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The Dominant Role of the German Banks and New Players in the German Financial Sector

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German Corporate Governance in International and European Context

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Abstract

Traditionally corporate law systems based on common law are also very much based on the concept of ‘ownership’ of the company by the shareholders—the idea that the shareholders ‘own’ the company and that they can control the company through their voting power at the general meeting.1 They cast their vote personally or by proxy and can employ this means to determine the destiny of the company. The voting right of a shareholder is seen as a personal right and, generally speaking, can be cast according to the shareholder’s perception of what is in his or her own best interest.2

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References

  1. For a succinct exposition of this concept, see Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (Bullock Report) Cmnd 6706 (HMSO, London 1977) 59 para 2.

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  31. Baums (n 3) 511.

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  34. Ibid 2005 and 2000.

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  35. Ibid 2006 and 1996.

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  40. Großfeld and Ebke Werner Ebke, ‘Controlling the Modern Corporation: A Comparative View of Corporate Power in the United States and Europe’ [1978] AJCL 397 (n 11) 95.

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  43. Peltzer Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regeln zur Einschränkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften?’ [1996] JZ 842 ff (n 3) 843.

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Authors
  1. Jean du Plessis
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  2. Claus Luttermann
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du Plessis, J., Luttermann, C. (2007). The Dominant Role of the German Banks and New Players in the German Financial Sector. In: German Corporate Governance in International and European Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71187-2_8

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