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References
See Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), Update on Communications, press release of February 10, 2006, http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/otp/otp_com.html. According to the Report on Activities of the Court, as of September 16, 2005 1497 communications were submitted (ICC-ASP 4/16, Assembly of State Parties Fourth Session, p. 7, http://www.icccpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-4-16_English.pdf).
See for this and the following information in the OTP press release, supra note 2.
Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), adopted by a vote of 11–0, 4 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States).
See, e.g., the Freiburg Declaration on the Position of the Prosecutor of a Permanent International Criminal Court, in L. Arbour et al. (eds.), The Prosecutor of a permanent ICC (2000), pp. 667 et seq. (printed versions in English, French, Spanish and German).
See supra note 2. For the management of referrals and communications in general see OTP, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, Annex: Referrals and Communications, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/policy_annex_final_210-404.pdf.
According to Article 5 of the ICC Statute the Court has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression (the latter being subject to a definition still to be found, para. 2). Thus, “ordinary” crimes like single murder, theft or rape are outside its subject matter jurisdiction. On the crimes see K. Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht (2006), § 7, margin notes (mn.) 122 et seq.; id., in AIDP (ed.), International Criminal Law: Quo vadis? Nouvelles Études Pénales (2004), pp. 219–282.
See supra note 4 and text.
The OTP (see supra note 2; text with footnotes 5 and 7) distinguishes between “basic reporting” (Phase II-A) and “more thorough and intensive analysis” (Phase II-B and Phase III).
See the decisions published as an annex to OTP, supra note 2.
These were the situations, which were in Phase II (see supra note 11) in September 2005 (Interview with Xabier Aguirre, senior case analyst, ICC-OTP, The Hague, September 30, 2005).
See most recently Human Rights Watch, World Report 2006, Events of 2005, Colombia, pp. 179–186, http://hrw.org/wr2k6/wr2006.pdf.
G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (2005), mn. 195 et seq.; M. C. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2003), pp. 18 et seq. and 333 et seq.
Cf. A. Ciampi, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the ICC, A Commentary, Vol. 2 (2000), pp. 1711 et seq.
C. Kreß et al., in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999), part 9, mn. 1 et seq.; A. Ciampi, supra note 16, pp. 1607 et seq.; B. Swart, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. Jones (eds.), supra note 16, pp. 1589 et seq.
E. Kern, Gerichtsverfassungsrecht (1965), p. 227 with regard to the relationship between the prosecutor and the police.
Cf. M. C. Bassiouni, supra note 15, pp. 18 et seq. and 388 et seq.
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-AR108bis., App. Judgment of October 29, 1997, paras. 47 and 54. More detailed regarding the vertical character of cooperation G. Sluiter, International criminal adjudication and the collection of evidence (2002), pp. 82 et seq.; G. Sluiter, in H. Fischer, C. Kreß and S. R. Lüder (eds.), The Rules of Procedure and Evidence on Cooperation and Enforcement (2001), pp. 688 et seq.; B. Swart, supra note 17, pp. 1592 et seq.; J. Meißner, Die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof nach dem Römischen Statut (2003), pp. 10 et seq. (about cooperation with interstate organizations Art. 87 (6) ICC Statute).
Cf. B. Swart, supra note 17, pp. 1590 et seq.; G. Sluiter 2002, supra note 20, pp. 81 et seq.; K. Ambos, Finnish Yearbook of International Law 1998, pp. 413 et seq.; W. Schomburg and O. Lagodny, Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, 3rd ed. (1998), introduction, mn. 45–46; J. A. Vervaele and A. Klip, European cooperation between Tax, Customs and Judicial Authorities (2002), pp. 35 et seq.; C. Kreß in H. Grützner and P. G. Pötz (eds.), Internationaler Rechtshilfeverkehr in Strafsachen, 63. Ergänzungslieferung (2004), preliminary remarks to III 26, mn. 205 et seq.; C. Kreß et al., supra note 17, part 9, mn. 3; P. Wilkitzki, International Criminal Law Review 2002, p. 198; J. Meißner, supra note 20, pp. 10 et seq. and 275 et seq.
K. F. Nagel, Beweisaufnahme im Ausland (1988), p. 72; H. Grützner, in M. C. Bassiouni and V. Nanda (eds.), A Treatise on International Criminal Law (1973), pp. 234 et seq.; B. Swart, supra note 17, pp. 1590 et seq.
Cf. B. Swart, supra note 17, pp. 1590 et seq.; M. C. Bassiouni, supra note 15, pp. 333 et seq.; G. Sluiter 2002, supra note 20, pp. 81 et seq.; J. Meißner, supra note 20, pp. 12 et seq.
Cf. A.-L. Chaumette, International Criminal Law Review 2004, pp. 357 et seq. Bilateral agreements on cooperation, like the ones between the USA and the ICTY/ICTR, are therefore superfluous since UN Member States only have to establish the prerequisites for cooperation in their domestic law (cf. G. Sluiter 2002, supra note 20, pp. 63 et seq.; J. Godinho, Journal of International Criminal Justice 2003, pp. 502 et seq.; contra R. Kushen, Journal of International Criminal Justice 2003, pp. 517 et seq.).
Cf. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 20, paras. 26, 47, 54 and 63; see also Art. 25, 103 UN Statute; C. Kreß, supra note 21, III 27, mn. 57; B. Swart, supra note 17, pp. 1592 et seq.; A. Ciampi, supra note 16, pp. 1610–11; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003), pp. 357 et seq.; G. Sluiter 2002, supra note 20, pp. 47 et seq., 139 et seq.
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 20, paras. 26–31, 33–37 and ICTY/ICTR rules 7–11, 59 (b) and 61 (e).
For more details on the negotiations, see P. Mochochoko, in R. S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court (1999), pp. 305 et seq.; C. Kreß, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 1998, pp. 449 et seq.; C. Kreß et al., supra note 17, part 9, mn. 4.
See C. Kreß, supra note 21, preliminary remark to III 26, mn. 206 for examples of horizontal and vertical elements; B. Swart, supra note 17, pp. 1594 et seq.; C. Kreß et al., supra note 17, part 9, mn. 5; K. Ambos, supra note 21, pp. 413 et seq.; J. Meißner, supra note 20, pp. 275 et seq.; G. Sluiter 2002, supra note 20, pp. 82 et seq.; P. Caeiro, in V. Moreira et al. (eds.), O Tribunal Penal Internacional e a ordem jurÍdica portuguesa (2004), pp. 69–157 at p. 70.
Thereto G. Sluiter 2002, supra note 20, pp. 68 et seq.; A. Ciampi, supra note 16, pp. 1615 et seq.; C. Kreß and K. Prost, in O. Triffterer, supra note 17, Art. 87, mn. 18 et seq.; G. Palmisano, in F. Lattanzi and W. A. Schabas (eds.), Essays on the Rome Statute (1999), pp. 402 et seq.
OTP, supra note 6, p. 10.
For more examples and references see K. Ambos, supra note 8, § 8, mn. 65, 79.
Cf. C. Kreß, in O. Triffterer, supra note 17, Art. 86, mn. 1 et seq.; A. Ciampi, supra note 16, pp. 1608 et seq.; C. Kreß and K. Prost, supra note 29, Art. 87, mn. 32 et seq.; G. Sluiter 2002, supra note 20, pp. 67 et seq. Concerning the special position of the Security Council, see G. Palmisano, supra note 29, pp. 416 et seq.; P. Gargiulo, in F. Lattanzi and W. A. Schabas (eds.), supra note 29, pp. 100 et seq.
Cf. Amnesty International on implementation at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/icc-implementation-eng. According to the report International Criminal Court: The failure of States to enact effective implementing legislation (AI Index: IOR 40/019/2004), September 1, 2004, to August 23, 2004 only 36 out of 94 States Parties have enacted legislation implementing any of their obligations under the Rome Statute. According to the ICC Monitor, Issue 32, May 2006, p. 5, up to January 2006 40 of the 100 State Parties have enacted some form of legislation implementing the Rome Statute. 30 States enacted (substantive) “complementarity legislation” and 32 cooperation legislation. 37 States have some form of “draft complementarity legislation” and 27 “draft cooperation legislation”. 33 have no complementarity legislation whatsoever, and 41 lack any form of cooperation legislation.
See “ICC delegation to visit Sudan’s Darfur,” Sudan Tribune, February 27, 2006, http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14271.
In Resolution 1593, supra note 4, the Security Council limits the powers of the ICC: “6. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State.”
Cf. A. Wartanian, Georgetown Journal of International Law 2005, pp. 1302 et seq.; M. P. Scharf, DePaul Law Review 2000, pp. 938 et seq.
See the Justice Rapid Response Feasibility Study (October 2005), produced at the request and the support of the governments of Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; see also K. Ambos, supra note 8, § 8, mn. 16. In the fifth meeting on Justice Rapid Response (JRR) group the value of JRR as an international cooperation mechanism was emphasized and the following practical steps were introduced: 1. Focal Points, 2. Rosters, 3. Training, 4. Standard operating procedures, 5. Cooperation among interested parties, 6. Ultimate coordination of JRR, 7. Promoting participation (cf. Chair’s Conclusions of the Venice Conference on Justice Rapid Response, June 15–17, 2006).
See on the rationale and scope of universal jurisdiction K. Ambos, supra note 8, § 3, mn. 93 et seq.
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of September 18, 2004 (2005), para. 616: “The ICC should defer to national courts other than those of Sudan which genuinely undertake proceedings on the basis of universal jurisdiction”; see also M. Delmas-Marty, Journal of International Criminal Justice 2006, p. 6.
On these principles see K. Ambos, supra note 8, § 3, mn. 1 et seq.
For an analysis see K. Ambos, supra note 8, § 3, mn. 100; more detailed, id., in Münchner Kommentar StGB und Nebenstrafrecht, Vol. VI, § 1 VStGB, mn. 24 et seq. (to be published 2007).
See K. Ambos, Archiv des Völkerrechts 1999, pp. 318 et seq.; id., Impunidad y derecho penal internacional, 2nd ed. (1999), pp. 66 et seq.
Decision of September 13, 2005, published in Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 2006, p. 117. For a critical commentary K. Ambos, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 2006, pp. 434 et seq.
See especially the contributions of W. Kaleck and F. Jessberger in this volume.
For a more detailed discussion see K. Ambos, supra note 47; id., supra note 45, § 1 VStGB, mn. 31.
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Ambos, K. (2007). Prosecuting International Crimes at the National and International Level: Between Justice and Realpolitik. In: Kaleck, W., Ratner, M., Singelnstein, T., Weiss, P. (eds) International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-46278-1_5
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