This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Cf. Brownlie, I., Basic Documents in International Law, 4th. Ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, pages 388–425. For example, see the text of the latter in RGDIP, 1986/2, pages 502–540.
Concerning this matter, the ICJ has stated that they are rules which in many aspects “can be considered as a codification of existing customary international law on the point” (the case regarding the Arbitral Award of 31 July, 1989, ICJ, Reports 1991, p. 70).
Cf. Gonzalez Campos, J.D., Sanchez Rodriguez, L.I. and Andres Saenz de Santa Maria, M.P., op.cit., p. 262.
Before the Vienna Convention of 1969, Fitzmaurice held that to clarify its meaning “is, ex hypothesi, to give effect to that will and intention. If the text is not clear, recourse must be had to extraneous sources of interpretation; but the object is still the same — namely — that the text has a certain meaning, on the basis of which the parties have certain rights and obligations, and, therefore, that this is what they must have intended in concluding the treaty” (Fitzmaurice, G., “The Law and Procedure of the ICJ 1951–1954: treaty interpretation and other treaty points” British Yearbook of International Law, 1957, p. 207. Currently, the interpretation process must be carried out in accordance with the rules of the aforementioned Convention.
Dupuy, R.J., “Communaté internationale et disparités de developpement” R. des C., vol. 165 (1979–IV)., p. 185. Cf. also Weil, P., “Vers una normativité relative en Droit International”, RGDIP, 1982/1, pages 5–47.
Thus, for example, Macgibbon, Y., “Means for the identification of International Law General Assembly Resolutions: Custom, Practice and Mistaken Identity”, in the collection edited by Bin Cheng, International Law: Teaching and Practice, Stevens, London, 1982, pages 10–26. For this author, the Resolutions of the General Assembly are only recommendations even for the States which have voted for them: “given the powers of the General Assembly, that is all they can be” (p. 13).
In this respect, the ICJ was requested to give an advisory opinion on the Legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), and stated the following: “The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussion leading to it, the provisions of the Charter invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council” (ICJ, Reports 1971, p. 53). As regards this matter, it should be pointed out that in recent practice, the Security Council has usually expressly stated which Chapter or provision of the Charter led to their adopting the resolution in question. Concerning these problems see, for example, Castañeda, J., “Valeur juridique des résolutions des Nations Unies” R. des C., vol. 129 (1970–71), pages 205–232; Mosler, H., “Remarques sur la superposition du droit des Organisations internationales au droit des gens interétatique” in the collection Estudios de Derecho Internacional, Homenaje al Profesor Miaja de la Muela, Tecnos, Madrid, 1979, vol. I, pages 429–442; McWhinney, E, Les Nations Unies et la Formation du Droit, Pedone/Unesco, Paris, 1986.
See Institute of International Law, Yearbook of the Institute of International Law, 1987, vol. 6-II, p. 281.
See Virally, M., “Résolution et accord international”, in the collection Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1984, pages 299 et seq.
Dupuy, R.J., “Droit déclaratoire et Droit programmatoire: de la coutume sauvage à la soft law” in the collection L’élaboration du droit international public, ed. Pedone, Paris, 1975, p. 140. See also Virally, M., “La distinction entre textes internationaux de portée juridique et textes internationaux dépourvus de portée juridique”, Yearbook of the Institute of International Law, vol. 60-I, 1985, pages 166–257.
Focsaneanu, L., “Les langues comme moyen d’expression du droit international”, A.F.D.I., 1970, pages 257 et seq. On this issue cf. Reuter, P., “Quelques réflexions sur le vocabulaire du droit international”, in the collection Mélanges en l’honneur M. le Doyen Trotabas, Pedone, Paris, 1970, pages 423–445. See also our work “Lenguaje y Derecho Internacional”, in the collection Homenaje al Profesor D. Juan Manuel Castro Rial y Canos, F. MariñO, ed. Trotta, Madrid, 2002, pages 299–318.
Dupuy, P.M., Le Droit interrnational de l’environnement et la souveraineté des Etats. Bilan et perspectives“, in the collective work L’Avenir du Droit International de l’Environnement, Colloque Workshop, La Haye, 1985, p. 34. See also Salmon, J., “Le fait dans l’application du droit international”, R. des C., t. 175 (1982–II), pages 257–414 and Boyle, A.F., “Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law”, I.C.L.Q., 1999, vol. 48, no 4, pp. 901–913.
For example, article 27 of the Unesco Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, which states: “1. The States Parties to this Convention shall endeavour by all appropriate means, and in particular by educational and information programs, to strengthen appreciation and respect by their peoples of the cultural and natural heritage defined in Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention. 2. They shall undertake to keep the public broadly informed of the dangers threatening this heritage and of the activities carried in pursuance of this Convention” (International Legal Materials, 1972, p. 1358).
Virally, M., “The distinction between....”, op.cit., page 219, Cf. Weil, P., op.cit., page 44.
Ibid., page 334.
As an example, we can quote article 1 of the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources of May 17, 1980, which states: “The Contracting Parties to this Protocol (hereinafter referred to as ‘the parties’) shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate, combat and control pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area caused by discharges from rivers, coastal establishments or outfalls, or emanating from any other land-based sources within their territories” (International Legal Materials, 1980, pages 869 et seq. The italics are ours). Along the same lines, see the Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of November 13, 1979.
Ibid. page 335. As regards this issue, see. also Skubiszewski, K., “L’élaboration des grandes conventions multilatérales et des instruments non conventionnels à fonction ou à vocation normative”, Yearbook of the Institute of International Law, vol. 61-I, Paris, 1985, pages. 29–249 and 305–358; and vol. 61–II, Paris, 1986, pages 257–276, and the Resolution of the Institute of International Law adopted in 1987 at its session held in Cairo quoted above (Institute of International Law, Yearbook..., op.cit., pages 279 et seq.).
Ibid., pages 222 et seq. Within this group should be included the conventional obligations expressed by statements such as “shall cooperate”, “shall take appropriate measures”, “if possible”, etc. Through these expressions the state assuming the obligation can determine what is demanded of it at a particular time at its own discretion. Despite this, these cases also involve legal obligations imposed by a conventional norm. On many occasions the texts containing obligations expressed in this manner can only establish a framework of action for the future. See, for example, the way certain obligations are expressed in the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat made on February 2, 1971.
A sector of doctrine describes the work of the ILC as searching technically and with some empiricism for the general points of agreement between the states involved, in agreement with its mission for the progressive codification and development of International Law (SUR, S., op.cit. page 71). Previous to the two Vienna Conventions, see Berlia, G., “Contribution à l’interprétation des traités”, R. de C., vol. 114 (1965-I), pages 283–333; BERNHARDT, R., Die Auslegung völkerrechtlicher Verträge insbesondere in der neuen Rechtsprechung internationaler Gerichte, C. Heymanns Verlag, Köln-Berlin, 1963.
Among ourselves, Remiro holds that these rules are declarations “although their presentation, ordering and hierarchy include aspects involving progressive development”. They are also guidelines “to the extent that the parties to a treaty can adapt their interpretation as they see suitable”. Finally, they can be applied generally to all treaties without prejudice to the development of particular rules as, for example, what is stipulated in article 5 of the Vienna Convention of 1986 concerning the Law on Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations (cf. Remiro Brotons, A., Derecho Internacional, op. cit., page 309).
See Yasseen, M.K., “L’interprétation des traités d’après la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traits”, R. des C., vol. 151(1976-III), page 9.
See Salmon, J., “Le fait dans l’application...”, op. cit., page 357.
See I.L.C., Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 1996-II, page 103.
This has led REMIRO to state that, following the proposals of the ILC, the Convention chose the objectivist conception and joined the teleological interpretation to it. A secondary role has been conferred on the essential elements of the subjectivist conception (See Remiro Brotons, A., Derecho Internacional..., op. cit., page 309. In this regard, see Carrillo Salcedo, J.A., Curso de Derecho Internacional Público, Tecnos, Madrid, 1991, pages 163 et seq. Concerning the objectivist conception, see FAVRE, A., op. cit., pages 75–98.
This principle already appears in the earliest jurisprudence of the ICJ before the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Thus, in its advisory opinion on the Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations it states: “The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural express the purpose of the provisions in their context and in accordance with their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter” (ICJ, Reports 1950, page 8). And quoting the IPCJ in the case of the Polish Postal Service in Danzig (Series B, number II, page 39) it adds: “It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that words must be interpreted in the sense which they would normally have in their context, unless such interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or absurd” (ibid.). In its first case, the advisory opinion on the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, the I.C.J. also uses it (cf. I.C.J., Reports 1948, pages 61–63).
See ILC, Yearbook..., op. cit., page 242.
Cf. Brownlie, I., Principles of..., op. cit., page 629. See also MACLACHIAN, C., “The principle of systematic integration and Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention”, The international and comparative law quarterly (I.C.L.Q.), 54 (2005), 2, pp. 279–320.
In this case, the Court interpreted that the notion in question (“territorial status”) had been used with an evolutionary criteria and this intention had been brought into effect (see ICJ, Reports 1978, page 32). In the cases of the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco and Western Sahara, however, the Court interpreted in accordance with the law in force at the time of the execution of the act (see, respectively, ICJ, Reports 1952, page 189 and Reports 1975, page 38).
This criteria is taken by the ILC from the work of the Institute of International Law (see Yearbook of the Institute of International Law, 1952, vol. 44, book 1, pages 190 et seq.) and from the jurisprudence of the ICJ. See a recent example in the case concerning the territorial dispute (CIJ, Reports 1994, page 22).
In this regard, cf. for example, Yasseen, M.K., op. cit., pages, 25 et seq.; Remiro Brotons, A., Derecho Internacional, op. cit., pages 310 et seq; Carreau, D., Droit International Public, 3rd edition, A. Pedone, Paris, 1991, page 141. In the case of the Territorial Dispute, the I.C.J., stated: “42. According to Article 3 of the 1955 Treaty, the parties ‘recognize that the frontiers.... are those that result’ from certain international instruments. The word ‘recognize’ used in the Treaty indicates that a legal obligation is undertaken. To recognize a frontier is essentially to ‘accept’ that frontier, that is, to draw legal consequences from its existence, to respect it and to renounce the right to contest it in the future” (ICJ, Reports 1994, page 229).
In which, in opposition to one of the allegations based on the intention of the states which were parties to the Treaty of Versailles, it stated that: “The Court is not prepared to adopt the view that the text of the Treaty of Versailles can be enlarged by reading into it stipulations which are said to result from the proclaimed intentions of the authors of the Treaty, but for which no provision is made in the text itself” (CPJI, Serie A/B n o 43, page 144).
This occurs in the case of the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, in which Qatar holds that when it subscribed to the combined communiqué it was subscribing “to a statement recording a political understating, but not to sign a legally binding agreement”. The ICJ rejects this: “nor could any such intention, even if shown to exist, prevail over the actual terms of the instrument in question”” (ICJ Reports 1994, page 122).
Ibid. An argument which is supported by the context in which the joined communiqué took place: “within the framework of the good offices of.... King Fahd Ben Abdul Aziz” of Saudi Arabia (ibid., page 119).
According to the ICJ: “Interpretation must above all be based upon the text of the treaty”. And it repeats the case law of the PCIJ when it ruled on the acquisition of Polish Nationality, and adds: “Having before it a clause which leaves little to be desired in the nature of clearness, it is bound to apply this clause as it stands, without considering whether other provisions might with advantage have been added to or substituted for it” (all this appears in ICJ, Reports 1994, pages 22 and 25).
The purpose and the objective of the treaty, “Reading the 1955 Treaty in the light of its object and purpose one observes that it is a treaty of friendship and good neighbourliness concluded, according to its Preamble, ‘in a spirit of mutual understanding and on the basis of complete equality, independence and liberty’” (ibid. page 25); and adds that, “the object and purpose of the Treaty thus recalled confirm the interpretation of the Treaty given above,...” (ibid., page 26).
“The conclusions which the Court has reached are reinforced by an examination of the context of the Treaty, and, in particular, of the Convention of Good Neighbourliness between France and Libya, concluded by the parties at the same time as the Treaty” (ibid).
Thus, “Considered in the light of Article 2 of the Agreement, the principle laid down in Article 1 is valid only as regards the area mentioned in Article 2” (ICJ, Reports 1993, page 50).
It states that “The 1965 Agreement has in any event to be read in its context, in the light of its object and purpose” (ibid.) These criteria will be examined in their relevant section of this work.
The case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (ICJ, Reports 1994, pages 119 and 121 respectively).
I.LC., Yearbook..., op.cit., page 244. As regards the PCIJ in the case cited, it stated that: “The geographical meaning of the word ‘Greenland’, i.e. the name which is habitually used in maps to denominate the whole island, must be regarded as the ordinary meaning of the word. If it is alleged by one of the Parties that some unusual or exceptional meaning is to be attributed to it, it lies on that Party to establish its contention” (PCIJ, Series A/B, Number 53, page 49). Along the same lines, cf. the advisory opinion of the ICJ in the Western Sahara case (ICJ, Reports 1975, pages 38 et seq.).
See Remiro Brotons, A., Derecho Internacional..., op.cit., page 311. Also, Carreau, D., Droit..., op. cit., page 141.
Before the codification carried out by the ILC, the PCIJ stated that the parameter of the “context” is limited insofar as its use cannot lead to “absurd or unreasonable results” (reply to an inquiry on the case of the Polish Postal Service in Danzig, PCIJ, Series B, Number 11, page 39.
The preamble is an integral part of the treaty and often states its purpose and objective. Sometimes it entails essential rules which determine the position of the treaty within the framework of international regulations (as in the final paragraph of the preamble of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law on Treaties when it states that the rules of customary International Law will continue to govern the issues not regulated in the Convention. Cf. Yasseen, M.K., op. cit., page 35).
One example is the case concerning the Territorial Dispute. The context is that of the Good Neighbourliness Convention between France and Libya of 1955. The ICJ states that: “53. The conclusions which the Court has reached are reinforced by an examination of the context of the Treaty, and, in particular, of the Convention of Good Neighbourliness between France and Libya, concluded between the parties at the same time as the Treaty” (ICJ, Reports 1994, page 26).
Cf. ILC, Yearbook..., op. cit., page 243. One example of this type can be found in the case concerning the Territorial Dispute, in which Libya holds that it from the use of the plural “frontiers” in article 3 of the treaty of 1955 it is deduced that the parts intended the delimitation of some of its frontiers and not the totality of the frontier. In the opinion of the Court, “...the use of the plural is,..., to be explained by the fact that there were differences of legal status between the various territories bordering on Libya, for whose international relations France was at the time responsible, and their respective frontiers had been delimited by different agreements. Tunisia was a protectorate at the time, Algeria was a groupe de départements and French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa were both groupes de territories d’outre-mer. In this context, the use of the plural is clearly appropriate, and does not have the significance attributed to it by Libya” (ICJ, Reports 1994, page 23. The italics are ours).
As regards the interpretative declarations, in the Ambatielos case the ICJ stated that “the provisions of the Declaration are in the nature of an interpretation clause, and, as such, should be regarded as an integral part of the Treaty”. (Preliminary Exception, ICJ, Reports 1952, page 44).
Yasseen, M.K., op. cit., page 35. These formula make the treaty more specific and thus contribute to the security of the conventional relations and help to prevent probable conflicts of interpretation (cf. ibid.).
Cf. ILC, Yearbook..., op. cit., page 243. Regarding the ICJ, see its statement on the Ambatielos Case (ICJ, Reports 1952, page 44).
This practice constitutes an objective proof of the agreement of the parties as regards the meaning of the treaty (cf. ILC, op. cit., page 243). In this respect, the following statement of the ICJ can be quoted concerning the Corfu Cannel case: “The subsequent attitude of the Parties shows that it was not their intention, by entering into the Special Agreement, to preclude the Court from fixing the amount of the compensation” (ICJ, Reports 1949, page 25). Cf. Concerning this issue, the works of COT, J.P. quoted in preceding pages of this work, as well as the case law of the PCIJ in the Cases of the Competence of the ILO with regard to the Regulation of Agricultural Work (CPJI, Series B No. 2, pages 39 et seq.), the Interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne (CPJI, Series B No. 2, page 24) and the Brazilian Loans (CPJI, Series A, No. 21, page 119).
Concerning these questions, see Distefano, G., “La practique subséquente des États parties a un traité” (A.F.D.I., 1994 pages 41–71). Also our work, “El Régimen Jurídico del Aeropuerto de Fuenterrabía: análisis del Acta hispano-francesa de 11 de julio de 1957” (R.E.D.I., 1987, pages 121–141).
This leads the Court to state that “... if the intention of the 1965 Agreement had been to commit the Parties to the median line in all ensuing shelf delimitations, it would have been referred to in the 1979 Agreement” (ICJ, Reports 1993, page 51).
See ibid.
ILC, Yearbook..., op. cit, page 244.
ICJ, Reports 1978, page 31, paragraph 75. The italics are from the original. See, along the same lines, the advisory opinion of the ICJ regarding the Western Sahara case in relation to the non-self-governing territories (ICJ, Reports 1975, pages 29b et seq.).
Ibid., p. 32, paragraph 77. And it adds that these terms, “must be interpreted in accordance with the rules of international law as they today, and not as they existed in 1939”, which implies “to take account the evolution which has occurred in the rules of international law concerning a coastal State’s rights of exploration and exploitation over the continental shelf” (ibid., pages 33 et seq., paragraph 80).
ICJ, Reports 1952, page 189. Carrillo Salcedo specifies that if the text had extraordinary relevance in traditional International Law due to its coherence within a voluntary conception of law, the International Law Commission of the United Nations and the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986 give clear preference to the objectivist criteria, and join it with the teleological or finalist dimension...” (“Course...,” op. cit., page 164).
In Remiros’s opinion “purpose and end constitute a criterion of interpretation in which the first factor, the purpose, involves realism and moderation, and the second, the end, involves idealism and progress. One is the fuel and the other is the smoke”. (Derecho Internacional..., op. cit., page 313). In Yasseen’s opinion, when it mentions these, the Vienna Convention “wished to state a criterion formed by the reasonable sense of these two terms. Thus, this criterion may be what the parties wished to achieve within the limits of the norm they have drafted” (op. cit., page 57). For Carreau, the method of teleological interpretation has an analogy “with the central criterion of admissibility of the reservations (...). The treaty must be interpreted depending on its ends”, and he describe this as a “dynamic” and “activist” technique of interpretation. (Droit..., op. cit., page 142).
ICJ, Reports 1993, pages 50 et seq.
ILC, Yearbook..., op. cit., page 245. In the opinion of the ad hoc Judge Torres Bernardez it is clear that the submittal of two different articles of the general rule of interpretation and of the complementary means “does not at all mean that there are two interpretative processes. The interpretative process is a single one and, the interpreter is free at any moment to turn his attention to the supplementary means of interpretation concerned without waiting for completion of the application of the general rule of Article 31” (case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, I.C.J., Reports 1992, p. 720).
PCIJ, Series A/B, Number. 44, page 33.
ICJ, Reports 1950, page 8. That is to say, recourse to complementary methods is only possible when the use of the interpretative criteria of the general rule does not enable the problem to be solved.
According to Carreau, “the projects which have led to the adoption of the text, the oral or written interventions of the participants regarding the acceptance or the rejection of amendments etc. are part of the preparatory work” (Droit..., op. cit., page 144).
Cf. Brownlie, I., Principles of..., op. cit., page 630.
See Yasseen, M.K., op.cit., page 86. Brownlie shows the same caution when he states that the preparatory work constitutes an “aid which must be used with discretion from the time that its use may deviate from the approximation to the text and, in particular, in the case of multilateral agreements, the documents of the procedures of the conference, treaty projects and the rest van be confusing or not very convincing” (Principles of..., op. cit., page 630).
One example of this is the case of the Land, Insular and Maritime Frontier Dispute in which the Chamber of the ICJ states that the examination of the circumstances “constitute no more than a supplementary means of interpretation, used only where the meaning of the text is ambiguous or obscure, or the interpretation would lead to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable (see article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” (ICJ, Reports 1992, page 584). See also page 138, note (35) of this work.
Yasseen, M.K., op. cit., page 90.
The case of the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (ICJ, Reports 1992, page 719).
ILC, Yearbook......, op. cit., page 246. An adds that the different mechanics of the languages, the lack of a complete “consensus ad idem”, or the lack of sufficient time to coordinate the texts can lead to minor or even important discrepancies in the meaning of the texts. In such cases, the plurality of texts can constitute another important reason for ambiguity or lack of clarity in the terms of the treaty. Moreover, when the meaning of the terms is ambiguous or unclear in one language, but in others it is clear and convincing as regards the intention of the parties, the multi-lingual character of the treaty facilitates the interpretation of the text with the doubtful meaning (cf. ibid., pages 246 et seq.).
Ibid., page 247.
Cf. ILC (Yearbook..., op. cit., page 247).
One example of this is the case of the Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), in which the Chamber of the ICJ decided on the interpretation most in accordance with the purpose of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation signed by Italy and the United States on 1948 (See ICJ, Reports 1989, page 68).
Cf. ICJ, Reports 1992, pages 351 et seq.
ICJ, Reports 1993, page 48.
ICJ, Reports 1994, page 119.
In the words of Sir H. Waldock “a simultaneous combination of these means in a single operation” (ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, page 200).
As regards this cf. Torres Bernardez, S., in his individual opinion on the case of the Land, Insular and Maritime Dispute (ICJ, Reports 1992, page 719).
For example, the purpose and the reason for the treaty in the case of the Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad). Cf. ICJ, Reports 1994, page 26).
ICJ, Reports 1992, page 583. The ICJ appeals to the context in order to show that “the object of the verb ‘determine’ is not the maritime spaces themselves but the legal situation of these spaces. No indication of a common intention to obtain a delimitation by the Chamber can therefore be derived from this text as it stands” (ibid.). In addition, in order to confirm the conclusion (cf. ibid.). See, in the same line, the individual opinion of the ad hoc Judge TORRES BERNARDEZ on the same case (ibid., page 722).
The Chamber appeals to comparative practice: “In considering the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty, it is appropriate to compare them with the terms generally or commonly used in order to convey the idea that a delimitation is intended. Whenever in the past a special agreement has entrusted the Court with a task related to delimitation, it has spelled out very clearly what was asked of the Court: the formulation of principles or rules enabling the parties to agree on delimitation, the precise application of these principles or rules (see North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) and Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) cases), or the actual task of drawing the delimitation line (Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area case). Likewise, in the Anglo-French Arbitration of 1977, the Tribunal was specifically entrusted by the terms of the Special Agreement with the drawing of the line” (ibid., p. 586). See the advisory opinion of judge “ad hoc” Torres Bernardez (specially, pp. 716–730).
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(2007). The Text, the Authentic Expression of the Will of the Parties, Constitutes the Subject of the Discrepancy: The Conventional Rules. In: Sovereignty and Interpretation of International Norms. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68207-3_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68207-3_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-68206-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68207-3
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)