Abstract
Institutions matter. In law-making every nation does proceed according to its own peculiar methods. In legislative games the formal institutional structure poses many kinds of constraints as to how bills are processed and what various actors can do at the various stages of the game. These constraints modify the choice set of the relevant actors. Indeed, they even dictate who the relevant players are in the first place. The formal constraints also dictate the temporal ordering of things, namely: who can do what and when? The constitution settles the sequence of the possible moves by the various actors.
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Wiberg, M. (2009). Veto Players in Legislative Games: Fake and Real. In: Ganghof, S., Hönnige, C., Stecker, C. (eds) Parlamente, Agendasetzung und Vetospieler. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91773-3_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91773-3_4
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