Abstract
After distinguishing between a metaphysical and a contemplative-strategy interpretation of the no-self doctrine, I argue that the latter allows for the illumination of significant and under-discussed Kantian affinities with Buddhist views of the self and moral psychology. Unlike its metaphysical counterpart, the contemplative-strategy interpretation understands the doctrine of no-self as a technique of perception undertaken from the practical standpoint of action. I argue that if we think of the contemplative-strategy version of the no-self doctrine as a process that is undertaken in order to free oneself from delusion and to see things more objectively (inter alia, in order to promote right action), then we find a clear parallel in Kant’s duty of self-knowledge, which demands that we rid ourselves of deluded moral self-descriptions. While in Buddhism the aim is a selflessness that liberates one from suffering, for Kant the aim is an agency free of the conceit that interferes with clear moral vision, sound judgement, and dutiful action. I conclude by responding to objections advanced by Charles Goodman which aim to show that the Kantian position is deeply at odds with Buddhist thinking, arguing that neither Kantian agency nor Kantian self-legislation is undermined by the doctrine of no-self.
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Notes
- 1.
As Marya Schechtman puts it: “Constructionist accounts view persons as constructs out of temporal parts, while non-constructionist accounts see these parts as abstractions from a unified person.” In Schechtman, “Diversity in unity: practical unity and personal boundaries,” Synthese, 162(3), 2008, 405–423; 406.
- 2.
Derek Parfit , Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 223.
- 3.
Christine Korsgaard , “Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit ,” in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 363–397, 371.
- 4.
“The Characteristic of Nonself,” in Bhikkhu Bodhi (trans.), The Connected Discourses of the Buddha : A Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya, (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000), 901–903. SN 22.59 (PTS: S iii 66).
- 5.
Peter Harvey , “Theravada Philosophy of Mind and the Person,” in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings, eds. William Edelglass and Jay Garfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 267.
- 6.
Ven. Thanissaro Bhikkhu argues for anattā as a “technique of perception” in “No- self or Not-self ?”, in Noble Strategy (Valley Center, Ca.: Metta Forest Monastery Publisher , 1999), 71–4.
- 7.
“Ananda (Is There a Self?)”, in Bhikkhu Bodhi (trans.), The Connected Discourses of the Buddha : A Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000) , 1393–4. SN 44.10. By “quietism ” I refer to the position in contemporary analytic philosophy that rejects the development of substantive philosophical theories, proposing instead that philosophical inquiry at best rids us of confusion, but does not provide knowledge.
- 8.
“All the taints,” in Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (trans.), The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya, 3rd edition (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2009) , 91–96.
- 9.
“Aggivacchagotta Sutta,” in Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (trans.), The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha : A Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya, 3rd edition (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2009) , 590–602.
- 10.
Richard Robinson, Willard Johnson, and Thanissaro Bhikkhu, Buddhist Religions: A Historical Introduction, 5th edition (Toronto: Wadsworth Publishing, 2005), 91.
- 11.
Śāntideva, “Excerpt from the Bodhicaryavatara” in William Edelglass and Jay Garfield eds. , Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 388–399.
- 12.
It should be noted that not all Mahāyāna approaches to the no-self doctrine are put in straightforwardly metaphysical terms. Some, relying on the doctrine of upāya , or skillful means, introduce a comprehensive strategy which acknowledges that teachings of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas will be adapted to the capacities of the hearers in order to be effective and of benefit.
- 13.
Charles Goodman , The Consequences of Compassion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 11.
- 14.
He writes: “Once we bring to bear on ethics the teaching that there are no metaphysically important differences between different sentient beings , it cannot ultimately matter whether harms are compensated by benefits to the same beings or to others; nor can it ultimately matter who it is that carries out a harmful action.” Goodman, 97 .
- 15.
I am not here claiming that Goodman cannot account for moral responsibility, just claiming that nothing about the good is entailed by the metaphysical reading of the no-self doctrine.
- 16.
Owen Flanagan makes this point in The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2011), 131.
- 17.
“Now look you, Kalamas. Be ye not misled by report or tradition or hearsay. Be not misled by proficiency in the collections, nor by mere logic or inference, nor after consideration reasons, nor after reflection on and approval of some theory, nor because it fits becoming, nor out of respect for a recluse (who holds it). But, Kalamas, when you know for yourselves: These things are unprofitable, these things are blameworthy, these things are censured by the intelligent; these things when performed and undertaken, conduce to loss and sorrow – then indeed do ye reject them, Kalamas.” See Anguttara-Nikaya, Woodward trans. (Oxford: The Pali Text Society, 2000), pp.171–172, PTS: A i 188.
- 18.
Jay Garfield discusses the similarities between Kant’s transcendental idealism and Vasubandhu’s Citta-matra Idealism in “Western Idealism through Indian Eyes ,” in his Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 152–169.
- 19.
By contrast, the Buddhist position is that it is both possible and desirable to attain access to a dimension unfabricated by the mind .
- 20.
Immanuel Kant , Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), B404/A346.
- 21.
Critique of Pure Reason, B131–2.
- 22.
Critique of Pure Reason, A811/B839.
- 23.
Andrews Reath , for example, clearly distinguishes “secular” and “theological” interpretation of the highest good as presented across Kant’s works. “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 26(4), 1988, 593–619.
- 24.
Immanuel Kant , “The End of All Things,” in Religion and Rational Theology , trans. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), AK 8: 335.
- 25.
See the Spinoza chapter (ch. 5) in this volume for a discussion of related issues.
- 26.
Kant , Critique of Pure Reason, B420.
- 27.
Immanuel Kant , The Metaphysics of Morals , Trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), AK 6:386.
- 28.
The Metaphysics of Morals , AK 6:441.
- 29.
Immanuel Kant , Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Robert Louden, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), AK 7:133.
- 30.
Immanuel Kant , Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath, eds. Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), AK 27:365.
- 31.
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , trans. Mary Gregor , (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), AK 4:408.
- 32.
Immanuel Kant , Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), AK 5:85.
- 33.
The Metaphysics of Morals , AK 6:457.
- 34.
I have argued for this in “Kant and the Buddha on Self-Knowledge,” in Stephen R. Palmquist (ed.), Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 695–708.
- 35.
Goodman, 201 .
- 36.
Wuerth argues that thinkers like Henry Sidgwick and Christine Korsgaard have failed to properly mark Kant’s distinction between Wille and Willkur, and that this has led to confusion about Kant’s position. “Sense and Sensibility in Kant’s Practical Agent : Against the Intellectualism of Korsgaard and Sidgwick,” European Journal of Philosophy, 21(1), 2010, 1–36.
- 37.
As Mark Siderits notes, the reductionist version of the no-self doctrine denies that persons are completely distinct existences but does not deny the distinctness of the causal series that a person may experience as herself. So it makes sense to designate one series as me and the other as you by reference to the relations between earlier and later parts of the series. See Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2007), 83.
- 38.
This form of identity is practical in that it marks “a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.” Christine Korsgaard , The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 101.
- 39.
Goodman, 211 .
- 40.
Goodman, 213 .
- 41.
Goodman, 212 .
References
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———. 1991. The Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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———. 2006. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Trans. Robert Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reath, Andrews. 1988. Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant. Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (4): 593–619.
Robinson, R., W. Johnson, and Thanissaro Bhikkhu. 2005. Buddhist Religions: A Historical Introduction. 5th ed. Toronto: Wadsworth Publishing.
Sāntideva. 2009. Excerpt from the Bodhicaryāvatāra. In Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings, ed. William Edelglass and Jay Garfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schechtman, Marya. 2008. Diversity in unity: practical unity and personal boundaries. Synthese 162 (3): 405–423.
Siderits, Mark. 2007. Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Thanissaro, Bhikkhu. 1999. Noble Strategy. Valley Center: Metta Forest Monastery Publisher.
Wuerth, Julian. 2010. Sense and Sensibility in Kant’s Practical Agent: Against the Intellectualism of Korsgaard and Sidgwick. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1).
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O’Hagan, E. (2018). Anattā and Ethics: Kantian and Buddhist Themes. In: Davis, G. (eds) Ethics without Self, Dharma without Atman. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67407-0_7
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