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References
See Chapter IV of the present work. See also, Thirlway, H., “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice”, B.Y.I.L. 1990, pages 31–110.
Quel Lopez, F.J., Las reservas a los tratados internacionales (Un examen de la práctica española), op. cit., p. 182. The change is due to the influence of the soviet block and of Latin American legal thought which, in the early years of the U.N.O., rejected the old League of Nations system.
I.C.J., Advisory Opinion concerning Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Reports 1951, pages 21–22.
Ibid., p. 22. Besides the evolution of international practice, the I.C.J. also takes into account the fact that the conception of the absolute integrity of a convention had not been transformed into a rule of international law: “It does not appear, moreover, that the conception of the absolute integrity of a convention has been transformed into a rule of international law. The considerable part which tacit assent has always played in estimating the effect which is to be given to reservations scarcely permits one to state that such a rule exists, determining with sufficient precision the effect of objections made to reservations. In fact, the examples of objections made to reservations appear to be too rare in international law to have given rise to such a rule” (ibid., pages 24–25). Cf. Quel Lopez, F.J., Las reservas a los tratados..., op. cit., pages 182–186.
Ibid., p. 24.
I.C.J., Reports 1969, pages 38–39.
Ibid., p. 39. For a development of this question see Quel Lopez, F.J., op. cit., pages 286 et seq.
In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, where it states: “this — the reservation of the United States — would not be a reason for the Court to take the view that the operation of the treaty process must necessarily deprive the customary norm of its separate applicability. Nor can the multilateral treaty reservation be interpreted as meaning that, once applicable to a given dispute, it would exclude the application of any rule of customary international law the content of which was the same as, or analogous to, that of the treaty-law rule which had caused the reservation to become effective” (I.C.J., Reports 1986, p. 94).
I.C.J., Reports 1975, p. 39, paragraph 79.
Ibid., p. 39, paragraph 80.
Ibid. This was the case of the Western Sahara when it was colonized by Spain: “(it) was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them”, with which Spain concluded protection agreements (ibid.).
The I.C.J. specifies that: “the Geneva Convention did not embody or crystallize any pre-existing or emergent rule of customary law, according to which the delimitation of continental shelf areas between adjacent States must, unless the Parties otherwise agree, be carried out on an equidistance-special circumstances basis. A rule was of course embodied in Article 6 of the Convention, but was a purely conventional rule” (I.C.J., case concerning the North Sea Continental Shelf, Reports 1969, p. 41).
Ibid., p. 46. As regards the differing content of the concept of “continental shelf” in International Law and in other disciplines the I.C.J. emphasizes “the lack of identity between the legal concept of the continental shelf and the physical phenomenon known to geographers by that name” (case concerning Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), I.C.J., Reports 1982, p. 46).
This was stated in the following terms: “The slightest irregularity in a coastline is automatically magnified by the equidistance line as regards the consequences for the delimitation of the continental shelf. Thus it has been seen in the case of concave or convex coastlines that if the equidistance method is employed, then the greater the irregularity and the further from the coastline the area to be delimited, the more unreasonable are the results produced. So great an exaggeration of the consequences of a natural geographical feature must be remedied or compensated for as far as possible, being of itself creative of inequity” (I.C.J, Reports 1969, p. 49).
The recent jurisprudence of the I.C.J. confirms this conception: Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (I.C.J., Reports 1982, p. 92: “the delimitation must be carried out in accordance with equitable principles which take all the relevant circumstances into account”); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (I.C.J., Reports 1984, pages 100 et alt.); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (I.C.J., Reports 1985, pages 37 et alt.). From the point of view of doctrine see Blecher, M.D., “Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf”, A.J.I.L., 1979, pages 60 et alt.; Gournais, E., “The delimitation of the continental shelf of islands. Some observations”, Revue Hellénique de Droit International (R.D.H.I.), 1980, pages 111 et alt.; Rangel, V.M., “Le plateau continental dans la Convention de 1982 sur le Droit de la Mer”, R. des C., t. 194 (1985-V), pages 269–428; Villani, V., “La delimitazione della piattaforma continentale e della zona economica exclusiva si sensi della Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sul diritto del mare”, Riv. Diritto Internazionale, 1985/2, pages 261–298; Juste Ruiz, J., “Delimitaciones marinas en Africa Occidental. El Laudo arbitral sobre la delimitación de la frontera marítima entre Guinea y Guinea-Bissau”, R.E.D.I., 1990/1, pages 7–41; Bedjaoui, M., “‘L’énigme’ des ‘principes Equitables’ dans le droit des délimitations maritimes”, R.E.D.I., 1990/2, pages 367–389.
See Sanchez Rodriguez, L.I., “Uti possidetis: la reactualización jurisprudencial de un viejo principio (a propósito de la Sentencia del TIJ la en el asunto Burkina Fasso República de Mali)”, R.E.D.I., 1988/2, p. 123.
I.C.J., Reports 1986, p. 565: “Nevertheless the principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law. It is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power”.
See Sanchez Rodriguez, L.I., “Uti possidetis...”, op. cit., p. 129. From the statement of the I.C.J. which considers this principle to be a general principle of the international legal order, this author concludes that the Court raises the principle of uti possidetis to the category of the most important principles of International Law (see Ibid., p. 144), and this is due to its link with structural principles such as the self-determination of peoples, because of its relationship with the intangibility of frontiers and, consequently, with that of the territorial integrity of States (cf. ibid.).
This first element, “emphasized by the Latin genitive juris, is found in the pre-eminence accorded to legal title over effective possession as a basis of sovereignty. Its purpose, at the time of the achievement of independence by the former Spanish colonies of America, was to scotch any designs which non-American colonizing powers might have on regions which had been assigned by the former metropolitan State to one division or another, but which were still uninhabited or unexplored” (I.C.J., Reports 1986, pages 566).
In the words of the I.C.J.: “However, there is more to the principle of uti possidetis than this particular aspect. The essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. Such territorial boundaries might be no more than delimitations between different administrative divisions or colonies all subject to the same sovereign. In that case, the application of the principle of uti possidetis resulted in administrative boundaries being transformed into international frontiers in the full sense of the term” (ibid., p. 566).
And this because the I.C.J. does not pronounce on the de facto “uti possidetis”, nor on the twofold nature (constitutional and international) of this principle in America (see Sanchez Rodriguez, L.I., “Uti possidetis...”, op. cit., pages 131–136).
I.C.J., Reports 1986, p. 567. Concerning this question see also our work La frontera hispano-francesa y las relaciones de vecindad, San Sebastian, 1990, pages 37–39, and the bibliography quoted in this work.
Thus, in the case concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), (cf. I.C.J., Reports 1992, pages 565 et alt.).
Cf. Torres Bernardez, S., “The ‘Uti Possidetis Juris Principle’ in Historical Perspective”, in the collective work Völkerrecht zwischen normativen Anspruch und politischer Realität. Festschrift für Karl Zemanek zum 65. Geburtstag, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1994, pages 417–437. Especially, pages 431 et alt.
I.C.J., Reports 1996, p. 239.
Ibid., p. 242. And this, in the light “of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering and their ability to cause damage to generations to come” (ibid., p. 244).
“The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law”. And later: “... in any case any right of recourse to such reprisals would, like self-defence, be governed inter alia by the principle of proportionality“ (I.C.J., Reports 1996, pages 245 and 246).
Ibid., p. 247.
Ibid., p. 253. As maximum, “these treaties could therefore be seen as foreshadowing a future general prohibition of the use of such weapons, but they do not constitute such a prohibition by themselves” (ibid.).
“Furthermore, the members of the international community are profoundly divided on the matter of whether non-recourse to nuclear weapons over the past 50 years constitutes the expression of an opinio juris” (ibid., p. 254).
Ibid., p, 255. In other words: “The emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such is hampered by the continuing tensions between the nascent opinio juris on the one hand, and the still strong adherence to the practice of deterrence on the other” (ibid.).
Ibid., p. 256.
Ibid.
Its cardinal principles are the distinction between combatants and non-combatants (so States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets) and the prohibition to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants (according to this, it is prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering), so States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapon they use (cf. ibid., p. 257).
Cf. ibid., p. 261.
Ibid., p. 262.
Ibid., pages 262–263.
Ibid., p. 263.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 266.
I.C.J., case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, p. 19, para. 53. About this case see Sassoli, M., “L’arrrêt Yerodia: quelques remarques sur une affaire au point de colision entre les deux couches du droit international ”, R.G.D.I.P., Tome 106/2002/4, pp. 791–818; Henzelin, M., “La compétence pénale universelle: une question non résolue par l’arrêt Yerodia”, R.G.D.I.P., Tome 106/2002/4, pp. 819–854; Hopkins, K., “The International Court of Justice and the question of sovereign immunity: why the Yerodia case is an unfortunate ruling for the development of public international law”, South African Yearbook of International Law, 27 (2002), pp. 256–263; TOMUSCHAT, Ch., “L’immunité des Etats en cas de violations graves des droits de l’homme”, R.G.D.I.P., Tome 109/2005/1, pp. 51–74; BIANCHI, A., “L’immunité des Etats et les violations graves des droits de l’homme: la fonction de l’interprète dans la détermination du droit international ”, R.G.D.I.P, 2004/1, pp. 63–101; and Caplan, L. M., “State immunity, human rights, and jus cogens: a critique of the normative hierarchy theory”, A.J.I.L., 2003, Vol. 97, No. 4, pp. 741–781.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 20, para. 54.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 21, para. 58.
Ibid., p. 22, para. 60.
Ibid., p. 22, para.60.
Ibid. Nevertheless, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression can never be considered as acts committed during the period of office of a Minister for Foreign Affairs in a private capacity.
Ibid.
I.C.J., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, para. 78.
See I.C.J., Reports 1986, pp. 98–101.
I.C.J., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, para. 87.
Ibid., para. 88.
See I.C.J., Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J., Reports 1975, p. 68, para. 162.
See I.C.J., East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J., Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29.
I.C.J., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, para. 89.
See I.C.J., Reports 1996 (I), p. 256, para. 75.
Ibid.
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 21.
I.C.J., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, para. 152.
I.C.J., case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals, Reports 2004, para. 48.
I.C.J., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, para. 152.
Concerning the several obligations relate to Israel see ibid., paras. 149–153. About this questions see Gomez-Robledo, J., “L’avis de la C.I.J. sur les conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire palestinien occupé: timidité ou prudence?”, R.G.D.I.P., tome 109/2005/3, pp. 521–537.
Cf. I.C.J., LaGrand case, Reports 2001, pp. 513–514, para. 125.
Ibid.
Cf. ibid. Such review and reconsideration has to be carried out “by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention-of Vienna on Consular Relations-” (I.C.J. LaGrand case, Reports 2001, p. 514, para. 125), including, in particular, the question of the legal consequences of the violation upon the criminal proceedings that have followed the violation (cf. case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals, Reports 2004, para. 131.
IC.J., case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals, Reports 2004, para. 131.
Ibid., para. 133.
Ibid., para. 134.
Ibid.
Cf. LaGrand case, (I.C.J., Reports 2001, p. 514, para. 125).
Cf. case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals, Reports 2004, para. 143. It adds that appropriate clemency procedures can supplement judicial review and reconsideration, “in particular where the judicial system has failed to take due account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, as has occurred in the case of the three Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 114 above” (ibid., para.143).
Cf. ibid., para.138.
Ibid., para. 139.
Ibid.
I.C.J., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, para. 155.
See ibid., para. 159.
Ibid., para. 160.
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(2007). Customary Norms. In: Sovereignty and Interpretation of International Norms. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68207-3_9
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