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Science in Diplomatic Apparatus: The Diversity of National Approaches

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Science and Diplomacy

Part of the book series: Science, Technology and Innovation Studies ((STAIS))

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Abstract

How is science diplomacy taken into consideration and implemented in diplomatic apparatus? To answer these questions, we turn to an examination of science diplomacy of five major European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, United Kingdom), three developed countries outside Europe (Canada, Japan, United States), two emerging countries (China, India) and Russia.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    However, attachés did not disappear from the vocabulary of French embassies, where an “attaché pour la science et la technologie” is acting as a deputy science counselor.

  2. 2.

    This little studied topic was discussed in a report commissioned in 2008 by the German ministry of foreign affairs; it was prepared by the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) and issued in April 2009 under the title Aufgabenkritische Analyse deutscher Aussenwissenschaftspolitik (AWP) in sechs ausgewählten Zielländern. An article was adapted from it by Flink and Schreiterer (2010). A comparative analysis of national scientific networks is also available in Berg L.-P. (2010).

  3. 3.

    Likewise, we do not take into account foreign bases intended to promote student mobility, such as those of Campus France or the German DAAD. We do not consider either establishments primarily devoted to the dissemination of the language and culture, such as the Goethe Institute or the Confucius Institute.

  4. 4.

    A position held since its creation by physicist Catherine Bréchignac, Permanent Secretary of the French Academy of Sciences. Her mission is to promote French scientific and technological excellence and to support the country’s research strategy internationally.

  5. 5.

    Canada, China, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, Spain, United Kingdom, United States of America.

  6. 6.

    With ten regional offices all located in developing countries, the French Agricultural Research Centre for International Development (CIRAD) is another vector of French influence in the South.

  7. 7.

    “Germany wants to become the driver of European strategy development in research and innovation policy”, Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2008), p. 27. The official communication introduces also the “High-Tech Strategy” as a “model for Europe”. See for example the brochure Germany Inspires Innovation—Welcome to Europe’s leader in Science of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

  8. 8.

    See note 2 above.

  9. 9.

    The table does not include locally recruited employees.

  10. 10.

    With offices in Moscow, New Delhi, New York, Tokyo and Washington, and a Sino-German Center for Research Promoting in Beijing.

  11. 11.

    In China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, South Korea and United Arab Emirates. Fraunhofer also has liaison offices in Austria, Brazil, India and Malaysia. It also created six institutes in the United States and three in Europe (Roy 2010, 2012). S. Roy, “Le positionnement international de la Fraunhofer” note of the Service for Science and Technology of the Embassy of France in Germany, March 10, 2010; Roy S., “Partenariat à l’international des différents organismes de recherche et agences de financement allemands” note the Service for Science and Technology of the Embassy of France in Germany, January 9, 2012.

  12. 12.

    For example, the German House of Research and Innovation in São Paulo includes the representations of the following institutions: Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (AvH); CLIB 2021—Cluster Industrial Biotechnology eV; Academic Exchange Service (DAAD); German Research Foundation (DFG); Freie Universität Berlin; Georg-August-UniversitätGöttingen, Technical University of Munich (TUM); UAS 7—German Universities of Applied Sciences University Alliance Metropolis Ruhr (UMAR); TASK—The Centre of Competence for Soil, Groundwater and Site Revitalisation of the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ); WestfalianWilhelms-University of Münster.

  13. 13.

    25% of them go to the USA, 20% to Great Britain, 16% to France (where they generally represent the biggest part of foreign researchers at the national Center for Scientific Research, with about 14% of the total). See La Repubblica, March 5, 2013.

  14. 14.

    The Federal Council delivers messages every 4 years on the international promotion of education, research and innovation. In 2010, the Federal Council issued its vision of the international strategy in the fields of education, research and innovation. See Internationale Strategie der Schweiz im Bereich Bildung, Forschung und Innovation, www.sbf.admin.ch/bfi-international.pdf.

  15. 15.

    It is worth mentioning a remarkable feature of the Swiss scientific diplomacy: scientific neutrality has been “put to work to the benefit of the political neutrality of Switzerland during the Cold War”. This strategy guided “the participation of Switzerland in the establishment of three international organizations for scientific research at European level: the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in 1953, the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) in 1961 and the European Molecular Biology Conference (EMBC) in 1969” (Strasser and Joye 2005, p. 61).

  16. 16.

    Sir Mark Walport, a physician, has served in this position since 2013.

  17. 17.

    Irrespective of qualifications: counselors and attachés, but also assistants and translators. Some jobs may be only part-time. The figures in this table cannot be compared to those given about other countries in this chapter, which relate only to the expatriate workforce.

  18. 18.

    There are also the resources of the British Council, which has a budget dedicated to science of £8–10 million and a team of four scientific advisers (Embassy of France in the United Kingdom 2011).

  19. 19.

    The ministry of foreign affairs was renamed Global Affairs Canada in 2015.

  20. 20.

    For 22 research disciplines, the share of China and South Korea in world publications has increased since the early 2000s, while that of Japan has declined (Sunami et al. 2013).

  21. 21.

    Ibid. See also The New Growth Strategy: Blueprint for Revitalizing Japan, issued by the Cabinet in June 2010. http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/economy/growth/report20100618.pdf.

  22. 22.

    In that respect, a “Strategic Program for Building an Asian Science and Technology Community”, operated by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) was launched in 2006, with the support of the Special Coordination Funds for Promoting Science and Technology, and covering the period 2006–2010.

  23. 23.

    The e-Asia Joint Research Program, which is at the heart of this initiative, was launched in Singapore in 2012.

  24. 24.

    Data from 2012.

  25. 25.

    John Holdren, a specialist in environmental sciences, was nominated to this position in 2014.

  26. 26.

    The Office of the Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary (STAS), http://www.state.gov/e/stas/.

  27. 27.

    In September 2015, the post was confided to Vaughan Turekian, former director of international relations of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

  28. 28.

    Valuable information on the implementation of scientific advisors network in US embassies are given by Wilton Lexow, head of the CIA’s Applied Sciences Division, in an internal memo written in 1966 and declassified in 1994 under the title The science attaché program. See also Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch 1955.

  29. 29.

    At the same time, 25 countries used a science counselor in their embassy in Washington (1960).

  30. 30.

    These regional hubs are located in: Accra, Addis Ababa, Amman; Gaborone; Lima, San Jose; Astana, Bangkok, Kathmandu; Budapest, Copenhagen; Suva. ESTH officers network’s activities are regularly described in reports that the Department of State publishes on its website: http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/sciencediplomacy.

  31. 31.

    Between 2006 and 2010, the Chinese international science and technology cooperation program has funded 1728 projects, totaling 4.38 billion yuan (486 million euros). Over 3600 foreign researchers have received aid from the Chinese government, via four specifically dedicated major national programs.

  32. 32.

    http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/organization/Mission/index.htm.

  33. 33.

    Official website: http://www.dst.gov.in.

  34. 34.

    In official terms, Rossotrudnichestvo is “the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, compatriots living abroad, and international humanitarian cooperation”.

  35. 35.

    In 1941 the first British science officer was appointed abroad: the grandson of Charles Darwin became director of the Central Scientific Office in Washington. In 1942, Joseph Needham, a member of the Royal Society, was appointed head of the British Scientific Mission in China (Royal Society and AAAS 2010).

  36. 36.

    We hesitate to include Russia in the leading group, given the very special nature of its scientific network.

  37. 37.

    Thus, in Germany, a country where researchers are generally very reluctant to coordinate with the government, little more can be done officially than to call for all those acting internationally to “work together” (Federal Ministry of Education and Research 2008).

  38. 38.

    In France, the issue of coordination of diplomatic science networks, and more generally of networks of the state and of public operators abroad, was discussed in two recent evaluation reports: the report of the General Inspectorate of Finance and the General Inspectorate of Foreign Affairs (2013), already mentioned, and the joint report of the Ministère de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche and the Ministère des affaires étrangères (2014).

  39. 39.

    In the UK, funds for research are allocated through seven councils, federated within the RCUK.

  40. 40.

    The number of ministry and other government body officials with scientific or engineering training is about 3500, including more than 700 areas of expertise. They gather in a Group of Government Scientists and Engineers.

  41. 41.

    Since 1989 Australia has a chief scientist who advises the Prime Minister and other ministers. Israel has a chief scientist at the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor. The position of ambassador for science also exists in South Korea.

  42. 42.

    There is in Japan a reluctance to entrust high-profile scientists with political or administrative responsibility. More generally, “most Japanese political leaders do not perceive S&T as a useful instrument for foreign policy. Even if they do, they rarely mention it in international fora” (Sunami et al. 2013).

  43. 43.

    “90% of science counselors and attachés for university and scientific cooperation come from universities and research institutes placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education and Research” (Ministère de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche et Ministère des affaires étrangères 2014, p. 27).

  44. 44.

    This has not always been so: in the years 1950–1960, the American advisers were all senior scientists (Lexow 1966).

  45. 45.

    In 2011, this was the case for about half of the personal of the British Science and Innovation network (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills—Foreign Commonwealth Office 2012).

  46. 46.

    We leave aside China, India and Russia in these comments.

  47. 47.

    The British Science and Innovation Network also has a strong orientation towards innovation. The focus on innovation appears in the name of the ministry responsible for research and supervision on the scientific network (Department of Business, Innovation and Skills) and in the title of the strategic document (“Innovation and Research Strategy for Growth”). The Science and Innovation Network also has close ties in the field with the UK Trade and Investment department.

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  1. Faculty of International Affairs, University of Le Havre, Le Havre, France

    Pierre-Bruno Ruffini

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Ruffini, PB. (2017). Science in Diplomatic Apparatus: The Diversity of National Approaches. In: Science and Diplomacy. Science, Technology and Innovation Studies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55104-3_4

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