Abstract
In this chapter we present a number of definitions of security for secure computation. Specifically, in Sections 2.2 to 2.4 we present definitions of security for semi-honest, malicious and covert adversaries; all these definitions are based on the ideal/real-model paradigm for formulating security. We begin with the classic definitions of security in the presence of semi-honest and malicious adversaries, and then proceed to the more recent notion of security in the presence of covert adversaries.
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Hazay, C., Lindell, Y. (2010). Definitions. In: Efficient Secure Two-Party Protocols. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14303-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14303-8_2
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