Abstract
In this chapter we introduce the main concepts used in the sequel, that is preferences and preference profiles, social choice functions and correspondences (Section 1.1). We also recall various properties of these correspondences (Section 1.2), and discuss some important properties like monotonicity (Section 1.3). We define the notion of social choice mechanism (Section 1.4) and its rough form: the effectivity function or blocking (Section 1.5). In Appendices 1.A1 and 1.A2, we discuss two seminal theorems of social choice theory, that of Arrow and that of Gibbard-Satterthwaite. Both are closely related with Mueller-Satterthwaite theorem from Section 1.3. In Appendix 1.A3, we investigate the notion of minimal monotone SCC.
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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Danilov, V.I., Sotskov, A.I. (2002). Basic Concepts. In: Social Choice Mechanisms. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24805-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24805-7_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07715-9
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