Abstract
We put forward the notion of a verifiably secure device, in essence a stronger notion of secure computation, and achieve it in the ballot-box model. Verifiably secure devices
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Provide a perfect solution to the problem of achieving correlated equilibrium, an important and extensively investigated problem at the intersection of game theory, cryptography and efficient algorithms; and
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Enable the secure evaluation of multiple interdependent functions.
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Izmalkov, S., Lepinski, M., Micali, S. (2008). Verifiably Secure Devices. In: Canetti, R. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4948. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_16
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