Abstract
As part of all secondary principles of the principle of legality in criminal law, certain rules are employed to govern the resolution of the conflict of laws. All secondary principles of the principle of legality face situations in which one criminal norm contradicts another, or one interpretation of a criminal norm contradicts another, with all the relevant criminal norms and interpretations applicable to case at hand. As discussed in Chaps. 2–5, the rules of conflict of laws provide solutions for solving these conflicts within each secondary principle.
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Notes
- 1.
See above at Sect. 2.3.
- 2.
See above at Sect. 3.4.
- 3.
See above at Sect. 4.4.
- 4.
See above at Sect. 5.4.
- 5.
Ogden v. Folliot, (1790) 3 T.R. 726; Lynch v. Paraguay Provisional Government, [1861–1873] All E.R. 934, [1861–73] All E.R. 934; Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A.C. 150; Attorney General for Canada v. Schulze, (1901) 9 S.L.T. 4; Raulin v. Fischer, [1911] 2 K.B. 93; Banco De Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso De Borbon Y Austria, [1934] All E.R. 555, [1935] 1 K.B. 140; 104 L.J.K.B. 46;151 L.T. 499; 50 T.L.R. 284; 78 Sol.Jo. 224; Frankfurter v. W. L. Exner Ltd., [1947] Ch. 629; Novello v. Hinrischen Edition Ltd., [1951] Ch. 595; Schemmer v. Property Resources Ltd., [1975] Ch. 273; Attorney General of New Zealand v. Ortiz, [1984] 1 A.C. 1, [1983] 2 W.L.R. 809, [1983] 2 All E.R. 93; United States of America v. Inkley, [1989] Q.B. 255, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 304, [1988] 3 All E.R. 144; Larkins v. N.U.M., [1985] I.R. 671; Bank of Ireland v. Meeneghan, [1994] 3 I.R. 111; In re The Antelope, (1825) 10 Wheat. 66; State v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 8 S.Ct. 1370, 32 L.Ed. 239 (1888); SA Consortium General Textiles v. Sun & Sand Agencies Ltd., [1978] Q.B. 279, [1978] 2 All E.R. 339, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 1.
- 6.
Lawrence Collins, Dicey and Morris The Conflict of Laws II 1195–1283 (13th ed., 2000).
- 7.
For instance, when two statutes contradict one regulation. According to the first stage, the two statutes govern the regulation, but within the first stage the conflict of laws between these two statutes cannot be solved, and the second stage is required.
- 8.
For instance, when two posterior statutes contradict one prior statute. According to the second stage, the two posterior statutes govern the one prior statute, but within the second stage the conflict of laws between these two statutes cannot be solved, and the third stage is required.
- 9.
For instance, when two norms, which are applicable through the protective applicability of the criminal norm, contradict one norm, which is applicable through the passive personality applicability. According to the third stage, the two norms, which are applicable through the protective applicability of the criminal norm, govern the one norm, which is applicable through the passive personality applicability, but within the third stage the conflict of laws between these two norms cannot be solved, and the fourth stage is required.
- 10.
State v. Collins, 55 Wash.2d 469, 348 P.2d 214 (1960); compare with Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 98 S.Ct. 909, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978); Ex Parte Chiapetto, 93 Cal.App.2d 497, 209 P.2d 154 (1949).
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Hallevy, G. (2010). The Conflict of Laws Within the Conflicts of Laws in the Principle of Legality. In: A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13714-3_6
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