Abstract
Scan chain based attacks are a kind of side channel attack, which targets one of the most important feature of today’s hardware - the test circuitry. Design for Testability (DFT) is a design technique that adds certain testability features to a hardware design. On the other hand, this very feature opens up a side channel for cryptanalysis, rendering crypto-devices vulnerable to scan-based attack. Our work studies scan attack as a general threat to stream ciphers and arrives at a general relation between the design of stream ciphers and their vulnerability to scan attack. Finally, we propose a scheme which we show to thwart the attacks and is more secure than other contemporary strategies.
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Agrawal, M., Karmakar, S., Saha, D., Mukhopadhyay, D. (2008). Scan Based Side Channel Attacks on Stream Ciphers and Their Counter-Measures. In: Chowdhury, D.R., Rijmen, V., Das, A. (eds) Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2008. INDOCRYPT 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5365. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89754-5_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89754-5_18
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