Abstract
In The Uses of Argument (1958), Stephen Toulmin proposed a new, dialectically grounded structure for the layout of arguments, replacing the old terminology of “premiss” and “conclusion” with a new set of terms: claim, data (later “grounds”), warrant, modal qualifier, rebuttal, backing. Toulmin’s scheme has been widely adopted in the discipline of speech communication, especially in the United States. In this paper I focus on one component of the scheme, the concept of a warrant. I argue that those who have adopted Toulmin’s scheme have often distorted the concept of warrant in a way which destroys what is distinctive and worthwhile about it. And I respond to criticisms of the concept by van Eemeren et al. (The study of argumentation. Irvington, New York, 1984), Johnson (The rise of informal logic, pp. 116–152, Newport News, Vale Press 1996) and Freeman (Dialectics and the macrostructure of arguments: A theory of argument structure. Foris, Berlin, 1991). Their criticisms show the need for some revision of Toulmin’s position, but his basic concept of warrant, I shall argue, should be retained as a central concept for the evaluation of arguments.
Bibliographical note: This chapter was previously published under the same title in Anyone who has a view: Theoretical contributions to the study of argument, Argumentation Library volume 8 (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 2003), 69–82. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Republished with permission of Springer. An earlier version of the chapter was presented in 2002 at the Fifth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation in Amsterdam and subsequently published in Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, ed. Frans H. van Eemeren, J. Anthony Blair, Charles A. Willard, and A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans (Amsterdam: Sic Sat, 2003), 485–490.
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Notes
- 1.
“Propositions of this kind I shall call warrants (W) … our warrant will now be some such statement as … the relevant laws give us a warrant to draw this conclusion.” (Toulmin 1958, pp. 98–100) “Such a general, step-authorizing statement is called a warrant … the difference between grounds and warrants (facts and rules) is a functional difference.” (Toulmin et al. 1984, pp. 46–47; italics in original).
- 2.
Proof: Suppose not. Then the implicit premiss is compatible with the opposite, i.e. with the proposition that the premisses are true and the conclusion false. Hence the expanded argument with this implicit premiss made explicit will not be formally valid. QED
I formulate the logical minimum in terms of the negation of a conjunction (construing both negation and conjunction truth-functionally, in the classical sense) rather than in terms of a conditional, because the semantics of the indicative conditional are a matter of dispute. The logical minimum is equivalent to a truth-functionally defined Philonian or “material” conditional.
- 3.
For the distinction between needed “gap-filling” assumptions and used “gap-filling” assumptions, see (Ennis 1982).
- 4.
Verheij (2006) describes Toulmin as inconsistent in occasionally seeming to refer to an instance of a conditional statement (i.e. an ungeneralized particular conditional) as a warrant. Verheij notes that elsewhere Toulmin unambiguously emphasizes the generality of warrants.
- 5.
From left to right: Suppose that, given that a man born in Bermuda has some property P, you may take it that Harry has property P. Then in particular, given that a man born in Bermuda was born in Bermuda, you may take it that Harry was born in Bermuda. But obviously a man born in Bermuda was born in Bermuda. Therefore Harry was born in Bermuda.
From right to left: Suppose that Harry was born in Bermuda. Suppose that, for some arbitrary property P, a man born in Bermuda has some property P. Then Harry has property P. By conditionalization, for an arbitrary property P, if a man born in Bermuda has some property P, then Harry has property P. Hence, since P was an arbitrary property, if a man born in Bermuda has some property P, then Harry has property P. QED.
- 6.
Proof: Left to right: Suppose that, if some proposition p is true if Mary is coming, then you may take it that p is true. Then, in particular, if it is true that Mary is coming if Mary is coming, then you may take it that Mary is coming. But obviously, if Mary is coming, then it is true that Mary is coming. Hence Mary is coming.
Right to left: Suppose that Mary is coming. Now suppose that an arbitrary proposition p is true if Mary is coming. Then p is true. Hence, by conditionalization, if an arbitrary proposition p is true if Mary is coming, then p is true. Hence, in general, if some proposition p is true if Mary is coming, then p is true. QED.
- 7.
This is Toulmin ’s example. Freeman actually proposes the example: “If Mary is coming to the party, John won’t. Mary is coming to the party. So John won’t.” But the conditional statement in this argument is not a candidate for a warrant, because it is not general. If someone actually propounded this argument, its warrant on Toulmin’s analysis would be purely formal: A true conditional with a true antecedent has a true consequent. This is just modus ponendo ponens.
- 8.
In what Toulmin calls a “more candid” form: For any propositions p and q, given that your car is starting to skid on an icy road, and your car won’t turn if p, and p if you do q, you may take it that you are not to do q. This is logically equivalent to the injunction not to do anything that will prevent your wheels from turning if your car starts to skid on an icy road.
- 9.
The example comes from the sample of 50 arguments previously mentioned, i.e. from Hitchcock (2002b).
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Hitchcock, D. (2017). Toulmin’s Warrants. In: On Reasoning and Argument. Argumentation Library, vol 30. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53562-3_6
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