Abstract
The electoral salience of constitutional revision has grown since 2012, but this belies the widening gulf between the public-at-large and political elites on whether and how to amend the constitution. Public opinion polls show that voters are split evenly on the necessity of revisions, but that opponents are more mobilized on this issue, as seen by the surprising success of the CDP in the 2017 election. By contrast, surveys of election candidates show mounting support for amendment, with pro-revision parties collectively accounting for two-thirds in the Diet. However, there remain significant differences on the exact topic of revision, particularly between the LDP and its coalition partner, Kōmeitō. These divisions between the public and elites leave the fate of constitutional amendment uncertain, despite the LDP’s convincing victory in 2017.
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Notes
- 1.
In January 2000, the House of Representatives (HR) and Councillors (HC) first established a Commission on the Constitution (Kenpō Chōsakai) to deliberate matters related to constitutional amendment. It is not a standing committee of the Diet, and only takes action upon formal request from political parties. Thus far, its proposals have been limited to establishing procedures for a constitutional national referendum (promulgated May 2007) and lowering the referendum voting age to 18 (promulgated June 2014).
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/index.htm.
- 2.
The LDP’s 2012 constitutional draft updated a previous version from 2005. The 2012 version (in Japanese) can be found at: https://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/news/policy/130250_1.pdf.
- 3.
Japanese constitutional scholars largely reject the illegitimacy argument, contending that the COJ’s ratification by a freely elected Diet satisfied minimal requirements for democratic constitutionalism. If anything, it could be called more democratic than the Meiji Constitution, which was imposed on the Japanese people by Meiji oligarchs without any public input. (cf. Ashibe 2015).
- 4.
The majority view among constitutional scholars is that collective self-defense is unconstitutional under Article 9. In an Asahi survey of 122 constitutional scholars, 116 responded that the Cabinet interpretation of July 2014 was not appropriate, as a Cabinet declaration can be reversed easily by a subsequent administration, producing legal instability on a matter of vital national interest. In addition, 104 responded that Heiwa Anzen Hōsei exceeded the limits of Article 9 interpretation (Asahi July 11, 2015, online edition).
- 5.
In its 2012 constitution draft, the LDP suggested a more detailed “state of emergency” provision, such as allowing the Cabinet to issue decrees that have the force of law and requiring citizens to follow government directives. For a comparative analysis of the LDP’s state of emergency proposal, see McElwain (2017).
- 6.
The full UTAS data, which received responses from 97% of all candidates (1142 out of 1180), can be found online at the Asahi Shinbun (only in Japanese). http://www.asahi.com/senkyo/asahitodai/.
- 7.
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McElwain, K.M. (2018). Constitutional Revision in the 2017 Election. In: Pekkanen, R., Reed, S., Scheiner, E., Smith, D. (eds) Japan Decides 2017. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76475-7_16
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