Abstract
This chapter analyses Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) attempts to deal with security threats in the wake of the Syrian crisis and the implications for relations with Lebanon’s Sunni community. Examining incidents where the LAF has been accused of targeting and conspiring to kill Sunni clerics, the authors analyse the growing discontent among Lebanese Sunnis who are opposed to the military role of Hizbollah in Syria. Since the 2011 Syrian revolt, the LAF has been accused of being a partisan institution, reflecting the growing influence of militant jihadist movements targeting the army. The lack of a national defence strategy has forced the army to intervene on a case-by-case basis in a context of sectarian unrest. However, in contrast to the situation in Shia-majority areas controlled by one dominant actor, Hizbollah, the Sunni ‘scene’ emerges as more fragmented.
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Notes
- 1.
Saudi Arabia had pledged a USD 3 billion donation of French military equipment in 2013, and another billion dollars of emergency relief to the army in August 2014. Both pledges were withdrawn in early 2016 because of the growing Saudi–Iranian tensions. However, the USA has stepped up its military assistance since 2011 (Moussa, 2014, p. 490). See also Chapter 1 (this volume).
- 2.
The Army Intelligence (mukhabarat al-jaysh) is the intelligence service of the LAF. Its leader is always a Maronite Christian, as is also the case with the army commander. In March 2016, Brigadier General Camille Daher, formerly head of the office of army commander Jean Kahwaji, was appointed to the position. The Directorate of General Security (GS) is in charge of surveillance of Lebanon’s borders. It is headed by Major General Abbas Ibrahim, a Shia who is considered close to Hizbollah. Prior to the appointment of Jamil al-Sayyd as GS Director-General (1998–2005), the institution had always been headed by a Christian. The State Security Forces are mainly responsible for the protection of state personnel. They are led by Brigadier General Tony Saliba, who is close to President Michel Aoun. Prior to that, they were led by General George Karaa, a Greek Orthodox who was in conflict with his deputy, Mohammad Tufaily, a Shia. The Internal Security Forces (ISF) correspond to the police and gendarmerie. Although the institution has traditionally been headed by a Sunni, it was between 2013 and 2017 headed by Major General Ibrahim Basbous, who is Greek Orthodox. General Imad Othman, a Sunni close to Prime Minister Saad Hariri, was appointed head of the ISF in March 2017, as part of a larger deal in which army commander Joseph Aoun was also invested. The Information Branch of the ISF was created in the 1990s and was given responsibility and vast resources for investigating the Hariri assassination after 2005. It is funded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE; and its servicemen are trained in France and the USA, see Nerguizian (2015, pp. 110–122). The Information Branch was used as a tool by the Future Movement to establish political control in Sunni areas. Its role has diminished after former Information Branch head, Brigader General Wissam al-Hassan was assassinated in October 2012. Recently, the Information Branch has been put under the authority of the head of the ISF. See Macaron 2017.
- 3.
The National Dialogue sessions were launched in 2006 to find solutions to the paralysis of the Lebanese political system.
- 4.
The party’s support to the Assad regime was evident from the beginning of the uprising; the first funeral service of a Hizbollah commander killed in Syria was held in August 2012. Its military engagement was acknowledged by its General Secretary, Hassan Hasrallah, in April 2013, during the battle of al-Qusayr, a Syrian border town (Le Monde, 2013).
- 5.
Journalist Fidaa Itani, a specialist on Jihadi movements, estimated in March 2016 the number of Lebanese to have gone to Syria not to exceed 900. Personal communication, Beirut, August 2016.
- 6.
Quintan Wiktorowicz provides the most widely cited definition of Salafism: Salafis are distinguished by their common creed (‘aqida), which centres on strict adherence to the principle of Tawhid (the oneness of Allah) and their rejection of human reasoning and logics (Wiktorowicz, 2006, p. 207). Salafi jihadism is the current established by Abdallah Azzam and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and which crystallized into the al-Qaeda movement. (Kepel and Milelli, 2009).
- 7.
We note the existence of Sunni notables competing with the Future Movement, who are not among the populists or the Salafis, but for simplicity reasons we will not focus on them here.
- 8.
The Taif Agreement gave Syria responsibility for assisting the army to regain control over territory.
- 9.
General Michel Aoun, who spent 15 years in exile in France after fighting a ‘war of liberation’ against Syria from 1988 to 1990, is the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). He was elected President of Lebanon in October 2016.
- 10.
Muin Merhabi, interview, Sunni MP from Akkar, Beirut, February 2015. General Joseph Aoun was appointed Commander of the LAF in March 2017.
- 11.
Lebanese general, interview, Beirut, December 2014.
- 12.
The army intelligence chief is appointed by the army commander.
- 13.
Amer al-Hassan is the cousin of Wissam al-Hassan, a Sunni from Koura near Tripoli, who headed the Information Branch of the ISF and who was assassinated in October 2012.
- 14.
High-level security source, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 15.
The popularity gained from the Nahr al-Bared crisis helped propel army commander Michel Suleiman’s candidacy to the presidency.
- 16.
Misbah al-Ahdab, interview, former Sunni MP from Tripoli, Beirut, February 2015; Houssam Sbat, sheikh and professor, interview, Lebanese University, Tripoli, February 2015; (Daily Star, 2015b).
- 17.
Sunni figure in Bab al-Tabbaneh, interview, Tripoli, March 2016.
- 18.
Sunni figure in Bab al-Tabbaneh, interview, Tripoli, March 2016.
- 19.
Sunni figure in Bab al-Tabbaneh, interview, Tripoli, March 2016.
- 20.
Interviews, Tripoli, 2015/2016.
- 21.
When a security plan was implemented in the Beqaa, those arrested were mainly petty criminals.
- 22.
Daily Star (2015a). A group calling itself the ‘Kuwaikhat group’ (after the place where sheikh Abdel-Wahid was assassinated) assumed responsibility for the assassination of Badr Eid.
- 23.
Muin Merhabi, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 24.
Khaled Daher, Sunni MP from al-Dinniyeh, press conference, 20 May 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IaqlsKjMZ0Q (accessed December 2016)
- 25.
Samir Frangie, Lebanese intellectual and Maronite politician, one of the founders of the 14 March alliance, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 26.
He had taken the control of the mosque in 1996 (Meier, 2014, p. 58)
- 27.
Accessible through this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fIKeEe1VNvo. The word shabbiha means thugs and alludes to the pro-Assad thugs used to repress demonstrations in early in the Syrian uprising (accessed December 2016).
- 28.
The fatal shooting of Maarouf Saad, an MP, during a demonstration in Sidon in February 1975, is considered one of the triggers of the civil war.
- 29.
Zaynab, daughter of Imam Ali and grand-daughter of prophet Muhammad, is a key figure in Shiism (Mervin 1996, p. 22).
- 30.
Retired Lebanese General, interview, Bain militaire, Beirut, 29 July 2013.
- 31.
Muin Merhabi, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 32.
Imad Ahmad Jomaa, the leader of the Fajr al-Islam Brigade, constituted about 300–400 men.
- 33.
The 16 Lebanese soldiers and policemen held by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (what was then known as al-Nusra Front) were freed, in exchange for 13 Islamist prisoners in Lebanese jails, see Nour Samaha, 2015. ‘Lebanese army and Nusra conduct prisoner swap’, (al-Jazeera, 2 December 2015).
- 34.
Muin Merhabi, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 35.
Lebanese general, interview, Beirut, December 2014.
- 36.
Muin Merhabi, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 37.
Muin Merhabi, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 38.
- 39.
Mustafa Alloush, Sunni MP from Tripoli, interview, Tripoli, February 2015.
- 40.
Mustafa Alloush, interview, Tripoli, February 2015.
- 41.
Mustafa Alloush, interview, Tripoli, February 2015.
- 42.
Ashraf Rifi, Minister of Justice and former head of the ISF, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 43.
Unlike the Future Movement, populists like Merhabi and Daher maintained that exposing the mistakes of the LAF would force it to reform. They argued that since the army command and the parliamentary Defence Committee had failed to respond to their requests in private, they ‘did not find any other channels than the media to put pressure and make changes’.
- 44.
Sheikh in Dar al-Fatwa, interview, Tripoli, February 2015.
- 45.
Sheikh in Dar al-Fatwa, interview, Tripoli, February 2015.
- 46.
Muin Merhabi, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 47.
Muin Merhabi, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 48.
Khaled Daher, interview, Tripoli, February 2015.
- 49.
This was a part of a campaign to remove political symbols, initiated by Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk, a Sunni and member of the Future Movement, in January.
- 50.
Sheikh in Dar al-Fatwa, interview, Tripoli, February 2015.
- 51.
Sheikh in Dar al-Fatwa, interview, Tripoli, February 2015.
- 52.
Samir Frangie, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 53.
There were a few episodes of individual Sunni defections between 2012 and 2015, but they remained very limited (Kullab, 2014).
- 54.
The impact of Saad Hariri’s return to the premiership in December 2016 is still unclear at the time of writing (Spring 2017).
- 55.
Interviews with March 14 Muslim and Christian leaders from North Lebanon, 2013–2015.
- 56.
Azzam al-Ayubi, Secretary General of the Lebanon branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 57.
Azzam Ayoubi, interview, Beirut, February 2015.
- 58.
Rifi’s resignation was not accepted, in the absence of a president, so he remained in charge of the Ministry of Justice.
- 59.
Ashraf Rifi, personal communication, Oslo, June 2016. See also (L’Orient-le Jour, 2016L’Orient-le Jour, 2016).
- 60.
Interviews, Beirut, March 2016.
- 61.
In February 2016, Saudi Arabia withdrew its pledge of USD 4 billion of military aid.
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Gade, T., Moussa, N. (2017). The Lebanese Army After the Syrian Crisis: Alienating the Sunni Community?. In: Knudsen, A., Gade, T. (eds) Civil-Military Relations in Lebanon. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55167-8_2
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