Summary
This paper presents a multi-player multi-issue negotiation model to solve a resource allocation problem. We design a multilateral negotiation protocol, by which rational players bid sequentially in consecutive rounds till a deadline. Every player’s bid is a proposal for resources allocated to himself. In this framework, we perform a thorough theoretical analysis of negotiation with complete information, which is also a preliminary for the more complex incomplete information case. Here we extend known results on single issue bilateral negotiations to multiple players and multiple issues. We show that, under a complete information setting, we can derive the negotiation strategies which form a subgame perfect equilibrium. We also show that when a discount factor exists, an agreement will be reached immediately at the end of the first negotiation round. The outcome is Pareto optimal, when every player maximizes his utility by making trade-offs between issues and selects the bid that is best for his opponents amongst multiple bids that would give the same maximum utility to himself.
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Wu, M., de Weerdt, M., La Poutré, H., Yadati, C., Zhang, Y., Witteveen, C. (2010). Multi-player Multi-issue Negotiation with Complete Information. In: Ito, T., Zhang, M., Robu, V., Fatima, S., Matsuo, T., Yamaki, H. (eds) Innovations in Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiations. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 319. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15612-0_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15612-0_8
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