Abstract
My aim in this brief paper is modest: not to present new findings, but to propose what I regard as a useful way of classifying voting procedures, and thus organizing the way we look at them. My main thesis is that we have to make a strict distinction between two kinds of consideration in choosing a voting/election procedure: Political criteria. I use this rubric in a very broad sense, including criteria ranging 9 from the pragmatic to the philosophical. But all of them are purely a matter of 10 opinion, not of “right” or “wrong”. 11 • Social-choice considerations. I take this rubric in the narrow sense: the logico- 12 mathematical properties of a voting procedure, the pathologies and paradoxes 13 that afflict it.
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Acknowledgements
Valuable comments from Dan S Felsenthal and Maurice Salles are gratefully acknowledged.
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Machover, M. (2012). The Underlying Assumptions of Electoral Systems. In: Felsenthal, D., Machover, M. (eds) Electoral Systems. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_1
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