Abstract
This chapter outlines the current conjuncture in Nicaragua and focuses in particular on struggles for Caribbean Coast autonomy in the face of growing mestizo hostility and intensified migratory pressures within the region. It also outlines key changes within both official Nicaraguan and grassroots media. While the government has undertaken serious efforts to undermine the freedom and independence of media in Nicaragua, citizens and activists are developing and deploying innovative media tactics of their own.
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Notes
- 1.
Hooker (2005b) has charted the historical shifts and continuities in official mestizo nationalisms in Nicaragua, focusing on three key variants: the vanguardismo of the 1930s, Sandinismo of the 1960s, and mestizo multiculturalism of the 1990s. While these three types show key continuities, there are also significant differences in emphasis, particularly with respect to understanding the nature of the encounter between Europeans and indigenous peoples. What her work reveals is that mestizo nationalism is extremely resilient and obstructs full citizenship for black and indigenous Costeños, but that it is also amenable to change.
- 2.
The two regions are now called the Región Autónoma de la Costa Caribe Norte/Autonomous Region of the North Caribbean Coast (RACCN), and the Región Autónoma de la Costa Caribe Sur/Autonomous Region of the South Caribbean Coast (RACCS). After the passage of the autonomy law, they were named Región Autónoma del Atlántico Norte/Autonomous Region of the North Atlantic (RAAN) and Región Autónoma del Atlántico Sur/Autonomous Region of the South Atlantic (RAAS). During the Somoza dictatorship, the two regions were collectively referred to as Zelaya. During the colonial era, the region was referred to as La Mosquitia. Today, as a result of frequent name changes, Costeños refer to their region as the Atlantic Coast, the Caribbean Coast and La Mosquitia, in addition to using the terms RAAN and RAAS. The term Zelaya is still used, but much less frequently.
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- 4.
With respect to the Standard of Living Survey (Encuesta de Medición de Nivel de Vida 2014, available here: http://www.inide.gob.ni/), Enrique Sáenz (2015) notes that the general and extreme poverty lines used by the government in 2015 are the same as they were in 1993, when per capita GDP was one-fifth of the current level. The definition of extreme and general poverty of C$30 a day (around US$1.10) and C$45 a day (around US$1.70), respectively, is less than half of that set by the World Bank, which defines moderate poverty as less than US$4 a day and extreme poverty as less than US$2.25 a day. The alleged fall in poverty can also be attributed more to the reduction in numbers of people per household (which has been fuelled largely by outmigration), to an increase in foreign remittances, and to the growth of the percentage of the population that is of working age, than to Sandinista poverty reduction programmes (see also Olivares 2015b).
- 5.
In 2007, for example, Margine Gutiérrez, former director of the Nicaraguan Institute of Culture, lost her job when she publicly criticized Daniel Ortega for gifting two original manuscripts authored by Rubén Darío, Nicaragua’s most important poet, to Hugo Chávez. In 2013, Sandinista deputy, Xochilt Ocampo, was stripped of her seat in the National Assembly when she abstained from voting on the interoceanic canal (Belli Pereira 2013; El Nuevo Diario 2013). At times, the dismissals appear to be enacted to punish minor acts of party disloyalty. In March 2017, two successive secretaries to the municipal council from San Juan del Sur were removed from their positions, the first for attending a school inauguration where the special guest was leading Nicaraguan author and Sandinista dissident, Sergio Ramírez, and the second for appearing on Facebook in a photo with the US ambassador, Laura Dogu (Villareal 2017a, 2017b).
- 6.
The Boston University School of Public Health has been investigating this epidemic since 2009, and published results in 2015 showing that “occupational factors” likely play a role in the epidemic, but that their study “did not find support for the hypothesis that agricultural chemicals are a causal agent for kidney disease. Instead, among field-workers, agrichemical applicators, who have the most direct contact with chemicals, were found to experience the smallest decline in kidney function.” However, the BU researchers also wrote that the use of agricultural chemicals “remain[s] an important hypothesis and warrant[s] further study” (Chedekel 2015).
- 7.
Confidencial publishes a weekly print version that is circulated in Managua. Barricada folded in 1998.
- 8.
At the start of the 2016 election campaign, there was an attempt to control social media interventions, a move that was roundly condemned and rapidly abandoned (López 2016).
- 9.
According to interworldstats.com, 27% of Nicaraguans had access to the Internet in 2015, compared with a Central American average of 46.8%. In 2016, access to the Internet by Nicaraguans had risen to 31.8% (against a Central American regional average of 53%), according to the same source (accessed 9 Dec. 2016).
- 10.
The closure of Kabu Yula was also reported in a WikiLeaks cable. See www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MANAGUA959_a.html.
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Cupples, J., Glynn, K. (2018). Constructing the Nicaraguan Conjuncture. In: Shifting Nicaraguan Mediascapes. SpringerBriefs in Latin American Studies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64319-9_3
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