Between Différance and Intersubjectivity: The Concept of Limited Rationality in the Realm of Constitutional Adjudication

Benvindo, Juliano Zaiden

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-11434-2_8

Juliano Zaiden Benvindo²

665 Accesses

Abstract

If the concept of limited rationality revealed the complexity of constitutional democracy, for there is no possibility of completely recollecting and gathering the history and its tensions nor is it possible to entirely do justice to the other, when it is transported to constitutional adjudication, the same reasoning applies. In this specific realm, it demonstrates that a judge aware of the boundaries of reason focuses: first, on the singularity of the case, not in predetermined formulas and patterns; second, on the system of rights, keeping it coherent throughout history; and third, on the other, as the quest for doing justice to the case, in all the complexities of the resolution as a non-resolution of the dialogue between symmetrical and asymmetrical justice. As a means to demonstrate how the concept of limited rationality applies to the reality, the reconstruction of German and Brazilian constitutionalisms, as previously examined, appears as a relevant sign, but it is the reexamination of constitutional cases that brings it to the effective practice of decision-making. In this regard, by showing how a judge aware of the limits of reason would judge the Crucifix, Cannabis and Ellwanger cases introduced in the first chapter, the concept of limited rationality shows that it is necessary to think of reason in constitutional adjudication in a different perspective, one that knows that adjudication has limits, and that these limits are constructed in the very practices of this dualism between law and justice, between history and the other’s otherness.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 129.00; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Softcover Book: USD 169.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 169.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
Seyla Benhabib, “Democracy and Difference: Reflections on the Metapolitics of Lyotard and Derrida,” in The Derrida-Habermas Reader, ed. Lasse Thomassen (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 149.
2.
Axel Honneth, “The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, ed. Stephen K White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 319.
3.
Jürgen Habermas, “On Law and Disagreement: Some Comments on ‘Interpretative Pluralism’”, Ratio Juris 16, no. 2 (June 2003), 193.
4.
See the fifth chapter.
5.
See the sixth chapter.
6.
See the first part.
7.
Honneth, “The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism,” 319.
8.
Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 87.
9.
Ibid.
10.
Jürgen Habermas, “On the Cognitive Content of Morality,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Spociety 96 (1996): 343.
11.
Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, 148.
12.
See Ibid., 150.
13.
Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’”, Cardozo Law Review 11 (1990): 961.
14.
Ibid., 963.
15.
Ibid., 967.
16.
Derrida, “Force of Law,” 961.
17.
Ibid., 965.
18.
Christoph Menke, “Ability and Faith: On the Possibility of Justice,” Cardozo Law Review 27 (2006): 601.
19.
See Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, 150.
20.
Menke, “Ability and Faith: on the Possibility of Justice,” 602.
21.
Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, 150.
22.
Honneth, “The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism,” 315.
23.
See the analysis of Christoph Menke’s theory in the last chapter (Sect. 7.3.3).
24.
See Miroslav Milovic, Comunidade da Diferença (Ijuí, RS; Rio de Janeiro: Unijuí; Relume Dumará, 2004), 131.
25.
Honneth, “The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism,” 315.
26.
Jacques Derrida, “A Response to Simon Critchley,” in The Derrida-Habermas Reader, ed. Lasse Thomassen (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 113.
27.
Honneth, “The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism,” 319.
28.
Miroslav Milovic, Comunidade da Diferença (Ijuí, RS; Rio de Janeiro: Unijuí; Relume Dumará, 2004), 132, translation mine.
29.
The emphasis here will be mostly on those cases we examined in the first chapter.
30.
See Bernhard Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik: Verfassungsrechtssprechung und Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft im Wandel,” Merkur 692 (December 2006).
31.
See Bernhard Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” Cardozo Law Review 14 (1993), 711–736.
32.
See Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik: Verfassungsrechtssprechung und Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft im Wandel,” 1125.
33.
See Peter Häberle, “Grundprobleme der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit,” in Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, ed. Peter Häberle (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976).
34.
See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 722.
35.
See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 246.
36.
See the sixth chapter.
37.
See the sixth chapter.
38.
There was no emphatic resistance to this BVG’s political role. See, for this purpose, Helmut D. Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehung- und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland (Frankfurt a.M; New York: Campus Verlag, 1979), 234–235.
39.
See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 720-721; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 247.
40.
See Heinz Laufer, “Politische Kontrolle durch Richtermacht,” in Verfassung, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, Politik: Zur verfassungsrechtlichen und politischen Stellung und Funktion des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, ed. Mehdi Tohidipur (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), 94. See also Fangmann, Justiz gegen Demokratie: Entstehungs- und Funktionsbedingungen der Verfassungsjustiz in Deutschland, 224.
41.
See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 711–736.
42.
See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 247.
43.
Ibid., 246.
44.
See Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1994), 76.
45.
See Erhard Denninger, “Freiheitsordnung - Wertordnung - Pflichtordnung,” in Verfassung, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, Politik: Zur verfassungsrechtlichen und politischen Stellung und Funktion des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, ed. Mehdi Tohidipur (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), 166–67.
46.
See the second chapter.
47.
BverfGE 35, 79.
48.
BverfGE 39, 1.
49.
BverfGE 88, 203.
50.
See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie: Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 131–133.
51.
See Schlink, “Abschied von der Dogmatik,” 1133.
52.
See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 730.
53.
See the third chapter.
54.
See the third chapter.
55.
See Marcus Faro de Castro, “The Courts, Law and Democracy in Brazil,” International Social Science Journal, no. 152 (June 1997): 241–252; Oscar Vilhena Vieira, Supremo Tribunal Federal: Jurisprudência Política (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2002), 135 ff.
56.
Castro, “The Courts, Law and Democracy in Brazil,” 246.
57.
See the third chapter.
58.
This characteristic is more serious than the concentration of powers observed in the German BVG, if we center on the criterion that, in Germany, any individual can file the main constitutional complaint – the Verfassungsbeschwerde – to initiate the judicial review, which is, as a matter of fact, one important reason that makes this court the most admirable constitutional organ in that country. For this reason, the STF, while expanding its activism to politics through judicial review, became, however, a distant partner of society. This raises immediately and perhaps with greater intensity the question of the legitimacy of its decisions (even though popularity and admiration in the case of the German BVG’s is not a parameter of legitimacy, as we formerly examined) and its insertion into the context of a constitutional democracy oriented by the principle of separation of powers.
59.
See Hans Kelsen, Wer soll de Hüter der Verfassung sein? (Berlin: Rotschild, 1931); Enzo Bello, “Neoconstitucionalismo, Democracia Deliberativa e a Atuação do STF,” in Perspectivas da Teoria Constitucional Contemporânea, ed. José Ribas Vieira (Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2007), 31 ff.
60.
See Peter Häberle, Verfassung als öffentlicher Prozeß: Materialen zu einer Verfassungstheorie der offenen Gesellschaft (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1978).
61.
Gilmar Mendes, interview by Izabela Torres, “Entrevista - Gilmar Mendes,” Correio Braziliense, Brasília (2008, 17-August), translation mine.
62.
ADInMC 223 (published on 06.29.1990).
63.
ADC 9 (published on 04.23.2004).
64.
See the third chapter.
65.
ADI 3.112 (published on 10.28.2007).
66.
ADI 3510 (published on 05.28.2008).
67.
Ibid., Justice Gilmar Mendes’s opinion, translation mine.
68.
BverfGE 88, 203.
69.
ADI 3510 (published on 05.28.2008). Justice Mendes’s opinion.
70.
Ibid., Justice Menezes Direito’s opinion.
71.
See the third chapter.
72.
See Robert Alexy, “Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation,” International Journal of Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press and New York School of Law) 3, no. 4 (2005): 578 ff.
73.
Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 729.
74.
See the sixth chapter.
75.
Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, 87.
76.
Jacques Derrida, “As If It Were Possible,” in Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971–2001 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 344.
77.
See the fifth chapter, when we discussed the construction of a substantive concept of democracy through the analysis of the logos of constitutionalism and the logos of democracy based on Derrida’s deconstruction.
78.
Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 729.
79.
See Schlink “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 711–736.
80.
Jacques Derrida, “Politics and Friendship,” in Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971–2001 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 182.
81.
Honneth, “The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism,” 319.
82.
BVerfGE 93,1.
83.
BVergGE 90, 145.
84.
HC 82.424-2/RS.
85.
See Richard Bernstein, “Introduction,” in Habermas and Modernity, ed. Richard Bernstein (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988), 88.
86.
BVerfGE 93,1.
87.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
88.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
89.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
90.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
91.
See Ibid.
92.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
93.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
94.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
95.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
96.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
97.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
98.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
99.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
100.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
101.
See Sonja M. Esser, Das Kreuz - ein Symbol Kultureller Identität? Der Diskurs über das Kruzifix-Urteil (1995) aus kulturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive (Münster, New York, München, Berlin: Waxmann, 2000), 33.
102.
See Derrida, “Force of Law,” 967.
103.
Honneth, “The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism,” 319.
104.
Ibid.
105.
Derrida, “Politics and Friendship,” 180.
106.
BVerfGE 93,1. Translation: Institute for Transnational Law.
107.
Honneth, “The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism,” 319.
108.
See the second chapter.
109.
See the fifth chapter.
110.
See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 711–736.
111.
See BVerfGE 90, 145 (III).
112.
See the first chapter.
113.
See the first chapter.
114.
BVerfGE 90, 145, translation mine.
115.
BVerfGE 90, 145, translation mine.
116.
See the first chapter.
117.
See the fifth chapter.
118.
See BVerfGE 6, 32 (Elfes-Urteil).
119.
See Bodo Pieroth and Bernhard Schlink, Grundrechte: Staatsrecht II (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2006), 86.
120.
See Ibid., 98.
121.
See Ibid.
122.
See Ibid., 99.
123.
See Ibid., 101.
124.
See Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition.” In: Cardozo Law Review, 711–736.
125.
Ibid., 729.
126.
For a very interesting analysis of the political character of balancing, see Bernhard Schlink, Abwägung im Verfassungsrecht (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1976).
127.
Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition,” 729.
128.
Honneth, “The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism,” 319.
129.
See the fifth chapter.
130.
Jürgen Habermas, “Reply to Symposium Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,” in Habermas on Law and Democracy, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and Andre Arato (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 430.
131.
See the first chapter.
132.
HC 82.424-2/RS (Justice Marco Aurélio’s opinion).
133.
HC 82.424-2/RS (Justice Marco Aurélio’s opinion).
134.
See HC 82.424-2/RS (published on 03.19.2004).
135.
See Milovic, Comunidade da Diferença, 131.
136.
Jacques Derrida, “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,” in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London; New York: Routeledge, 1996), 81.
137.
Honneth, “The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism,” 319.
138.
Ibid.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Faculdade de Direito, University of Brasília, Campus Darcy Ribeiro, Asa Norte, Brasília - DF, Brazil, 70.919-970
Professor Juliano Zaiden Benvindo (Faculty of Law)

Authors

Professor Juliano Zaiden Benvindo
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Juliano Zaiden Benvindo .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Benvindo, J.Z. (2010). Between Différance and Intersubjectivity: The Concept of Limited Rationality in the Realm of Constitutional Adjudication. In: On the Limits of Constitutional Adjudication. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11434-2_8

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11434-2_8
Published: 05 June 2010
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-11433-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-11434-2
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics