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The Underlying Assumptions of Electoral Systems

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Electoral Systems

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

Abstract

My aim in this brief paper is modest: not to present new findings, but to propose what I regard as a useful way of classifying voting procedures, and thus organizing the way we look at them. My main thesis is that we have to make a strict distinction between two kinds of consideration in choosing a voting/election procedure: Political criteria. I use this rubric in a very broad sense, including criteria ranging 9 from the pragmatic to the philosophical. But all of them are purely a matter of 10 opinion, not of “right” or “wrong”. 11 • Social-choice considerations. I take this rubric in the narrow sense: the logico- 12 mathematical properties of a voting procedure, the pathologies and paradoxes 13 that afflict it.

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References

  1. Amar, A. R. (1984). Choosing representatives by lottery voting. Yale Law Journal, 93, 1283–1308.

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  5. Machover, M. (2009). Collective decision-making and supervision in a communist society. Mimeograph, downloadable from http://tinyurl.com/ydfbs5z.

  6. Mill, J. S. (1861). Considerations on representative government. Downloadable from http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5669

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Acknowledgements

Valuable comments from Dan S Felsenthal and Maurice Salles are gratefully acknowledged.

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Correspondence to Moshé Machover .

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Machover, M. (2012). The Underlying Assumptions of Electoral Systems. In: Felsenthal, D., Machover, M. (eds) Electoral Systems. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-20440-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-20441-8

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