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Part of the book series: Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie ((JRR,volume 4))

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Abstract

Since the times of Montesquieu (1) and the Federalists (2) it has been usual to regard government as composed of certain powers whose function is to “check and balance” each other. In Montesquieu’s scheme these powers were the King, the nobility and the people. A balance between them should be obtained by vesting the executive function in the King and dividing the legislative power between the nobility and the people. Montesquieu did not regard the courts as power-holders because he conceived judicial decisions as passive reproductions of the will of the legislator (3). The Federalists, however,assigned a more active role of the courts. They considered the judiciary as the third power of government, besides the legislature and the executive. Courts of justice should, in the words of Alexander Hamilton, be “the bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments”, and it was therefore important that the judges possessed an “independent spirit” (4).

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Notes

  1. Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois (1748).

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  2. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison, The Federalist (1788).

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  3. Mais les judges de la nation ne sont…. que la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi, des être inanimés qui n’en peuvent modérer ni la force ni la rigueur“ (op. cit., Tome I, Livre XI, Ch. VI).

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  4. The Federalist, No. 78.

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  5. Op. cit., Tome I, Livere XI, Ch. IV.

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  6. On the use of exchange theory in sociology and social psychology see e.g. George Caspar Homans, Social Behaviour, its Elementary Forms (London 1961), Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (N.Y. 1964), John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (N.Y. 1959 ) and Torstein Eckhoff, Justice: Its Determinants in Social Interaction (Rotterdam 1974 ).

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  7. Cf. Torstein Eckhoff, “The Mediator, the Judge and the Administrator in Conflict-resolution”, Acta Sociologica, Vol. 10, 1966, pp. 148–172 (also in B—M. Blegvad (ed.), Contributions to the Sociology of Law, Copenhagen 1966 ).

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  8. Cf. Arvid Frihagen, Linjekonferanser og kartell-lovgivning ( Shipping Conferences and Anti-trust-Laws ), Oslo 1963, pp. 139–41.

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  9. Cf. Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Balance of Power, The Automobile Manufacturers and their Dealers (1966), p. 203.

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  10. The events leading to the establishment of this tribunal are analysed by Yehezkel Dror, “Organizational Functions of a Domestic Tribunal: A Case Study of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations”, The British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 2, 1964, pp. 42 ff.

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  11. The importance of judicial independence is discussed more in detail in Torstein Eckhoff, “Impartiality, Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence”, Scandinavian Studies in Law, vol. 9, 1965, pp. 1148.

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  12. Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (New York 1973) pp. 109–121 and J. Williard Hurst, The Growth of American Law (Boston 1950 ), pp. 134–140.

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  13. Cf. Fred Rodell, Nine Men (New York 1955 ), pp. 213–254.

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  14. Reported in Geoffrey Marshall, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth (Oxford 1957), pp. 139 ff.

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  15. Some of Blom’s findings are reported in English in Jette Moller Nielsen (ed.), Retssociologi i Norden, II ( Sociology of Law in the Nordic Countries, II ), ( Copenhagen 1970 ).

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  16. Rettsväsendekommissionens betänkande (Report of the Administration of Justice Committee) (Kommitteebetänkande 1971: B 112, Helsingfors 1971 ).

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  17. The development is described in greater detail by Vilhelm Aubert, “Law as a Way of Resolving Conflicts: The Case of a Small Industrialized Society” in Laura Nader (ed.), Law in Culture and Society (Chicago 1969 ).

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  18. See e.g. Friedman’s and Toharia’s papers in this volume, where data from U.S.A., England and Spain are presented.

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Authors

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Lawrence M. Friedman Manfred Rehbinder

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© 1976 Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH, Opladen

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Eckhoff, T. (1976). The relationship between judicial and political branches of government. In: Friedman, L.M., Rehbinder, M. (eds) Zur Soziologie des Gerichtsverfahrens (Sociology of the Judicial Process). Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, vol 4. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-96982-8_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-96982-8_2

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-322-96983-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-322-96982-8

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