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A Proof Calculus for Attack Trees in Isabelle

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Data Privacy Management, Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology (DPM 2017, CBT 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10436))

Abstract

Attack trees are an important modeling formalism to identify and quantify attacks on security and privacy. They are very useful as a tool to understand step by step the ways through a system graph that lead to the violation of security policies. In this paper, we present how attacks can be refined based on the violation of a policy. To that end we provide a formal definition of attack trees in Isabelle’s Higher Order Logic: a proof calculus that defines how to refine sequences of attack steps into a valid attack. We use a notion of Kripke semantics as formal foundation that then allows to express attack goals using branching time temporal logic CTL. We illustrate the use of the mechanized Isabelle framework on the example of a privacy attack to an IoT healthcare system.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Middlesex University London, London, UK

    Florian Kammüller

  2. Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Florian Kammüller

Authors
  1. Florian Kammüller
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Correspondence to Florian Kammüller .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Télécom SudParis, Evry, France

    Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro

  2. Department of Information and Communications Engineering, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain

    Guillermo Navarro-Arribas

  3. Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Hannes Hartenstein

  4. Autonomous University of Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain

    Jordi Herrera-Joancomartí

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Kammüller, F. (2017). A Proof Calculus for Attack Trees in Isabelle. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Navarro-Arribas, G., Hartenstein, H., Herrera-Joancomartí, J. (eds) Data Privacy Management, Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology. DPM CBT 2017 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10436. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67816-0_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67816-0_1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-67815-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-67816-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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