) 28 North Carolina J of Intl L and Com Reg 847; Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Lawyers and Accountants: A Semiotic Competition’ (2001) 36 Wake Forest L Rev 167.

  15. 15.

    Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Changing Concepts of Rules: Global Corporate Assessment’ (2002) 8 L and Bus Rev of the Americas 341.

  16. 16.

    Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Global Valuation: Geography and Semiotics’ (2002) 55 SMU L Rev 197; Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Global Financial Statements/Local Enterprise Valuation’ (2004) 29 J of Corp L 338.

  17. 17.

    B Großfeld and U Lehmann, ‘Management Structures and Worker’s Codetermination in Germany with European Perspectives’ [1994] Corporate Law Development Series 41, 43. See also Ingo Saenger, Gesellschaftsrecht, (Verlag Franz Vahlen, München 2010) 1.

  18. 18.

    This was in accordance with the general principle of the German law of corporations that large public corporations should be regulated in detail in a separate act – see B Großfeld and U Lehmann, ‘Management Structures and Worker’s Codetermination in Germany with European Perspectives’ [1994] Corporate Law Development Series 41, 42; Bernhard Großfeld and Werner Ebke, ‘Probleme der Unternehmensverfassung in rechtshistorisher und rechtsvergleichender Sicht (I)’ (1977) 22 AG 59 et seq; Friedrich Kübler and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht (6th ed, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg 2006) 4.

  19. 19.

    See S 23(5)1 AktG which provides that the articles of incorporation can only contain deviations from the prescribed provisions of the Act when it is specifically provided for.

  20. 20.

    Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl. 1965 I 1089) (Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1965, Part I at 1089).

  21. 21.

    Ulrich Eisenhardt, Gesellschaftsrecht (14th ed, CH Beck Verlag, München 2009) 3.

  22. 22.

    See in particular Peter Hanau, ‘Einführung’ in Mitbestimmungsgesetze in den Unternehmen mit allen Wahlordnungen (4th ed, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München 1991) VII–XX.

  23. 23.

    See further Chap. 5.

  24. 24.

    Friedrich Kübler and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht (6th ed, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg 2006) 13 et seq. With regard to the articles of incorporation (Satzung), see Hans-Joachim Mertens ‘Zuständigkeiten des mitbestimmenten Aufsichtsrats’ (1977) 6 ZGR 271, 283–88 and Hans-Joachim Mertens ‘Satzungs – und Organisationsautonomie im Aktien– und Konzernrecht’ (1994) 23 ZGR 426, 438–40; Barbara Grunewald, ‘Die Auslegung von Gesellschaftsverträgen und Satzungen’ (1995) 24 ZGR 68, 84–5.

  25. 25.

    See in particular Chaps. 2 and 4.

  26. 26.

    Detlev F Vagts, ‘Reforming the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives from the German’ [1966] Harvard L Rev 23, 33.

  27. 27.

    On the basic forms of German enterprises, see Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’ [1992] AJCL 503.

  28. 28.

    See Hannes Schneider and Martin Heidenhain, The German Stock Corporations Act (2nd ed, CH Beck Verlag, München 2000); Martin Peltzer and Anthony G Hickinbotham, German Stock Corporation Act and the Co-Determination Act: German-English Text with an Introduction in English (OVS Otto Schmidt Verlag, Köln 1999).

  29. 29.

    In particular the Joint Stock Companies Act 1837 (1 Vict c 73); Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict c 110) (5 September 1844); Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (19 & 20 Vict c 47) (14 Julie 1856) and several Amendments Acts like the Joint Stock Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict c 896); Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict c 131; Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1877 (40 & 41 Vict c 26); Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1879 (42 & 43 Vict c 76); Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1880 (43 Vict c 19); Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict c 28); and Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1886 (49 Vict c 23).

  30. 30.

    See WR Scott, The General Development of the Joint-stock System to 1720 (The University Press, Cambridge 1912).

  31. 31.

    Charles Wordsworth, The Law of Mining, Banking, Insurance and General Joint Stock Companies Not Requiring Express Authority of Parliament (6th ed, WG Benning and Co, London 1854); Nathaniel Lindley, A Treatise on the Law of Partnership, Including its Application to Joint-stock and other Companies (William Maxwell, London 1860); Francis William Clark, A Treatise on the Law of Partnership and Joint Stock Companies according to the Law of Scotland (T & T Clark, Edinburgh 1866); Henry Thring, The Law and Practice of Joint-stock Public Companies (2nd ed, Stevens & Sons, London 1868); Charles Fiish Beach, Company Law: Commentaries on the Law of Private Corporations whether with or without Capital Stock, also of Joint-stock Companies (TH Flood & Co, Chicago 1891); CEH Chadwyck Healy, Percy F Wheeler and Charles Burney, A Treatise on the Law and Practice relating to Joint Stock Companies under the Acts of 1862–1890 (3rd ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London 1894).

  32. 32.

    See Oliver Niedostadek, The Proprietary Company – das Recht der Australischen Private Company (LIT Verlag, Muenster 2004).

  33. 33.

    See, for instance as far as South Africa is concerned, Nico Olbrisch, Die südafrikanische close corporation und ihre strukturellen Unterschiede zur deutschen GmbH, Münsteraner Studien zur Rechtsvergleichung (Band 23) (LIT Verlag, Muenster 1997); Nico Olbrisch and Jean J. du Plessis, ‘Some Structural Differences Between the South African Close Corporation and the German GmbH’ [1997] TSAR 315 et seq.

  34. 34.

    Deutsches Aktieninstitut [DAI], DAI-Factbook 2010, 1-1-a.

  35. 35.

    Stastistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 2010, Umsatzsteuer 2008, 617.

  36. 36.

    See Jean J. du Plessis Bernard Großfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger and Otto Sandrock, German Corporate Governace in International and European Context (Springer Verlag, Heidelberg 2007) 6.

  37. 37.

    Werner Ebke, ‘The European Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws Revolution: Überseering, Inspire Art and Beyond’ [2005] The International Lawyer 39; Christian Kersting and Clemens Philipp Schindler, ‘Inspire Art Decision of Sept 2003 and its Effects on Practice’ (2003) 4 German L J (Electronic Journal) No 12.

  38. 38.

    See 6.2.2.

  39. 39.

    Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen.

  40. 40.

    See 6.3.1.1.

  41. 41.

    Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl. 1965 I 1089) (Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1965, Part I at 1089).

  42. 42.

    Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl. 1892, 477) (Official Journal of the former Reich, 1992 at 477).

  43. 43.

    See 6.3.2.

  44. 44.

    That is the place where those companies maintain their main administrative headquerters.

  45. 45.

    See 6.3.3.1.

  46. 46.

    See 6.3.3.2.

  47. 47.

    For details, see 6.4.1.

  48. 48.

    For details, see 6.5.

  49. 49.

    A “normal SE” is an SE with operations and more than 5 employees. In contrast to that, “empty SEs” are SEs with operations but without employees, “Shelf SEs” (a great number of which have been incorporated) are SEs with neither operations nor employees – see 6.4.5.

  50. 50.

    For details, see 6.4.5.

  51. 51.

    See also Werner Ebke, ‘The European Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws Revolution: Überseering, Inspire Art and Beyond’ [2005] The International Lawyer 39; Christian Kersting and Clemens Philipp Schindler, ‘Inspire Art Decision of Sept 2003 and its Effects on Practice’ (2003) 4 German L J (Electronic Journal) No 12.

  52. 52.

    Ingo Saenger, ‘Recent Developments in European Company and Business Law’ (2005) 10 Deakin L Rev 297, 309.

  53. 53.

    Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 of 8 Oct 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE). The document is online at <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/social_dialogue/l26016_en.htm>.

  54. 54.

    Cf Art 38(b) of the Regulation on the Statute for a European company; see Harald Kallmeyer, ‘Das monistische System in der SE mit Sitz in Deutschland’ (2003) 24 ZIP 1531. The French system provides this option between the one-tier board ‘Conseil d’administration’ and the two-tier board ‘Directoire/Conseil de surveillance’ in Art 225–58 and 225–68 Code de Commerce. Concerning the European company, two types of executive directors are possible – those from within the administrative board on the one hand and external executive directors on the other hand; cf Kallmeyer 1533.

  55. 55.

    The one-tier system (also known as the ‘unitary board structure’) is the system used in the USA and England and in jurisdiction under the influence of these systems, for example Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

  56. 56.

    The two-tier system (also known as the ‘dual board structure’) is mandatory in continental states of Europe such as Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and in large companies in the Netherlands.

  57. 57.

    BGH, 03.03.1991, II ZR 188/89, BGHZ 114, 127, 129 et seq; affirmed by BGH, 15.11.1993, II ZR 197/93, BGHZ 126, 340, 340 et seq. Both judgements (with further bibliography) described the function of the supervisory board as follows: ‘According to S 111 AktG the supervisory board is primarily responsible for monitoring the management. This control does not only relate to completed issues, but also to points of principles of the future business policy; [the control] is not limited to a review of legality, but must include the management’s expediency and thrift. Monitoring functions understood in this regard can only be effectively exercised by regular discussions with the management board and its ongoing consultancy; therefore, counselling is the leading instrument of a future-oriented management supervision.’ See Marcus Lutter and Thomas Kremer, ‘Die Beratung der Gesellschaft durch Aufsichtsratsmitglieder’ (1992) 21 ZGR 87 et seq for further details of these judgements. For questions of the supervisory board’s liability in this regard see Jens Buchta and Jürgen van Kann, ‘Die Haftung des Aufsichtsrats einer Aktiengesellschaft – aktuelle Entwicklungen in Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung’ (2003) 39 DStR 1665 et seq.

  58. 58.

    Cf Kerstin Hartmann, Die Aufsichtsratsvergütung als Erfolgsfaktor im deutschen Corporate-Governance-System (Peter Lang Verlag, Frankfurt 2003) 18, 31.

  59. 59.

    Peter Böckli, ‘Konvergenz: Annäherung des monistischen und des dualistischen Führungs- und Aufsichtssystem’ in Peter Hommelhoff, Klaus J Hopt and Axel von Werder (eds), Handbuch Corporate Governance: Leitung und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und Wirtschaftspraxis (2nd ed, Otto Schmidt Verlag, Köln 2009) 270,-272.

  60. 60.

    Ibid 258 et seq.

  61. 61.

    The preamble states: ‘In practice the dual board system, also established in other continental European countries, and the internationally widespread system of management by a single management body (Board of Directors) converge because of the intensive interaction of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board, both being likewise successful.’ Apart from that, the GCGC pleads for convergence with its recommendations made in the third division. It is a point in fact that companies increasingly intensify the cooperation of the management; cf Hendrik-Michael Ringleb, Thomas Kremer, Marcus Lutter and Axel von Werder, Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (4th ed, CH Beck Verlag, München 2010) para 111 with further bibliography in footnotes 80–83.

  62. 62.

    Recommendation on the role of (independent) non-executive or supervisory directors, 5 May 2004, 7; <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/docs/independence/2004–05–consultation_en.pdf>. Also Jean J. du Plessis, ‘Reflections on Some Recent Corporate Governance Reforms in Germany: A Transformation of the German Aktienrecht?’ (2003) 8 Deakin L Rev 389, 390–92.

  63. 63.

    Wolfgang Röller, ‘Quo vadis Aufsichtsrat?’ (1994) 39 AG 334.

  64. 64.

    Theodor Baums, ‘Der Aufsichtsrat – Aufgaben und Reformfragen’ (1995) 16 ZIP 15.

  65. 65.

    Christopher Martin, ‘Das U.S. Corporate Governance System – Verlust der Vorbildfunktion’ (2003) 6 NZG 952.

  66. 66.

    Peter O. Mülbert, ‘Corporate Governance in der Krise (Editorial)’ (2010) ZHR 375 et seq; Florian Möslein, ‘Contract Governance und Corporate Governance im Zusammenspiel’ (2010) JZ 72 at 73 et seq; Ulrich Seibert, ‘Das VorstAG – Regelungen zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung und zum Aufsichtsrat’ (2009) 32 Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht’ 1498; Martin Peltzer, ‘Trial and Error – Anmerkungen zu den Bemühungen des Gesetzgebers, die Arbeit des Aufsichtsrates zu verbessern’ (2009) 27 NZG 1041 at 1041.

  67. 67.

    For a very good and realistic overview of the aims and objectives of comparative research in the area of corporate governance, see Petri Mäntysaari, Comparative Corporate Governance (Springer Verlag, Berlin 2005) 9 et seq.

  68. 68.

    Paul Davies, ‘Employee Representation and Corporate Law Reform: A Comment from the UK’ (2000) 22 Comparative Labor L & Policy J 135 para 135.

  69. 69.

    Klaus J Hopt, ‘Gemeinsame Grundsätze der Corporate Governance in Europa?’ (2000) 29 ZGR 784–85; Carsten P Claussen, ‘Aktienrechtsreform 1997’ (1996) 41 AG 484; Theodor Baums, ‘Der Aufsichtsrat – Aufgaben und Reformfragen’(1995) 16 ZIP 15; Günter Langenbucher and Ulf Blaum, ‘Audit Committees – Ein Weg zur Überwindung der Überwachungskrise?’ (1994) 47 DB 2197–98; Stefan Grundmann and Peter Mülbert, ‘Corporate Governance – Europäische Perspektiven’ (2001) 30 ZGR 221–22. Also Paul Davies ‘Struktur der Unternehmensführung in Großbritannien und Deutschland: Konvergenz oder fortbestehende Divergenz?’ (2001) 30 ZGR 292.

  70. 70.

    Wolfgang Röller, ‘Quo vadis Aufsichtsrat?’ (1994) 39 AG 334. See generally Gerhard Cromme, ‘Status and Development of Corporate Governance in Germany’ address delivered at 7th German Corporate Governance Code Conference, Berlin, 27 July 2008 < http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/080627_Cromme_Konferenz_en.pdf> at 1.

  71. 71.

    As Paul Davies, ‘Employee Representation and Corporate Law Reform: A Comment from the UK’ (2000) 22 Comparative Labor L & Policy J 135 para 137 points out ‘there is no “one best” system of corporate governance’.

  72. 72.

    Carsten Berrar, ‘Die zustimmungspflichtigen Geschäfte nach §111 Abs.4 AktG im Lichte der Corporate Governance-Diskussion’ (2001) 54 DB 2185–86.

  73. 73.

    Jean J. du Plessis, ‘Corporate Governance: Reflections on the German Two-tier System’ [1996] TSAR 20 at 44–46.

  74. 74.

    Ingo Saenger, ‘Conflicts of Interest of Supervisory Board Members in a German Stock Corporation and the Demand for their Independence – An Investigation in the Context of the current Corporate Governance Discussion’ (2005) 1 Corporate Governance L Rev 147 at 153.

  75. 75.

    Mark J Roe, ‘Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the US’ [1993] Yale L J 1927, 1979–80.

  76. 76.

    Also Alfred F Conrad, ‘The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in European Community and US Law’ [1984] Michigan L Rev 1459; Richard M Buxbaum, ‘Institutional Owners and Corporate Management: A Comparative Perspective’ [1991] Brooklyn L Rev 1. For an analysis of Conrad and Buxbaum’s insights, see Edward Rock, ‘America’s Fascination with German Corporate Governance’ (1995) 40 AG 291, 293, 296–98.

  77. 77.

    Detlev F Vagts, ‘Reforming the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives from the German’ (1966) 80 Harvard L Rev 76–78, 87–88.

  78. 78.

    Theodor Baums, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the banks’ [1992] AJCL 516 and 523.

  79. 79.

    Marcus Lutter, ‘Unternehmensplanung und Aufsichtsrat’ (1991) 38 AG 249, 250. Marcus Lutter, ‘Vergleichende Corporate Governance – Die deutsche Sicht’ (2001) 30 ZGR 226–27 points out two of the unique characteristics of the German corporate governance system, namely the two-tier board system and employee at supervisory board level. He is, however, adamant that none of these should be changed (at 227).

  80. 80.

    See Arno Probst and Manuel R Theisen, ‘Herausforderungen und Grenzen “mitunternehmerischer” Entscheidungen im Aufsichtsrat’ (2010) 65 DB 1573 at 1578; Elmar Gerum, Das deutsche Corporate Governance-System (Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag, Stuttgart 2007) 418–419 and 436–438; Frank Wooldridge and Matthias Pannier, ‘The German Corporate Governance Code: Status and Development’ [2005] EBLR 225 at 240–241; B Großfeld and U Lehmann, ‘Management Structures and Worker’s Codetermination in Germany with European Perspectives’ in (1994) 1 Corporate Law Development Series 45.

  81. 81.

    See Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (Bullock Report – Minority Report) 174 para 17, 177 para 36 and 189–91 (Appendix B); Wedderburn of Charlton, ‘Companies and Employees: Common Law or Social Dimension?’ [1993] LQR 230–38; Tom Hadden, Company Law and Capitalism (2nd ed, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London 1977) 447–48; André C Côté, ‘Legal Regulation and Workers’ Participation in the Enterprise’ (PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science 1973) 276–77. Also see Preamble to the 1st Draft Fifth Dir (1972 Bulletin of the European Communities (Supplement 10/72) 6–7); ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ [1972] Bulletin of the European Communities (Supplement 10/72) 33.

  82. 82.

    Bericht der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex an die Bundesregierung, November 2010 <http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/ger/download/16122010/Governance_Bericht_Nov_2010.pdf> at 9-10, para 1.1.3.

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  1. Deakin University, Geelong Waurn Ponds Campus 75 Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds, VIC, 3216, Australia

    Jean J. du Plessis

  2. Institute for International Business Law, University of Muenster, Universitätsstraße 14-16, 48143, Muenster, Germany

    Bernhard Großfeld & Ingo Saenger

  3. Orrick Hoelters & Elsing Attorneys Düsseldorf, University of Muenster Institute for International Business Law, 1 Birkhahnweg, 48155, Muenster, Germany

    Otto Sandrock

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du Plessis, J.J., Großfeld, B., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O. (2012). An Overview of German Business or Enterprise Law and the One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted. In: German Corporate Governance in International and European Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23005-9_1

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