Abstract
This chapter asks whether and in what sense(s) the un-self-centred way of being that Heidegger develops in his later writings under the description Gelassenheit parallels the Buddhist doctrine of anattā. The term Gelassenheit is adopted from Meister Eckhart, for whom it meant a relinquishing of the appropriating desire that constitutes the ordinary self. It does not per se involve a denial of the reality of the individual self in every respect. Yet Heidegger’s thought, both early and late, has been compared with Buddhist positions both because of its critique of the Cartesian notion of the self as an underlying substance, and because Gelassenheit as a way of being seems similar to Buddhist ideals of liberation that rest on seeing through the fiction of the self. At the same time, though, one should notice that Heidegger came to affirm the idea of Gelassenheit through a critical confrontation with Nietzsche, who denies the ultimate reality of the self as a single entity but nonetheless affirms the value of assertive will to power, an ideal that is the opposite of Buddhist selflessness. An exploration of these themes through a comparative focus on Heidegger and anattā helps to identify various senses in which the self could be said to “be” or exist. It also raises questions about the relation between metaphysical views on this subject and existential, ethical or soteriological ideals.
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Notes
- 1.
Reinhold May suggests that Heidegger’s understanding of the “clearing” was indebted to Leon Wieger’s interpretation of the Chinese character wu (May 1996, 31–34). I am less certain but in any case my objective in this essay is to draw conceptual comparisons rather than establish points of historical influence. Heidegger was certainly influenced by East Asian sources, however, and May provides a helpful survey of his contact with Chinese and Japanese thinkers and texts. See also Parkes 1987 , 1993.
- 2.
“BT” refers to Being and Time (Heidegger 1962); page numbers refer to the German text, cross-referenced in the margins of Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation.
- 3.
Anthony Traylor argues, on the other hand, that Heidegger acknowledges in Being and Time that Dasein is also, in a way, present-at-hand, and that in general “far from being relegated to the ontological periphery , Vorhandenheit as pure presence-at-hand stands at the epicenter of Heidegger’s problematic” (Traylor 2014, 464). However, while I agree with Traylor that a basic sense of in fact being there, common to Dasein and the things it encounters, is presupposed in Heidegger’s account but not adequately thematized, in my view this sense has to be differentiated from the concept of Vorhandenheit as intrinsically involving substantiality. It may be that this basic sense of “being” that is common to Dasein and things simply cannot be explicated, from which it would follow that the ultimate project of Being and Time, “to work out the meaning of being and to do so concretely” cannot in principle be completed.
- 4.
Heidegger is explicit on this point: “In our existential interpretation, the entity which has been presented to us as our theme has Dasein’s kind of being, and cannot be pieced together into something present-at-hand out of pieces which are present-at-hand.” (BT302)
- 5.
- 6.
See Peter Harvey’s interpretation of the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta in Harvey 2009, 268–269.
- 7.
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), John Locke discussed the question of the self’s continuity and identity in terms of personhood, describing “person” as “a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit,” and therefore applying “only to intelligent agents , capable of a law, and happiness , and misery” (Book II, Ch. 27, “Of identity and diversity,” Locke 2010–2015, 120). This dimension of the question about the “real” existence of the self remains important in current debates; see, for example, Korsgaard’s critique of Derek Parfit in Korsgaard 1989.
- 8.
- 9.
Nietzsche challenges the idea that there is any such “subject” from a number of directions, arguing in one place that “‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed” (Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, 13; Nietzsche 1989, 45).
- 10.
The following description of nirvana by Miri Albahari suggests there are: “There is a radical shift in motivational structure: no longer do such persons seek gratification from any state of affairs. Losing family or suffering illness fails to dent their equanimity. The arahant operates from a different basis: no more identifying with the ‘I’ of such situations than most of us would identify with burning leaves on a fire. Yet they still act fluently in the world – with great joy and spontaneity and compassion ” (Albahari, 79). Heidegger was himself admittedly not much like an arahant, but then Gelassenheit describes a possible way of being rather than an achievement of this particular man.
- 11.
For an extended analysis and defense of the coherence of this idea, see Framarin 2009 .
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Sikka, S. (2018). Selfless Care? Heidegger and anattā . In: Davis, G. (eds) Ethics without Self, Dharma without Atman. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67407-0_9
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