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How to Be a Pluralist About Disagreement

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Epistemic Pluralism

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

There has been little focus on what it means for disagreement to manifest itself in a variety of ways, and how these various forms of disagreement might relate to each other. In this chapter, I focus on doxastic disagreements. I examine four different ways that doxastic disagreement can present itself: descriptive disagreement , conceptual disagreement , full disagreement and credal disagreement . Pluralism is one way to resolve issues concerning doxastic disagreement . One such pluralist account, developed out of John MacFarlane ’s work, is disjunctive pluralism . I criticise Disjunctive Pluralism and argue for an alternative pluralist theory of disagreement that I call kinship pluralism . Moreover, I argue that kinship pluralism can be adequately extended to other varieties of disagreement , namely group and agnostic disagreement .

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Acknowledgments

I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO) under grant agreement #FFI2016–80588-R, the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 programme under grant agreement H2020-MSCA-ITN-2015-675415, and the Juan de la Cierva postdoctoral fellowship programme. Special thanks are due to Delia Belleri, Annalisa Coliva, and Sven Rosenkranz for discussion of various parts of this material.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, 08001, Spain

    Michele Palmira

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  1. Michele Palmira
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Correspondence to Michele Palmira .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California Irvine, Irvine, California, USA

    Annalisa Coliva

  2. Yonsey International Campus, Underwood International College, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

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Palmira, M. (2017). How to Be a Pluralist About Disagreement. In: Coliva, A., Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, N. (eds) Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_11

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