Abstract
This chapter aims to analyze and compare the EU judicial System with the judicial mechanisms of four global regimes: the World Trade Organization, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Mercosur and the World Bank. It opens with a discussion of the multiple jurisdictions – international, constitutional and administrative – of EU courts. Then, the fundamental structure and functions of the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization and of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea are examined. Next, the Mercosur system and the Inspection Panel of the World Bank are considered. Finally some reflections are made comparing and contrasting these judicial systems in a functional perspective. In a global legal space characterized both by juridification and judicialization, several differences can be identified between judicial systems founded on voluntary jurisdiction, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and judicial systems based on exclusive and obligatory jurisdiction, such as the EU and the WTO. Furthermore, important divergences can also be found in comparing prima facie similar mechanisms for international compliance.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Shapiro (1999), p. 328; Dehousse (1998). Nevertheless, it should be born in mind that the European Union has its origins, just like the WTO and the Mercosur, in the regional international organizations for commercial trade. (Holmes (2001), p. 79: “It is clear that the experience of the EU influenced the way in which the WTO was set up. In principle the two entities are comparable in the sense that the WTO, like the EU, is a form of preferential trading arrangement and the two can be compared with each other”).
- 2.
“Incomparables cannot be usefully compared”: Graziadei (2003), p. 100, who cites Zweigert and Kotz (1998). In this sense, see for example Weiler (1999), p. 34, who observes that “panels and appellate body fulfil the same function and cover the same issue based on similar norms that national courts and the ECJ fulfil in the European Union”.
- 3.
In this sense, among others, Craig (2006), p. 284: “the rationale for inclusion of national courts is that they are enforcers of Community Law in their own right”.
- 4.
Here, the intention is simply to suggest that due to the role of the courts regarding the violation of the Treaties, the Court of Justice resembles the international jurisdictions that exercise analogous roles of dispute settlement between States in other international contexts.
- 5.
Falcon (2004), p. 1153; Falcon (2007), p. 151. According to the author, the Court undertakes a “hard look review” of State actions under Art. 258 of the Treaty, because the conduct giving rise to the lack of compliance is usually based on a law or legal provision of the State concerned: this is precisely the reason why it transforms itself, substantially, into a kind of judicial review court, which may review any act of any State.
- 6.
Arnull (2006), p. 34, who underlines that obligatory and exclusive features are frequently lacking in international public law. On the question of the exclusivity of jurisdiction by the Court of Justice Lavranos (2007), p. 121, referring to an action brought by Ireland against England before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
- 7.
The Commission has vast discretion about these matters. On this point Arnull (2006), p. 35: “as the CFI explained in SDDDA vs. Commission, “the Commission is not bound to initiate an infringement procedure against a Member State; on the contrary, it has a discretionary power of assessment, which rules out any right for individuals to require it to adopt a particular position””.
- 8.
- 9.
Dehousse (1998), p. 18.
- 10.
Joint cases 90 and 91/63, Commission of the European Economic Community v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Kingdom of Belgium [1964] ECR I-625. This could be considered the result of a different and greater institutionalization of the European common market interests and could explain why the Commission has in the European Union a guardian role, while the same mechanisms are missing, for example, in the WTO, where countermeasures are frequently a consequence – even monitored by the DSS mechanisms – of the lack of compliance with the obligations established in the agreements and the actions brought before the DSS is only reserved to the States, without recognition of any role in this sense of the Secretariat.
- 11.
Constitutional law requires an order between superior-constitutional sources and derived sources. According to Shapiro (1999), p. 328, the Court of Justice evolved from an international court to a constitutional court in the moment at which EU legislation also evolved from a division of power, as regards its institutional framework.
- 12.
Shapiro (1999), p. 328.
- 13.
Van Gend en Loos (26/62) and Costa Enel (6/64). On the consecration with these decisions of the theories of direct effect and supremacy, Arnull (2006), p. 161.
- 14.
- 15.
Shapiro (1999), p. 330.
- 16.
Likewise Falcon (2007), p. 146.
- 17.
According to an efficacious expression from Schepl and Blankenburg (2001), p. 17.
- 18.
Falcon (2004), p. 1153.
- 19.
Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, [1987] ECR I-4199.
- 20.
Craig (2006), p. 285: “thus while national courts can declare EC norms to be valid, and whilst they must treat ECJ decisions that a community norm is invalid as having erga omnes effect, they cannot themselves declare a Community norm to be invalid”.
- 21.
The evolution of international dispute settlement is analyzed, among others, by Weiler (2004), pp. 550–551.
- 22.
Where juridification is not, on the contrary, consistently issued or affirmed, eventual conflicts between the subjects of the organizations tend to be resolved according to diplomatic mechanisms, not entrusted to third parties but to dynamics and procedures of a political-international nature.
- 23.
The World Trade Organization was established as an institutionalization of the GATT agreements. In 1948, when the GATT agreements were enacted, it lacked any form of juridification. Only between the 1970s and 1980s were the juridification and judicialization processes started, and since then, they have taken on an ever increasing role in resolving panel disputes. Due to this evolution, along with the creation of the WTO, obligatory (and exclusive) judicial mechanisms were provided to resolve the conflicts arising from the violation of the agreements. See Stone Sweet and Mathews (2008), p. 68.
- 24.
For an extensive investigation on the phenomenon of the International Courts, Treves (1999); Brown (2007), who reflects in particular on the dangers that the proliferation of the international courts and tribunals would have, in terms of fragmentation, “on the unity of international law”; Merrills (1998). On these issues, Charney (1999), p. 697; Cassese (2007), pp. 609–626; della Cananea (2005), p. 125; Cassese (2006, 2009).
- 25.
In 1947, GATT Articles XXII and XXIII established that the questions concerning the implementation of the agreements and the eventual cases of their violation would be managed by contracting parties, without providing for any different mechanism for dispute resolution or for any possibility to turn to judicial bodies (dual model). The contracting parties recognized common principles and rules as valid and effective and used diplomatic mechanisms to resolve eventual bilateral conflicts caused by violations of the agreements. In 1952, the panel practice was introduced, by which the parties could decide to refer the disputes under the agreements to panels, in which the litigating parties were not necessarily included (triadic consensual model). The panel practice initially had difficulty in becoming accepted and, until the 1970s, the contracting states obstructed the way for the legalism procedure (only six disputes were formally referred to the panel between 1960 and 1970). The idea to build a neutral adjudication function within the WTO system was aimed to ensure neutrality in the resolution of the conflicts emerging from the implementation of the agreements. With the Tokyo negotiations in 1979, the first agreement, called the Dispute Settlement Understanding, was added, which took account of some proposals coming from the US aimed at reinforcing the panels by identifying peculiar procedural rules and functional measures for the legalization of the dispute resolution system. And only with the Uruguay Round negotiations did the dispute settlement system settle down in its actual obligatory triadic model: the consensus of both parties is not necessary to activate the mechanisms of the resolution system and the decisions taken by the judicial bodies are binding. Moreover, the dispute settlement system is the only court that presides over the violation of WTO agreements.
- 26.
Stone Sweet and Mathews (2008), p. 68, according to which the States, aware of this role, use the dispute resolution system “in part, to evolve treaty rules they favor, and to block interpretations to which they reject. The AB is gradually exerting dominance over the normative evolution of the regime, which is to be expected given the legal system’s steady case load, and the AB’s trustee status”.
- 27.
Referring on this point, Marchetti (2009), p. 567.
- 28.
As we observed, the international jurisdiction of the Court of Justice represents the first attribution of the Court’s jurisdiction and is provided for by the institution of the EU and the Treaty of 1950. In the WTO context, on the contrary, disputes were for a long time assigned to mechanisms of negotiated resolutions, which slowly evolved, from 1970 onwards, to a dispute settlement system founded on neutral third-parties judicial bodies.
- 29.
Even if doubt could be cast on the jurisdictional character of the DSS, lacking some features of a jurisdictional nature.
- 30.
Not by chance, the enforcement phase of the DSS decisions and the limited range of the consequences deriving from the failure to observe them is a potential ground for criticism of the WTO system.
- 31.
- 32.
Treves (1999), p. 12.
- 33.
Oxman (1996), p. 353.
- 34.
Naturally, if both parties to the dispute agree that the dispute should be submitted, at the request of any party to the dispute, to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in Part I, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree (Art. 282 of the convention). The choice of the procedure must occur “when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, (…) by means of a written declaration” (Art. 287 n. 1 Conv.). It is interesting to point out, however, that the declaration does not affect the obligation of a State to “accept the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to the extent and in the manner provided for in Part Xl, section 5” (Art. 287 n. 2).
- 35.
In particular, Art. 1 of Annex VIII establishes that each party in a dispute arising from the interpretation and application of the articles of the Convention relating to: (1) fishing; (2) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; (3) marine scientific research; and (4) navigation, can initiate special arbitration proceedings after a written notice is given to the other party or parties to the dispute.
- 36.
Point 5 of Art. 287 of the Convention, in fact, establishes that if the parties to the dispute have not declared their acceptance of the same procedure for settling the dispute, the dispute must be taken to Arbitration (Annex VII). Point 3 of Art. 287 also favours the Arbitration Court: “A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration in force, shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII”. On this point Merrills (1998), p. 186: “a dispute may be referred to the Tribunal when both parties have made a declaration accepting its jurisdiction”.
- 37.
On the argument Treves (1996), p. 305.
- 38.
Article 20 n. 1 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: “The Tribunal shall be open to States Parties”.
- 39.
Merrills (1998), p. 186: “Unlike the ECJ, the Tribunal is open to entities other than states, including international organizations in certain circumstances (Art. 20(2)), and under the same provision may be used by states which are not parties to the Convention”.
- 40.
The International Seabed Authority is the organization that the contracting States go through to organize and control the Area’s activities, and, in particular, to manage its resources. Its principal organs include an assembly, a council, a secretariat and an Enterprise. The Authority’s organization and subdivision of tasks and responsibilities among the different organs is complex and provides for the emanation of rules, regulations and procedures concerning the equal distribution of financial profits and other economic advantages deriving from the activities conducted in the Area, as well as the payments and contributions received under Art. 82 , taking into consideration the interests and needs of developing countries and peoples that do not have full independence or a self-governing status (Art. 160 letter f (i)). Those concerning the exploration (and transport, treatment and commercialization of minerals), however, are referred to the Enterprise.
- 41.
According to the provisions of Art. 1 of the Convention, Area is defined as “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”.
- 42.
Wolfron (2008), p. 11.
- 43.
In each case, even international organizations and natural persons and legal entities can appear before the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber of the Tribunal to resolve the conflicts relating to the seabed (Arts. 14 and 35–40 of the Statute). See Treves (1999), p. 22.
- 44.
Section 2 (Area principles) establishes that the Area and its resources belong to all of mankind (Art. 136). The next Art. (137) on the legal regime of the Area and its resources, provides that “all rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area, however, may only be alienated in accordance with this Part and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority”.
- 45.
Article 178 of the Convention establishes that “the Authority, its property and assets, shall enjoy immunity from legal process except to the extent that the Authority expressly waives this immunity in a particular case”.
- 46.
Article 179 provides in particular for “the property and assets of the Authority, wherever located and by whom so ever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation or any other form of seizure by executive or legislative action”. According to the provisions of the following Art. 180, they are moreover exempt from restrictions, regulations, controls or moratoria of any nature.
- 47.
For example, Art. 181 provides that the archives of the Authority, wherever located are inviolable whereas Art. 183 provides that the Authority, its goods, and activities necessary to perform its responsibilities are exempt from custom duties and taxation.
- 48.
Merrills (1998), p. 187. The special Chamber for the deep seabed disputes has a real jurisdiction and a special composition. It is composed of 11 judges, which are chosen by (and among) the 21 judges that make up the Tribunal in order to guarantee a non- homogeneous geographic representation and diverse legal traditions. Nominations last for 3 years. The Chamber’s jurisdiction is defined through complex mechanisms of the administration of the Area. Disputes between States, between a State and the Authority, between the Authority and a possible contractor, and between the parties to a contract, as well as natural persons and legal entities may be heard by the Chamber. It is primarily a functional authority, which is why all disputes concerning the Area are drawn into the sphere of its jurisdiction.
- 49.
Merrills (1998), p. 190: Art. 189 of the Convention prohibits the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber to exercise on behalf of the Authority its discretionary powers. Moreover, it cannot pronounce itself on the legality (nor declare invalid) of any rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority, which would violate the Convention. According to Merrills, “these prohibitions are an uncompromising assertion of the controversial proposition that certain disputes concerning the exercise of legal powers are unsuitable for adjudication”.
- 50.
- 51.
- 52.
Ouro Preto Protocol (Protocol annexed to the Treaty of Asunción, on the institutional framework of Mercosur), Arts. 9, 15, 20: Decision, resolutions and guidelines are binding upon the member States.
- 53.
The extent of this evolution can be considered typical of the evolutions of dispute settlement international functions: from a dyadic phase to a triadic phase, from diplomatic and facultative mechanisms to obligatory mechanisms.
- 54.
These committees naturally cannot issue binding adjudication decisions upon the parties, but are limited to formulate recommendations.
- 55.
Articles 43 and 44 Brasilia Protocol. Granillo Fernandez (2003), p. 31.
- 56.
The Mercosur dispute settlement system entered into force on January 1, 2004.
- 57.
Chapter VII Procedimento de Revision. Article 17 establishes that either of the parties to a dispute may submit notice of appeal to the Permanent Review Tribunal against the decision of the Ad Hoc Arbitration Tribunal, within a period of no more than 15 days from the date of its notification. Appeals are limited to issues of law dealt with in the dispute and the judicial interpretations contained in the Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal’s decision. In any case, the disputes can be submitted directly to the Permanent Tribunal without first going to the MADT. See O’Keefe (2002).
- 58.
The parties can first try taking the dispute to the Trade Commission. In any case, an attempt at bilateral mediation must be made before initiating proceedings, as confirmation of the preference for diplomatic solutions originally established by the Treaty of Asunción. In case the negotiations should fail, the States may submit the dispute to the Common Market Group for consideration. At the end of the proceedings, the CMG may make recommendations which are non-binding in nature.
- 59.
See O’Keefe (2002), p. 9.
- 60.
Article 40 co. 1. A private party request must contain sufficient elements to permit a reconstruction of the violation and damage suffered. On the basis of these assumptions, the national section decides whether to accept the claim and proceed to initiate negotiations with the State responsible for the violation. If this negotiation fails, the Common Market Group will intervene (Art. 42).
- 61.
Article 26 of the Olivos Protocol.
- 62.
- 63.
IBRD 93-10 and 93-6 Resolutions.
- 64.
It consists of a multilateral bank for development and has 184 member countries. The countries are represented by a 24-member Board of Executive Directors. The bank has adopted a weighted system of voting where votes are weighted according to the amount of money each country puts in to the bank, thus stronger economic countries have more control. The Board must approve all the projects financed by the Bank, which are proposed by the Bank Management, and nominates the Bank’s President.
- 65.
These included the Sardar Sarovar dam and canal projects on the Narmada river in India. The criticism received by the Bank stimulated the President at that time, Lewis Preston, to engage in 1991 B. Morse, administrator of the Development Program of the United Nations, and T. Berger, ex-judge of the Supreme court of British Columbia in Canada (known as the Morse Commission), to undertake an independent review of the projects. The Commission’s final report, drawn up in 1992, revealed numerous violations of the Bank’s policies, which would have caused serious harm to the environment and to the people, and invited the Bank to reconsider the projects.
- 66.
“The primary purpose of the Inspection Panel is to address the concerns of people who might be affected by Bank projects and to ensure that the Bank adheres to its operational policies and procedures in the design, preparation and implementation of such projects”, in Accountability at the World Bank. The Inspection Panel 10 Years On, The World Bank, 2003, p. 3, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/TenYear8_07.pdf. According to the procedural norms established in 1994 to regulate the Inspection Panel’s functioning, whose role “is to carry out independent investigations”. After an inspection is requested, the Panel must, in fact, “inquire and recommend”.
- 67.
The independence and integrity of the Bank’s panel is guaranteed by strict bans and eligibility criteria: for example, a member may be removed from the panel only for just cause; panel members are precluded from any future employment by the Bank; and they cannot serve on the Panel until two years have elapsed since the end of their employment with the World Bank. Moreover, the components of the Panel – who must be of different nationalities – cannot participate in claims and requests in which they may have personal interests, and they cannot be involved with specific interest groups.
- 68.
Paragraph 12 of the Resolution establishes that each group of 2 or more peoples from the country where the project is taking place may present a request to the panel if, as a result of the violation of the Bank operational policies and procedures, their interests have been or are likely to be directly affected. Local subjects may present the request on their behalf or, in the exceptional case in which adequate representation of the territory’s interest has been met, even non-local subjects may represent on behalf of those alleging damage.
- 69.
Circi (2006), p. 282.
- 70.
Battini (2003), p. 269: the Inspection panel “is a hybrid, since it exhibits some of the features of an administrative jurisdiction, combined with others, on the whole predominant, which are characteristic of an independent advisory council”.
- 71.
Battini (2003), p. 269, according to whom the lack of obligation of the forum means that it is not cannot be included as a remedy.
- 72.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/AnnualReport05-06.pdf. From the Inspection Panel’s annual report, there was a considerable increase in the number of requests from 2004 to 2007 made with respect to the previous period. Of the 22 requests referred to the Panel over the 3-year period from 2004 to 2007, only 1 was disregarded because it did not meet the criteria, whereas the other 22 were registered. The Board authorized investigations for all of the 21 requests.
- 73.
Here we refer to the justice retenue which in France regulated the Conseil d’Etat jurisdiction before 1872.
- 74.
Stone Sweet (1999), p. 147.
- 75.
- 76.
Stone Sweet (1999), p. 150.
- 77.
The legal mechanisms still remain “very much oriented towards member States in accordance with the sovereign equality of States model”, not being a democratic model of accountability, in which control mechanisms of the actions are entrusted to individual parties. Where, in fact, this is anticipated (i.e., the World Bank Inspection Panel), decisions made are not binding on the parties. On this argument, de Wet (2008), p. 11.
- 78.
This can be considered true of the World Bank, if the Inspection Panel’s structural position as a third body is accentuated.
- 79.
Dehousse (1998), p. 16.
- 80.
Dehousse (1998), p. 16. A further difference: in addition to having several jurisdictions – as stated – EU judges are called upon to resolve disputes relating to taxes, commerce, society, intellectual property, consumer protection, and so on; see also De Burca and Weiler (2001), p. 6. On the contrary, judicial bodies of global organizations (WTO, World Bank, Convention on the Law of the Sea, Mercosur, etc.) do not accumulate different jurisdictions or have a general competence.
References
Arnull A (2006) The European Union and its court of justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Battini S (2003) Amministrazioni senza Stato. Profili di diritto amministrativo internazionale. Giuffrè, Milan
Beha J (2000) Cooperation and competition in a common market: studies in the formation of Mercosur. NY Physica-Verlag, New York
Bilancia P (ed) (2006) Federalismi e integrazioni sopranazionali nell’area della globalizzazione. Unione Europea e Mercosur. Giuffrè, Milan
Brown C (2007) A common law of international adjudication. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Carrasco ER (2008) The World Bank’s Inspection Panel: promoting true accountability through arbitration. Cornell Int Law J 41:3 ff
Cass DZ (2001) The constitutionalization of international trade law: judicial non-generation as the engine of constitutionalization. Eur J Int Law 2:39 ff
Cassese S (2006) Oltre lo Stato. Verso una costituzione globale? Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli
Cassese S (2007) La funzione costituzionale dei giudici non statali. Dallo spazio giuridico globale all’ordine globale. Riv Trimest Diritto Pubblico 3:609 ff
Cassese S (2009) I tribunali di Babele. I giudici alla ricerca di un nuovo ordine globale. Donzelli, Roma
Charney J (1999) The impact of the international legal system of the growth of international courts and tribunals. NY Univ J Int Law Polit 31:697 ff
Circi M (2006) L’attività del World Bank Inspection Panel a più di dieci anni dalla istituzione: un bilancio. In: Conticelli M, Cassese S (eds) Diritto e amministrazioni nello spazio giuridico globale. Giuffrè, Milan, p 271 ff
Craig P (2006) EU administrative law. Oxford University Press, Oxford
De Burca G, Weiler JHH (eds) (2001) The European court of justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford
de Wet E (2008) Holding international institutions accountable: the complementary role of non-judicial oversight mechanisms and judicial review. Ger Law J 9:1987 ff
Dehousse R (1998) The European court of justice. McMillan, London
della Cananea G (2005) Il diritto amministrativo globale e le sue corti. In: Manganaro F, Romano Tassone A (eds) Dalla cittadinanza amministrativa alla cittadinanza globale. Giuffrè, Milan, p 125 ff
Duina F (2006) The social construction of free trade: the European Union, NAFTA and MERCOSUR. Princeton University Press, Oxford
Falcon G (2004) Separazione e coordinamento tra giurisdizioni europee e giurisdizioni nazionali nella tutela avverso gli atti lesivi di situazioni soggettive europee. Riv Ital Diritto Pubblico Comunitario 5:1153 ff
Falcon G (2007) La giurisdizione amministrativa nel contesto delle funzioni giurisdizionali della Corte di Giustizia delle Comunità europee. In: Studi in onore di Leopoldo Mazzarolli, vol IV, Diritto processuale amministrativo. Cedam, Padua, p 151 ff
Granillo Fernandez M (2003) El sistema de solutión de controversias en el Mercosur. Derecho Mercosur Integración 5:31 ff
Graziadei M (2003) The functionalist heritage. In: Legrand P, Munday RJC (eds) Comparative legal studies: traditions and transitions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 100 ff
Holmes P (2001) The WTO and the EU: some constitutional comparisons. In: De Burca G, Scott J (eds) The EU and the WTO. Legal and constitutional issues. Hart, Oxford, p 79 ff
Kilpatrick C (1999) Turning remedies around: a sectoral analysis of the court of justice. In: Craig P, De Burca G (eds) The evolution of EU law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 142 ff
Lavranos N (2007) The MOX plant judgment of the ECJ how exclusive is the jurisdiction of the ECJ? J Environ Law 19:121 ff
Marchetti B (2009) The WTO dispute settlement system: administration, court or tertium genus? Suffolk Transnational Law Rev 3:567 ff
Marshall K (2008) The World Bank. From reconstruction to development to equity. Routledge Global Institutions, New York
Merrills JG (1998) International dispute settlement. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
O’Keefe TA (2002) Dispute resolution in Mercosur. J World Investment 3:507 ff
Orakhelashvili A (2005) The World Bank inspection panel in context: institutional aspects of the accountability of international organizations. Int Organ Law Rev 2:57 ff
Oxman BH (1996) The rule of law and the United Nations convention on the law of the sea. Eur J Int Law:353 ff
Petersmann EU (1996–1997) Constitutionalism and international organization. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business:398 ff
Schepl H, Blankenburg E (2001) Mobilizing the European court of justice. In: De Burca G, Weiler JHH (eds) The European court of justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 17 ff
Shapiro M (1981) Courts. A comparative and political analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London
Shapiro M (1999) The European Court of Justice. In: Craig P, De Burca G (eds) The evolution of EU law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 328 ff
Stone Sweet A (1999) Judicialization and the construction of governance. Comp Polit Stud 31:147 ff
Stone Sweet A, Mathews J (2008) Proportionality balancing and global constitutionalism. Columbia J Transnational Law 47:68
Treves T (1996) Aspects of the relationship between the jurisdiction of the international tribunal for the law of the sea and of the international court of justice. In: American Society of International Law, Nederlands Vereniging voor Internationaal Recht, Contemporary International Law Issues: conflicts and convergence. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, p 305 ff
Treves T (1999) Le controversie internazionali. Nuove tendenze, nuovi tribunali. Giuffrè, Milan
Ventura D (2005) Las asimetrias entre el Mercosur y la Union Europea. Fundación Konrad Adenauer, Montevideo
Von Bogdandy A, Bast J (2006) Principles of European Constitutional Law, 1st edn. Hart, Oxford
Weiler JHH (1999) The constitution of the common market place. In: Craig P, De Burca G (eds) The evolution of EU law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 34 ff
Weiler JHH (2004) The geology of international law – governance, democracy and legitimacy. J Int Law 64:547 ff
Wolfron R (2008) Legitimacy of international law and the exercise of administrative functions: the Example of the International Seabed Authority, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Fisheries Organizations. Ger Law J 9:2039 ff
Zuleeg M (1997) The European Constitution under constitutional constraints: the German scenario. Eur Law Rev 22:19
Zweigert K, Kotz H (eds) (1998) An introduction to comparative law, 3rd edn., trad. T. Weir. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Marchetti, B. (2011). EU and Global Judicial Systems. In: Chiti, E., Mattarella, B. (eds) Global Administrative Law and EU Administrative Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20264-3_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20264-3_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-20263-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-20264-3
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)