Skip to main content

Agenda Setting and Executive Dominance in Politics

  • Chapter
Parlamente, Agendasetzung und Vetospieler

Abstract

If one looks back on the contributions of institutional analysis to political science, two findings come to one’s mind: Duverger’s (1954; French original 1951) laws on the impact of electoral systems and the importance of agenda setting (paternity of this idea is difficult to attribute, but it probably belongs to McKelvey 1976). Döring’s major contributions revolve around this concept of agenda setting. I will first present them and locate them inside the literature, then I will show their relevance in assessing important theoretical questions in the literature, and then demonstrate how they can be expanded to cover countries that were not covered in the initial studies.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 89.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Arrow, Kenneth J., 1951: Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baron, David P., 1995: A Sequential Theory Perspective on Legislative Organization. In: Kenneth Shep-sle/ Barry Weingast (Hrsg.), Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 71–100.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baron, David P./John A. Ferejohn, 1989: Bargaining in Legislatures. In: American Political Science Review 89, 1181–1206.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diermeier, Daniel/Timothy J. Feddersen, 1998: Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure. In: American Political Science Review 92(3), 611–621.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Döring, Herbert, 1995a: Is Government Control of the Agenda Likely to Keep Legislative Inflation at Bay? In: Herbert Döring (Hrsg.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt/M.: Campus.

    Google Scholar 

  • Döring, Herbert (Hrsg.), 1995b: Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus.

    Google Scholar 

  • Döring, Herbert, 1995c: Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda. In: Herbert Döring (Hrsg.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 223–246.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duverger, Maurice, 1959: Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. 2. Auflage. London: Methuen&Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elgie, Robert, 2005: From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of Presidential/Parliamentary Studies? In: Democratization 12(1), 106–122.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huber, John D., 1996: The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies. In: American Political Science Review 90(2), 269–282.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, Arend, 1999: Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McKelvey, Richard, 1976: Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control. In: Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472–482.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson, Torsten/Guido Tabellini, 2000: Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy Cambridge. Mass: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1979: Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium In Multidimensional Voting Models. In: American Journal of Political Science 23(1), 27–59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shepsle, Kenneth/Barry R. Weingast, 1984: Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions. In: American Journal of Political Science 29, 49–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis, George, 2002: Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis, George/Eduardo Alemán, 2005: Presidential conditional agenda setting in Latin America. In: World Politics 58(3), 396–420.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis, George/Tatiana P. Rizova, 2007: Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries. In: Comparative Political Studies 40(10), 1155–1182.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Steffen Ganghof Christoph Hönnige Christian Stecker

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2009 VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tsebelis, G. (2009). Agenda Setting and Executive Dominance in Politics. In: Ganghof, S., Hönnige, C., Stecker, C. (eds) Parlamente, Agendasetzung und Vetospieler. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91773-3_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91773-3_2

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-531-15297-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-531-91773-3

  • eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Science (German Language)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics