Abstract
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game-theoretical model which can be identified in many repeated real-world interactions between competing entities. The Tit for Tat strategy has been identified as a successful strategy which reinforces mutual cooperation, however, it is sensitive to environmental noise which disrupts continued cooperation between players to their detriment. This paper explores whether a population of Tit for Tat players may evolve specialised individual-based noise to counteract environmental noise. We have found that when the individual-based noise acts similarly to forgiveness it can counteract the environmental noise, although excessive forgiveness invites the evolution of exploitative individual-based noise, which is highly detrimental to the population when widespread.
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Brumley, L., Korb, K.B., Kopp, C. (2009). Using Misperception to Counteract Noise in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In: Korb, K., Randall, M., Hendtlass, T. (eds) Artificial Life: Borrowing from Biology. ACAL 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5865. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10427-5_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10427-5_6
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