Abstract
In the previous chapters I investigated different solution concepts for cooperative games as descriptions of productive interactive situations. First, I considered the Core, which is a set of payoff vectors based on the bargaining power of various coalitions in the interactive situation. Next I considered single valued solution concepts with very powerful properties, resulting into value theory.
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© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gilles, R.P. (2010). The Cooperative Potential. In: The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 44. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05282-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05282-8_4
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Online ISBN: 978-3-642-05282-8
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