Abstract
June 1975. Hugo had visited Israel for several weeks, during which I had finally got a result that looked good for my dissertation. He returned late in the evening, but I couldn’t wait. Contrary to our practices, I called him at home. “I think I finally got the right result on extending Gibbard-Satterthwaite to correspondences.” “Well, Salvador, I’m afraid Gibbard has the right result. He just presented it in Jerusalem, and it solves it all.” (He was referring to the first version of Alan Gibbard, “The Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance”, Econometrica, 1977.) I could sense how sorry he was for me. But my thesis was at stake. “Cannot be. You should see mine. Can I just come to your home?” I intruded in Hugo’s home well past dinner time, and an hour later we were both relieved. Gibbard and I had taken two polar views on the same initial problem, and we had attained different but complementary results. That’s how I got approval for the first chapter in my dissertation, which is reprinted here. Chapter 2 followed easily, and everything was finished in a short time, leaving behind five years of learning, but also of risk: results had taken very long to come! Finally, Hugo had triggered them in his very special way.
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References
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BarberÀ, S. (2008). Salvador Barberà on Hugo F. Sonnenschein. In: Jackson, M.O., McLennan, A. (eds) Foundations in Microeconomic Theory. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74057-5_6
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