Abstract
The dialogical approach to logic is not a specific logical system; it is rather a general framework having a rule-based approach to meaning (instead of a truth-functional or a model-theoretical approach) which allows different logics to be developed, combined and compared within it. The main philosophical idea behind this framework is that meaning and rationality are constituted by argumentative interaction between epistemic subjects; it has proved particularly fruitful in history of philosophy and logic. We shall here provide a brief overview of dialogues in a more intuitive approach than what is found in the rest of the book in order to give a feeling of what the dialogical framework can do and what it is aiming at.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Literature pertaining to the dialogical framework also uses the terms posits and assertions to designate what we will here call statements, that is, the act of stating a proposition within a game of giving and asking for reasons; the meaning of a statement is defined by an appropriate challenge and defence, or, in other words, how reasons for this statement can be requested, what constitutes reasons for this statement and how these reasons can be provided.
- 2.
Göran Sundholm (1997, 2001) voiced some criticism against metalogical frameworks for meaning: standard model-theoretic semantics convert semantics in a formal metamathematical object for which the syntax is linked to the meaning by attributing truth-values to each sign that is uninterpreted (formula). The language thus does not express any content but is rather conceived as a system of signs speaking of the world, provided that a metalogical adequation between the signs and the world has been defined. For more on this issue, see Chap. 6, in particular Sect. 6.1.
- 3.
- 4.
This is a Wittgensteinian principle that Hintikka explicitely adopted. The reasons for linking the dialogical framework to CTT, allowing a greater explicitation of the meaning in the object language , are thus analogous to Hintikka’s vindication for the fecundity of game-theoretic semantics (GTS) in the epistemic framework for logic, semantics, and the foundations of mathematics.
- 5.
These ranks are enough for propositional logic: P can attack the two sides of a conjunction and defend the two sides of a disjunction. If the players are playing at their best (no mistakes), then 1 is enough for O: if she has a move allowing her to win, she will choose it straightaway.
- 6.
Since the players will play alternately, all of O’s moves will be uneven numbers, whereas all of P’s moves will be even numbers. There are no exceptions.
- 7.
Expressions are not listed by following the order of the moves, but by writing an attack on a new line and the defence on the same line as the corresponding attack, thus showing when a challenge is answered.
- 8.
References
Beirlaen, M., & Fontaine, M. (2016). Inconsistency-adaptive dialogical logic. Logica Universalis, 10, 99–134.
Cardascia, P. (2016). Dialogique des matrices. Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, 6.
Clerbout, N. (2014a). First-order dialogical games and Tableaux. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43(4), 785–801.
Clerbout, N. (2014b). Étude sur quelques sémantiques dialogiques: Concepts fondamentaux et éléments de métathéorie. London: College Publications.
Clerbout, N. (2014c). Finiteness of plays and the dialogical problem of decidability. IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications, 1(1), 115–140.
Clerbout, N., Gorisse, M.-H., & Rahman, S. (2011). Context-sensitivity in Jain philosophy: A dialogical study of/Siddharsiganis commentary on the handbook of logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 40(5), 633–662.
Duthil Novaes, C. (2007). Formalizing medieval logical theories: Suppositio, consequentiae and obligationes. Netherlands: Springer.
Felscher. (1985). Dialogues as a foundation for intuitionistic logic. In D. Gabbay, F. & Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of philosophical logic (Vol. 3, pp. 341–372). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
Fontaine, M. (2013). Argumentation et engagement ontologique. Être, c’est être choisi. London: College Publications.
Keiff, L. (2007). Le Pluralisme dialogique: Approches dynamiques de l'argumentation formelle. Lille: PhD.
Keiff, L. (2009). Dialogical logic (E. N. Zalta, Ed.). Retrieved from the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-dialogical
Krabbe, E. C. (1982). Studies in dialogical logic. Rijksuniversiteit, Gröningen: PhD.
Krabbe, E. C. (1985). Formal systems of dialogue rules. Synthese, 63, 295–328.
Krabbe, E. C. (2006). Dialogue logic. In D. Gabbay & J. Woods (Eds.), Handbook of the history of logic (Vol. 7, pp. 665–704). Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier.
Lorenz, K. (2001). Basic objectives of dialogue logic in historical perspective. (S. Rahman & H. Rückert, Eds.). Synthese 127(1–2), 225–263.
Lorenz, K. (2010a). Logic, language and method: On polarities in human experiences. Berlin, Germany/New York: De Gruyter.
Lorenz, K. (2010b). Philosophische Variationen: Gesammelte Aufsätze unter Einschluss gemeinsam mit Jürgen Mittelstrass geschriebener Arbeiten zu Platon und Leibniz. Berlin, Germany/New York: De Gruyter.
Lorenzen, P., & Lorenz, K. (1978). Dialogische Logik. Damstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Magnier, S. (2013). Approche dialogique de la dynamique épistémique et de la condition juridique. London: College Publications.
Marion, M., & Rückert, H. (2015). Aristotle on universal quantification: A study from the perspective of game semantics. History and Philosophy of Logic, 37(3), 201–209.
Nzokou, G. (2013). Logique de l'argumentation dans les traditions orales africaines. London: College Publications.
Popek, A. (2012). Logical dialogues from middle ages. In C. Barés Gómez, S. Magnier, & F. J. Salguero (Eds.), Logic of knowledge. Theory and applications (pp. 223–244). London: College Publications.
Prior, A. (1960). The runabout inference-ticket. Analysis, 21, 38–39.
Rahman, S. (1993). Über Dialogue, Prologische Kategorien und andere Seltenheiten. Frankfurt, Germany/Paris, France/New York: P. Lang.
Rahman, S., & Keiff, L. (2005). On how to be a dialogician. In D. Vanderveken (Ed.), Logic, thought and action (pp. 359–408). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer.
Rahman, S., & Keiff, L. (2010). La Dialectique entre logique et rhétorique. Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 66(2), 149–178.
Rahman, S., & Redmond, J. (2015). A dialogical frame for fictions as hypothetical objects. Filosofia Unisinos, 16(1), 2–21.
Rahman, S., & Tulenheimo, T. (2009). From games to dialogues and back: Towards a general frame for validity. In O. Majer, A. Pietarinen, & T. Tulenheimo (Eds.), Games: Unifying logic, language and philosophy (pp. 153–208). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
Redmond, J. (2010). Logique dynamique de la fiction. Pour une approche dialogique. London: College Publications.
Redmond, J., & Fontaine, M. (2011). How to play dialogues: An introduction to dialogical logic. London: College Publications.
Redmond, J., & Rahman, S. (2016). Armonía Dialógica: Tonk Teoría Constructiva de Tipos y Reglas para Jugadores Anónimos. Theoria, 31(1), 27–53.
Rückert, H. (2011). Dialogues as a dynamic framework for logic. London: College Publications.
Sundholm, G. (1997). Implicit epistemic aspects of constructive logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 6(2), 191–212.
Sundholm, G. (2001). A plea for logical atavism. In O. Majer (Ed.), The logica yearbook 2000 (pp. 151–162). Prague: Filosofía.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Rahman, S., McConaughey, Z., Klev, A., Clerbout, N. (2018). Basic Notions for Dialogical Logic. In: Immanent Reasoning or Equality in Action. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91149-6_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91149-6_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-91148-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-91149-6
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)